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Investigation into Workplace Culture for Medication Error Reporting in
Pharmacy
Tamala Lavelle Gulley
ABSTRACT
     This study determined impacts on reported medication errors in
pharmacy by analyzing the culture in an undisclosed pharmacy in Florida.  SPSS
Statistical Software was used to determine the relationship between medication
errors and workplace culture.  Workplace culture was analyzed by distributing a
43-question culture survey to the pharmacists.  There were two treatment
groups, Control and Intervention, and the culture survey was two-fold, pre-survey
and post-survey, utilizing identical questions to note the difference in a
comparative analysis.  During the pre-survey, the pharmacists in the Intervention
Group received an informational sheet which contained information on a non-
punitive culture as well as information about the National Practitioner Databank.
The data were collected, compiled into an Excel spreadsheet, and statistically
analyzed using SPSS to test the effect due to time (pre versus post intervention),
treatment group (control versus intervention) and the interaction between time
and treatment group.  Of primary interest was knowing if the change from pre to
post was significantly different for the two treatment groups using a statistical
significance of 0.05.
viii
There was a 26.7% increase in the total number of medication errors
reported from pre to post survey as compared to the number of reported
medication errors for the prior year.  It was determined that organizational culture
plays a role in the moral make-up of its individuals.  Additionally, it was
determined that a multi-culture approach was needed to develop a non-punitive
culture. Developing a non-punitive culture in pharmacies across the United
States is essential to accurate reporting of medication errors.
This study will showcase a few attributes - survey development, culture
assessment, and culture development - held by Industrial Engineers. Although
this study focuses primarily on pharmacy services, very few healthcare facilities
employee industrial engineers.  Hopefully, this study will be a gateway for
industrial engineers to enter into the healthcare industry.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
In the shame/blame environment, where errors are
seen as a form of personal moral failure that shatters
the culture of infallibility inculcated in physicians since
the first day of professional training, the physician’s
ultimate fear-“losing face” in front of one’s peers.
                    A. Wu,
                                                           Medical Error: The Second Victim.
British Medical Journal 320: p726-727, 2000
1.1 Introduction
Medication errors are commonplace in pharmacies in the commercial,
military, and community sector.  In the past, the reporting of medication errors
was limited to the facility in which the error occurred.  There were no governing
boards to verify the credentials of the pharmacists nor were there any reporting
agencies to report the medication errors, and no mandatory reporting laws.
However, as medication errors began to get the media attention, agencies that
governed patient safety began to emerge.   It was not until 1997 when
medication errors were specifically addressed when Representative William
Coyne (Democrat, Pennsylvania) introduced the Safe Medications Act of 1997
(See Appendix A).  This was the first bill that addressed the reporting of
medication errors, although it only pertained to the occurrence of death.  As an
2incentive for reporting the death-related medication error, (1) the healthcare
facility avoided a $15,000 fine for each unreported death, and (2) the healthcare
facility would continue to receive Medicare and state healthcare payments.
Until recently, the majority of the research focused on the individual that
made the error and not the organization.  According to a comment made by a
pharmacist, pharmacists were considered incompetent and dismissed from
employment if the pharmacist had made three medication errors.  In other words,
if the pharmacist wanted to keep the job, then some action needed to be taken
so the employer would not find out.  The reluctance to reveal the medical error
stems from various motives: loyalty to one’s peers, the shame associated with
making and admitting a mistake, and fear of reprisal (Haddad, 2001).  The fear of
retaliation, loyalty and shame are only part of the reluctance to reveal a medical
error.
The 2004 Institute of Medicine report notes that nurses are educated to
believe that clinical perfection is an attainable goal, and that "good" nurses do not
make errors. These same beliefs are echoed throughout the entire medical
community.  Physicians, pharmacists, optometrists, and all other healthcare
professionals are educated to believe that infallible job performance is optional
and if they work hard enough, they can achieve it.  The 2004 Institute of Medicine
report suggests that this fallacy is perpetuated by litigation practices and
licensing boards which have unjustly disciplined healthcare professionals who
were involved in an error, but found blameless by a number of independent
3authoritative bodies (ISMP, February 2005).  These actions are typical in a
culture where punishment is the solution to a medical error.
Ruth Benedict created a model of the shame culture (See Table 1.1).  This
model provides some insight into the primary aspect of a punitive system,
punishment.  A punitive culture is one that supports finger pointing and eventually
leads to a punishment.  In Benedict’s model, punishment is the result of a person
believing he/she did something wrong as well as others believing that the person
did something wrong.  In short, Benedict’s model points out the way an individual
feels towards something he/she did or did not do, is based solely on the
perception of others.  This implies the work environment/culture has some
bearing on whether or not to admit to wrong-doing. Benedict states, the
downside is the license it appears to give to engage in secret wrong-doing
(Atherton, 1976). Because of this, numerous medical errors go unreported.
Further, the researcher believes if a culture could exist in the healthcare industry
where pharmacists were not blamed for the occurrence of a medication error, the
pharmacist would be more prone to disclose the medication error.
Table 1.1 Shame-Culture
Shame-Culture Other People Believe
I believe I didn't do it I did it
I didn't do it No problem
I am ashamed and
dishonored by their
belief
I did it No one knows, so Iam not ashamed
I am guilty and
punished
41.2 Problem Setup/Definition
Only a few researchers have addressed the issue of medical errors.
According to the United States Institute of Medicine (1999), a medical error is
defined in the following context: “safety is defined as freedom from accidental
injury" and "error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as
intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim". Medical error awareness
dates back to 1976 when the United States House of Representatives’
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce issued its report, “Cost and Quality in Health Care:
Unnecessary Surgery.” The House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations (as cited in Null, G., Dean, C., Feldman, M., Rasio, D., Smith, D.,
2004) estimated that, on a nationwide basis, there were 2.4 million unnecessary
surgeries performed annually, resulting in 11,900 deaths. Since then,
researchers from the medical industry have written about medical errors and the
one thing that is in agreement is that medical errors do occur.
On November 29, 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a report,
“To Err is Human: Building A Safer Health System,” stating that medical errors
are the 8th leading cause of death in the United States, with as many as 98,000
people dying per year.  In all the literature, there appears to be a few gaps in the
research of medical errors, which are the driving force behind the direction of this
dissertation.  The gaps in the research are as follow:
51) The majority of the research focuses on reporting or lack there of.  The
IOM report recommended the establishment of a nationwide, mandatory
public reporting system.
2) The majority of data presented in the literature describes only the issue of
medical errors and not why or how they occur.
3) There has been little research into why a clinician opts to hide a medical
error.  Also, there has been little analysis as to whether the organizational
and individual characteristics contribute to the decision to disclose that a
medical error occurred or to keep quiet.
Of the total number of deaths reported as stated in the Institution of
Medicine report, over 7,000 deaths per year are attributed to medication-related
errors.  As defined by the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP), a medication error is defined as any
preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional,
patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice,
health care products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order
communication; product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding;
dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use.
Because of the questions raised by the gaps in the present literature, this
research is designed to investigate the following questions:
1) Can intervention improve company culture?
62) Are low company culture scores associated with a low number of reported
errors?  A low company culture score means a low representation of that
particular culture within the organization.  A company could have a high
score on one scale as it relates to a particular culture and low score on
another scale as it relates to another type of culture.  In this dissertation,
the individual score is compared to the aggregate response from the
survey group.  A company having a high score on one scale and a low
score on another scale would imply that the culture of that organization
resembles that of the highest scale score.
3) Will individuals with greater fear of reporting errors have lower company
culture scores on average than individuals with less fear?
The overwhelming number of deaths per year and the gaps in the existing
research defines my focus for this dissertation topic.  More narrowly put, the
purpose of this research is to increase the reporting of medication errors and
create a blueprint for an improved workplace culture.  Through the use of
pharmacists’ comments on practice in pharmacy and a detailed survey that asks
pertinent questions related to organizational culture and individual moral make-
up within that culture, a picture of the pharmacists’ work ethics and work culture
will be revealed. Both survey and comments will be analyzed to determine if
organizational culture and individual moral make-up can contribute to a greater
understanding of why a pharmacist opts to hide a medication error.
71.3 Summary of Objectives
The initial motivating factor of this research was to increase medication
error reporting.  Key milestones to reaching this goal included: (1) determining
the current obstacles to increased reporting, (2) developing a survey tool to
analyze the pharmacist’s workplace culture, (3) recruiting pharmacists to
participate in the survey, and (4) comparing reported medication errors (pre and
post survey) with the prior year reported medication errors.
The second objective of this research was to determine what entities in a
pharmacy system could possibly have an impact on medication safety.  Goals in
meeting this objective included analyzing all facets of a pharmacy and what role
each aspect played.  The results of identified pharmacy-related entities are then
used to formulate a warning system as to when potential error is on the horizon.
The last objective of this research was to develop a template for the
creation of a culture that supports medication error reporting.  The following
milestones were reached in accomplishing this objective: (1) development of a
theoretical model of error, and (2) development of a triple-check system that
includes the ordering physician, patient, and pharmacy.
1.4 Chapter Summary: Organization of this Work
This chapter gives a brief discussion on medical errors and how medical
errors became the primary focus in the realm of patient safety.  This chapter also
defines the term, medical error.  The current problem under investigation is
explained in detail.  Further, this chapter identifies the gaps in the research of
medical errors and explains the goals of this research.
8In Chapter 2, a comprehensive review of literature as it relates to medical
errors is unfolded.  Public opinion and that of pharmacists are noted on the issue
of medication errors.  The essence of reporting errors and the ethics associated
with disclosure including a legal perspective are discussed.  Also in Chapter 2, a
thorough analysis of culture to include a formal definition, main characteristics,
and its effect on people in the organization is presented.
In Chapter 3, a theoretical model of error in an organization is proposed
and discussed.  Various types of errors are identified, defined, and discussed.
The thought process mode in relation to human task performance is discussed.
The discussion of the pharmacy and the pharmacists highlight the working
environment and job design.  In this chapter, medication errors and causes are
identified.  Further, the development of the three hypotheses are discussed and
outlined.
Chapter 4 presents the methodology behind the creation of the
comprehensive survey used in this research to assess pharmacists in an
organization.  Also, Chapter 4 identifies the six types of cultures and their
associated characteristics are discussed.  The scale development and sample
size justification are presented in this chapter.  The statistical methods used to
analyze the data is identified and discussed.
A detailed data analysis in relation to the three hypotheses is presented
and discussed in Chapter 5.  Variations to the statistical methods mentioned in
Chapter 4 are identified and discussed.  How the survey scale scores were
derived is also presented in Chapter 5.
9Lastly, Chapter 6 provides a summary of work and conclusions based on
the results of Chapter 5.  A pathway to a non-punitive culture is identified,
presented and discussed.  Further, technological insights, recommendations, and
further research in the realm of medication errors are discussed.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The issue of medical errors is not new, but in the past, the problem has
not received its deserved attention.  Awareness of this issue dates back to 1976
(See Historical Perspective, Appendix A). Research began to emerge quite
rapidly and in great abundance on the topic of medical errors in the early 1990s
with accomplished research by Lucian Leape, M.D., and David Bates, M.D., and
supported by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, now the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality.  Most of the research on the issue of
medical errors is an offspring of the November 29, 1999 Institute of Medicine
report, “To Err is Human: Building A Safer Health System.”  The report states that
medical errors are the 8th leading cause of death in the United States, with as
many as 98,000 people dying per year and the estimated medical errors cost the
nation, roughly, $37.6 billion each year.  Of the 98,000 deaths per year, 7,000
are a result of medication errors.
The report called for mandatory and voluntary medical error reporting (See
Summary of Congressional Response, Appendix B).  Reporting provides a way
to obtain needed information about medical errors.  Reporting is essential to
holding healthcare systems accountable for delivering quality care and educating
11
the public about the safety of their healthcare system. Most importantly, reporting
is crucial to identifying existing patterns and discovering ways to prevent
recurring medical errors whether through surgery or prescription filling.
2.2 Opinion
Since the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report, patient safety has since
become a popular topic for journalists, healthcare leaders, medical professionals,
Congress and patients.  Providing healthcare is a difficult task in itself.  Now, add
the varying medical professionals that must interact in order to accomplish an
overall task of patient wellness.  The interaction among varying medical
professionals makes providing healthcare not only difficult but complex.  Some
believe that improvement in medicine and medication safety go hand-in-hand.
According to Robert Wachter, an expert on patient safety, medicine and
medication safety go in opposite directions. Wachter states that unless there is
an investment in safety with the same vigor as investment in medicinal progress,
the situation will actually get worse rather than better (Olsen, 2004).  However,
significant improvements have been made in some healthcare facilities since the
Institute of Medicine released the 1999 landmark report.  According to a study in
The Journal of the American Medical Association, the rate of change has been
painstakingly slow, and the death rate has not changed much.  In 2003, (as cited
in Leape & Berwick, 2005) Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospital
Organization began requiring hospitals to implement 11 safety practices,
including improving patient identification, communication, and "surgical site
verification" (marking a body part to ensure surgery is performed on the correct
12
part). Additionally, new residency training hour limitations were reduced to aid in
the reduction of errors contributed to fatigue.
2.2.1 Public
As the Institute of Medicine released its 1999 report, (as cited in AHRQ,
February 2000) 51% of Americans followed it closely, according to a survey by
the Kaiser Family Foundation. A national poll conducted by the National Patient
Safety Foundation found that Americans have a very real fear of medical errors.
In this survey, (as cited in AHRQ, February 2000) Americans rated the
healthcare system as moderately safe (4.9 on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is not safe
at all and 7 is very safe).  The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists
(1999) conducted a survey and asked respondents whom they would trust most
to explain their medication and it found that:1) 56% of respondents said the
doctor; 2) 32% said the pharmacist; and 3) 10% said a nurse.  This is evident
that doctors, pharmacists, and nurses need to form an alliance for the overall
health and wellness of the patient.
Most people believe that medical errors are the result of the failures of
individual providers.  Likewise, in pharmacy, a medication error is viewed by
most people, as the result of the failure of the individual pharmacist.  When
asked in a survey about possible solutions to medical errors, (as cited in AHRQ,
February 2000) 75% of the respondents thought it would be most effective to
keep health professionals with bad track records from providing care and 69%
thought the problem could be solved through better training of healthcare
professionals. According to the Institute for Safe Medication Practice 2001
13
survey on perceptions of a non-punitive culture, it is suggested that work is
needed on all fronts to fully adopt a non-punitive culture (Institute for Safe
Medication Practice, September 2001). ISMP FAQ defines a non-punitive
environment as a confidential reporting system where everyone understands that
errors will not be linked to an individual’s performance. ISMP FAQ states in this
type of practice environment, it should be easy to report errors, reward error
reporting and provide timely feedback to show what is being done to address
problems. In the ISMP 2001 survey, it found that 1) approximately 15% believed
that a nonpunitive culture excuses poor performance and absolves staff of
personal responsibility; 2) twenty-one percent believed that such a culture might
increase carelessness as individuals learn they will not be punished for mistakes.
2.2.2 Healthcare
Despite a growing awareness of the system-based causes of errors, many
in healthcare are still struggling to come to terms with the role of individual
accountability in a non-punitive culture.   The researchers blame the complexity
of health care systems, a lack of leadership, the reluctance of doctors to admit
errors and an insurance reimbursement system that rewards errors — hospitals
can bill for additional services needed when patients are injured by mistakes —
but often will not pay for practices that reduce those errors (Weise, 2005).
In the event of medication error, pharmacists in conjunction with the
Quality Systems team usually conduct the root cause analysis. To effectively
use the root cause analysis approach to medication error, all focus must be taken
off the pharmacist involved with the error and placed on the system-based
14
causes of error. The Institute of Medicine 1999 report emphasized that most of
the medical errors are system errors.  Research has shown that system
maintenance and enhancements can improve quality of care as well as reduce
the rate of error.  Hospitals in the Department of Veterans Affairs use hand-held,
wireless computer technology and bar-coding, which has cut overall hospital
medication error rates. A 1999 study published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association (as cited in AHRQ, February 2000) indicated that including a
pharmacist on medical rounds reduced the errors related to medication ordering
by 66%. It is apparent that systematic approaches to improving patient care are
essential to eliminate frequent errors in medication. Pretending that they do not
exist is to put the clinicians’ interests above those of the patients who have
entrusted their lives to the medical staff (Pietro et.al, March 2000).
In 2001 ISMP asked pharmacists to comment on the new government
proposal which would require a bar code on packages of all human drug and
biological products beginning in 2003.  Most responded, “It’s long overdue”
(ISMP, March 2002).  Even so, some expressed concern about the increased
risk of errors with internal repackaging of medications, especially if
manufacturers continue their downward trend of unit dose packaging (ISMP,
March 2002). In May 2002, over 600 pharmacists responded to an ISMP survey
on pharmacy interventions to tell about their experiences with: 1) factors that
impede or facilitate pharmacy interventions; 2) the types of interventions currently
performed; and 3) how the information is received by physicians, documented
and used. When barriers to optimizing a medication safety strategy interfere with
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the pharmacist's ability to perform interventions, serious errors may reach the
patient (ISMP, June 2002). Lack of technology support, inadequate staffing, and
inefficient documentation process were cited in the survey results as the most
frequent barriers to pharmacy intervention.  Before new technology is introduced
in a system, the manpower required to operate it as well as a technology support
team should be identified.
2.3 Reporting Errors
The Institute of Medicine report recommends the establishment of a
nationwide, mandatory public reporting system.  The implementation planned
would begin in hospitals and then venture out to encompass all locations where
patient care is practiced.  To achieve a successful reduction in errors, information
on best practices and effective solutions needs to be shared throughout the
medical community.  One of the reasons that information is not always available
is that the current healthcare system has disincentives for sharing information
(Eisenberg, 1999).  It is thought of as airing dirty laundry and shunned in the
medical industry. Eisenberg (1999) believed that the work of the Clinton
Administration could help change the culture of secrecy surrounding medical
errors into a culture of education and improvement.
The purpose of creating a reporting infrastructure is to help identify where
gaps in safety or certain patterns might exist in the health care system
(Eisenberg, 2002).  Reports would be made to state health departments,
applicable national accrediting organizations, and Medicare peer review
organizations.  Aggregate statistics, without identifiers, would be submitted to the
16
federal government, and confidentiality and privacy protections would be applied
to encourage reporting of errors (United States Congress, 2000). Providers
would be called upon to voluntarily report a range of patient safety data, including
the events that led to a patient’s undesirable outcome or potential undesirable
outcome as a direct association with the medical care the patient received.
Critical to the success of any national medical-error reporting system is
language that protects reported data from subpoena or legal discovery (American
Hospital Association and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital
Organizations, 2001).   As it stands now, hospitals are supposed to voluntarily
notify the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations of
sentinel events and then complete a root-cause analysis of preceding system
failures. Sentinel events are patient-care errors or accidents that lead to patient
death or major injury (Moore Jr, 1998).  Allowing voluntary reporting, in a shame-
blame environment, leads to a low number of reported medical errors.
In order for a medical error reporting system to work, legislation is needed
that protects confidentiality of all parties involved in the error including the
patient.  Patients should have readily available access to information about
preventable medical errors that cause serious injury or death, and providers
should have protections to encourage reporting which will aid in a speedy
elimination of that type of medical error. As cited in Shalgian (2001), reporting
systems should facilitate the sharing of patient safety information among
healthcare organizations and foster confidential collaboration with other
healthcare reporting systems.  Confidentiality protections for patients, healthcare
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professionals, and healthcare organizations as well as a non-punitive
environment that encourages identification of errors (Voelker, 2001) are essential
to the ability of any reporting system to learn about errors and effect their
reduction (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and
Prevention, 2003).  The correct response is to redesign systems so that errors
are acknowledged, detected, intercepted, and mitigated (Pietro et.al., March
2000).
2.4 Ethics
Ethics are rules for behavior, based on beliefs about how things should
be.  Ethical systems concern the “shoulds” and “should nots” of life, the principles
and values on which human relations are based (Mott, 2001). In some
situations, a behavior is considered ethical, whereas in what appears to be an
identical situation, that particular behavior is considered unethical.  Ethical
judgment is defined by its community members in expressing moral approval or
disapproval. Meriam-Webster Online defines moral as 1) of or relating to
principles of right or wrong in behavior; and 2) sanctioned by or operative on
one's conscience or ethical judgment.  A successful doctor-patient, doctor-
pharmacist, and pharmacist-patient relationship should be built upon the already
successful relationship between the doctor-pharmacist.  The development of
these relationships should be built upon what is ethical and morally right, and
most importantly, honesty.
Ethics, professional policy and the law suggest that timely and candid
disclosure should be standard practice (Hebert, Levin, Robertson, CMAJ 2001).
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Candor about error may lessen, rather than increase, the medicolegal liability of
the health care professionals and may help to alleviate the patient’s concerns
(Kraman and Hamm, 1999).  It has been suggested by many that guidelines exist
for disclosure of a medical error to patients and their families.  Revealing medical
errors to the public can be a positive experience for the medical community and
can promote public confidence in medicine (Pietro, Shyavitz, Smith, Auerbach,
2000).
Disclosure of error, by contrast, is consistent with recent ethical advances
in medicine toward more openness with patients and the involvement of patients
in their care (Hebert, Levin, Robertson, 2001).  The majority of patients and
surrogates expect, respect, and reward honesty on the physician’s part.  In other
words, evidence that patients who feel they have been communicated with
candidly are more likely to trust than sue the physician (Kraman and Hamm,
1999). Patients are due information about medical errors out of respect for them
as human beings as well as out of, what should be paramount, common
courtesy. Furthermore, by the principle of justice and/or fairness, when patients
are injured, they should be able to seek appropriate restitution.  This ethical
rationale for disclosure, based on a strong notion of autonomy, goes beyond
what the law might require one to do (Hebert, Levin, Robertson, 2001).
When a medical error is not disclosed, those who witness the error must
determine whether they should remain silent or reveal the error (Rajendran,
2001). Although the immediate temptation may be to cover up the fact that an
error has taken place (Kapp, 2001), indulging that temptation may bring about an
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unfavorable outcome in the long run.  The reluctance to reveal the medical error
stems from various motives: loyalty to one’s peers, the shame associated with
making—and admitting—a mistake, and fear of reprisal (Haddad, 2001).  The
need to cover up a medical error is strong, especially when it is believed that the
consequences of reporting the error will be detrimental.  Weighing the benefits
and harm from this perspective, one might conclude that withholding the truth
about the error is justified (Haddad, 2001).
Failing to disclose errors to patients undermines public trust in medicine
because it potentially involves deception (Bok, 1979).  This failure can be seen
as an infringement of professional ethics.  In this case, there is a lapse in the
commitment to act exclusively in the best interest of the patient. Ultimately,
patients may be caused preventable harm if they are injured further by the failure
to disclose.  At its core, concealing a medication error is one of the worst acts
that violate a doctor-patient or pharmacist-patient relationship on an ethical level.
There is no legal duty to disclose negligence when the disclosure would not
improve the likelihood of a good outcome from drug therapy (Pharmacy Law and
Management Conference, 2002).  Respect to others is demonstrated by being
honest, even when it is difficult to do. It shows a sign of integrity and moral
behavior, even if it is perceived that a greater good would come from ignoring the
error.  There are some who interpret the principle of truth-telling to require
complete honesty in every case.  It is important to note that withholding the truth
is a form of deception, hence a lie (Haddad, 2001).
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To change the balance of good and harm that result from reporting
medical errors, healthcare professionals need to recognize that government
entities like Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality or internal review
bodies can bring positive outcomes (Haddad, 2001).  Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality’s mission is to improve the quality, safety, efficiency, and
effectiveness of healthcare for all Americans. Further, healthcare professionals
need to trust that the good that comes from reporting an error outweighs the
negative effects on group loyalty and trust between co-workers that make it
possible to provide comprehensive healthcare (Haddad, 2001).
2.5 Eliminating Error
Throughout the pharmacy system, fail-safes should be installed to prevent
a medication error from occurring.  These fail-safes are sometimes referred to as
forcing functions. "Forcing functions" should be integrated to make it impossible
to act without meeting a precondition (Leape, 1994).  Twelve suggestions have
been proposed to assist in the elimination and eradication of medication errors.
1) Automate functions
2) Improve engineering of equipment, tools, instructions, procedures, the
work environment, the organizational structure
3) Improve the monitoring of operations to eliminate some of the
consequences of errors, even if the errors cannot be reduced
4) Improve feedback of information about errors and their consequences to
increase sensitivity to error-generating work habits
5) Improve interface design for pharmacists and machines
6) Increase and/or improve training to assist in awareness of contributory
factors of medication errors
7) Standardization of medications
a) Medication dosage – unit dose system
b) Times medications are administered
c) All packaging and labeling
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d) Storage – each unit should be organized similarly to assist
nurses who float between units
e) Predetermined dosing schedules for specific drugs
f) Preprinted orders
g) Equipment i.e. IV administration equipment
8) Share responsibility in the medicinal treatment plan
9) Limit number of hours worked in a day and in a week
10) Mandate breaks
11) Mandate light therapy for pharmacists working in non-daylight hours
12) Mandate continuing education training about medication errors
Items 2 through 4 above were suggested by Altman (as cited in DeGreene,
1970).  Item 7, standardization of medications was suggested by Medical Mutual.
Standardization is needed to ensure that any prescribing clinician can
electronically send a prescription to any pharmacy thereby eliminating the risk of
misinterpreting what is heard over the phone or what is handwritten on a
prescription.  In many states, verified electronic signatures are not acceptable,
thus prescribers must physically sign each prescription (ISMP, March 2001),
which introduces a potential pathway to error.  A reduction in medication errors
can be obtained if the pharmacy standardizes its processes.  Likewise, the
pharmaceutical industry must take a stance on medication errors. We (as cited
in ISMP, April 2001) have learned much from practitioner reports, including
evidence that a large percentage of medication errors are attributable, at least in
part, to commercial labeling, packaging, and nomenclature issues. The stance of
the pharmaceutical companies should be one of a take charge approach where
they collaborate with the medical community and participate in the
standardization of drug packages which are imprinted with a unique barcode.
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Another recommendation for medication error reduction is continuous
quality improvement.  When utilizing continuous quality improvement techniques,
a systems approach is used to solve problems. Plan-Do-Check-Act are the steps
used within continuous quality improvement systems (Value Based
Management.net, 2003).  These steps require people to think before they act and
to meticulously monitor the results.  In conjunction with advanced technology in
the form of bar-coding and automation, Plan-Do-Check-Act can reduce the
amount of medication errors significantly.  Separately, Plan-Do-Check-Act, if
used attentively and appropriately, can work just as well as being coupled with
advanced technology.
2.6 Legal Issues
One of the largest impediments to a vigorous frontal assault on the
medical errors issue is the fact that many physicians and other healthcare
professionals persist in equating the admission of errors with legal suicide (Kapp,
1997).  Error reporting is tied to significant malpractice reforms.  Fear of litigation
has hindered efforts to identify medical errors as well as a clinician’s admittance
to involvement in a medical error.  The culture of blame (as cited in Cutler and
Bocchino, 2000) pervades every aspect of medicine, from affecting patient safety
to increasing medical costs by encouraging the practice of defensive medicine.
Cutler and Bocchino (2000) stated that we need to enact malpractice reforms
applicable to healthcare claims in order to promote a more positive environment
for identifying and reporting medical errors. According to Wachter, (as cited in
Olsen, 2004) malpractice becomes an easy excuse for why clinicians don't talk to
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one another about medical errors.  Some medical professionals say that if the
malpractice issue could be fixed, the approach to medical errors would be
fundamentally different.  In order to achieve the open and honest forum
necessary for learning from and correcting our mistakes, we may need further
protection in law for this process, in the overriding interest of good health
(Smeltzer, 1989).  In 2003, President Bush was disappointed with the Senate’s
failure to pass the Medical Liability Bill.  The medical liability crisis is driving good
doctors out of medicine, and leaving patients in many communities without
access to both basic and specialty medical services (Bush, 2003).
Anxieties about adverse legal consequences, in the form of malpractice
lawsuits and, especially in the long-term –care arena, of regulatory punishments,
generally pervade contemporary healthcare environments (Kapp, 2001). Thus,
as a general rule, an error by an employee pharmacist leads to liability of the
corporate pharmacy employer and an error by a non-pharmacist clerk working
under the supervision of a pharmacist leads to liability of the pharmacist
(Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002). Pharmacists and
providers are taught the language to use in writing the patient record in order to
avoid litigation (Olsen, 2004).  Pharmacists have to make certain that patient
recordings in patient records can be interpreted in only one way.  Pharmacists
are taught to avoid words which are vague or have various meanings.
As cited in Phillips, Dovey, Hickner, Graham, Johnson (n.d.) the absence
of federal protection for submitted information to patient safety reporting systems
discourages the use of such systems, which reduces the opportunity to identify
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patterns and implement corrective measures. Information developed in
connection with reporting systems should be privileged for purposes of federal
and state judicial proceedings, including with respect to discovery, subpoenas,
testimony, or any other form of disclosure (Phillips et. al., n.d.).  From both a
legal and ethical perspective, the physician/patient relationship in the United
States at this time is best characterized as fiduciary in nature, built and
dependent on the trust that the patient is able to place in the physician (Journal
of the American Geriatrics Society, October 2001).  This trust is predicated on
the patient’s assumption that the physician must be guided in practice by the
ethical principles of nonmaleficence (avoiding causing harm, or primum non
nocere), beneficence (affirmatively doing well), and fidelity (honesty and loyalty)
(Kapp, 2001).  The main event which triggers malpractice litigation is patient
injury (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002).  Many lawsuits
begin because a healthcare professional expresses that the end result of another
healthcare professional’s designated patient therapy was negligent. When
seeking compensation for medical errors, litigants primarily state that they hope
to prevent further untoward incidents.
A significant external barrier that impedes full implementation of a non-
punitive culture is an external legal and regulatory environment that perpetuates
an ongoing punitive focus on individuals who make errors (ISMP, February
2005).  In the investigation of airline accidents it is not just the pilots that are
investigated but the entire crew and all the passengers.  The aircraft, the
weather, and air traffic systems are also investigated to determine if they played
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a role in the accident.  Likewise, in healthcare, the entire health delivery system
should be investigated. Long-lasting and essential changes can be witnessed
when the entire process of the health-delivery system is analyzed just as in the
airline industry.
2.7 Making it Worth Disclosing
How a facility deals with a health care error can either exacerbate an
already painful incident or, through disclosure, promote openness, healing,
learning and prevention (College of Nurses Ontario, 2004). No specific error can
be rectified after it has occurred, other than to be open and honest with the
patient and seek whatever remedial measures are necessary to treat problems
caused by the error (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002).
Colorado's largest malpractice insurer, COPIC, for example, has enrolled 1,800
physicians in a disclosure program under which they immediately express
remorse to patients when medical care goes wrong and describe in detail what
happened (Kowalczyk, 2005). According to College of Nursing (August 2004),
the Institute for Safe Medication Practice Canada lists13 steps involved in best
practices in disclosing a healthcare error.  The best practice steps are as follow:
1) Have open disclosure policies and procedures in place.
2) Have a key contact person or team ready and available to help staff deal
with adverse events.
3) Disclose as soon as possible to the client as soon as she/he is physically
and emotionally stable.
4) Choose an appropriate setting that is private and comfortable.
5) Acknowledge that a mistake has been made.
6) Describe the course of events, using lay terms.
7) State the nature of the mistake, the consequences, and the corrective
action taken.
8) Express regret and apologize.
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9) Elicit questions or concerns and commit to addressing them.
10) Provide follow-up to the client and let him/her know when to expect
further information.
11) Provide support and guidance to staff.  No one sets out to make medical
mistake.
12) Learn what happened with the human-machine interaction in the system
of duty performance.
13) Communicate the incident.  Sharing a medical mistake with other
facilities is a powerful step in the direction of error prevention.
It is of utmost importance that patients get involved in their therapy.  It is
important for patients to understand, comprehensively, what their treatment plan
is as dictated by the doctor and what medications are a part of the treatment
plan. According to AHRQ (July 2003), the United States Department of Health
and Human Services in conjunction with the American Hospital Association and
the American Medical Association developed “Five Steps to Safer Health Care,”
for patients to follow.  Those five steps are as follow:
1) Ask questions if you have doubts or concerns.
2) Keep and bring a list of ALL the medicines you take.
3) Get the results of any test or procedure.
4) Talk to your doctor about which hospital is best for your health needs.
5) Make sure you understand what will happen if you need surgery.
Another Patient Fact Sheet, “20 Tips to Help Prevent Medical Errors,” was
developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  These tips range
from a patient taking part in every decision about his/her healthcare to asking the
doctor if the proposed treatment is based upon the latest scientific evidence.
Uninvolved and uninformed patients are less likely to accept the doctor's choice
of treatment and less likely to do what they need to do to make the treatment
work (AHRQ Publication No. AHRQ 00-P038, February 2000).
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2.8 Understanding Culture
The word, culture is derived from the Latin verb colere, which means to
cultivate, and draws some of its meaning from this association from the act of
tilling soil for harvesting a rich produce (Renard, 2006). Merriam-Webster’s
dictionary defines culture generally as the integrated pattern of human
knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity for learning
and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations.  Schermerhorn’s
definition of culture is the shared set of beliefs, values, and patterns of behavior
common to a group of people (Schermerhorn Jr., 1996).  Morasco defines
culture as a set of characteristics that sets one group of people apart from
another (Morasco, 2002).  Although there are many definitions of the word,
culture, there are similarities in the meaning.
Culture consists of explicit and implicit patterns of behavior acquired,
created and transmitted (Renard, 2006). How a set of abstract principles is
translated into day-to-day behavior is defined by its culture (Morasco, 2002).
Culture is learned; it is not genetic, just as a person’s desire for a cream-cheese
bagel and orange juice in the morning is not genetic, but a learned cultural
response to morning hunger (Renard, 2006). On the contrary, Morasco believes
that people have a set of nearly instinctive default behaviors, programmed into
each person from infancy, which represents accepted norms and modes within
each person’s local environment (Morasco, 2002). Whether learned or
instinctive, a person’s behavior is driven by three forces: 1) human nature; 2)
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culture and; 3) personality (Morasco, 2002). Further, culture is powerful but not
immutable template of behavior (The Wharton School, 2004).
2.8.1 Organizational Culture
Just as culture transcends from one person to another in society, it
transcends within an organization; hence the term organizational culture,
sometimes referred to as corporate culture or company culture. Cultures in
organizations are the same as in societies (Nitschke, n.d.) however, in an
organization there are two levels of culture, the observable culture and the core
culture (Schermerhorn Jr., 1996).  Observable culture is what one sees and
hears and the core culture is the underlying beliefs that influence behavior and
actually give rise to the aspects of observable culture.
There are several definitions of organizational culture in which all have
fundamental similarities. Organizational culture as defined by Edgar Schein is a
pattern of basic assumption- invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration- that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
relation to those problems (Schein, 1990). Organizational culture is the
environment in which people work (Hodgetts, 1999).  Organizational culture has
been defined as a collection of values and norms that are shared by people in an
organization and that control the way they interact with each other and with
stakeholders outside the organization. Organizational culture is a series of
values, standard interpretations, insights and ways of thinking that are shared by
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members of an organization and are passed on to new members of the
organization (Daft, 2002).
Company culture is a system of shared values, beliefs, behaviors and
goals widely accepted by the membership and translated into the way a company
treats its employees and internal and external customers (Culture or Reputation,
n.d.). Company culture is based on shared values and workplace norms (Rao,
2003). The shared beliefs, from top to bottom, are what the company is doing,
what it is offering or providing or what it is manufacturing is of the highest quality
(Culture or Reputation, n.d.). Because culture is shared, it can remain influential
long after its creator has been forgotten (Deering, Dilts & Russell, 2003). Culture
creates vast inertial guidance in all that is done, leading one to repeat readily
what has gone before with little concern for why (The Wharton School, 2004).
Thus a key aspect of a culture is its ability to pass on knowledge and
competence to its members (Deering, Dilts & Russell, 2003).
Corporate culture is that intangible something that influences the
environments in which we work every day (Pegasus Communication, 2004). It is
the perceived personality of an organization that is determined by the people who
form or make up an organization and partly from the reputation it has from the
quality of goods or services that it offers (Culture or Reputation, n.d.).  Corporate
culture thus refers to the emotional climate or personality of the organization
(Renard, 2006).  An organization’s culture refers to unspoken beliefs, values and
traditions translated into statements of vision and mission, common to the work
force that are expressed in silence and powerful rules, which control and
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reinforce the behavior that is encouraged or discouraged in the workplace
(Renard, 2006). Corporate culture not only forms the foundation of any business
but also should be reflected in the company’s mission statement and re-enforced
through internal objectives (Culture or Reputation, n.d.).
Culture comprises values, norms, and conventions that people both
absorb and recreate as part of the community of people, whether a company,
work group, or religious organization (The Wharton School, 2004). Every
company and every organization has a culture of sorts and it can be a force for
good or for bad depending on its values, the way the corporate leaders
determine strategy and direction and how they train their staff to interpret those
values (Culture or Reputation, n.d.).  Culture has the potential to mold behavior,
strengthen common beliefs, and promote members to apply their efforts to
accomplish organizational objectives that are viewed as important.  Well crafted,
it can effectively align thousands of people and decisions; poorly designed, it can
misalign an entire organization (The Wharton School, 2004).  The challenge of
identifying and analyzing company culture lies in its invisibility (Renard, 2006).
2.8.2 Culture Change
Cultures that are developed over the course of years and years of
evolution are not changed in the short term nor does change come easily
(Nitschke, n.d.). Change happens and most people cannot tell how or when
things changed, they just did (Nitschke, n.d.). While changing a company’s
culture overnight is downright impossible, workplace experts say the first step is
to take a close look at the existing culture, define it, and then ask if it has the right
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qualities to back up the business goals (Leung, 1997).  Cultures can be changed,
but it takes recognition, perseverance, time and leadership (Nitschke, n.d.).  The
truth is that more than 70% of large scale system implementation change efforts
fail and of these failures more than 70% are due to culture-related issues:
employee resistance to change and unsupportive management behavior (Witt,
2006).  Sometimes there are valid reasons for employee skepticism, and that is
probably due to ill-conceived plans for change that failed in the past (Nitschke,
n.d.).
Cultures are capable of making or breaking an organization if left to their
own evolution (Nitschke, n.d.). When leadership is fragmented or inconsistent,
when departments degenerate into factions, when gaps emerge between a
company’s stated purpose and its actual mode of operation, toxic cultures are
born (Sea Change, 2003). It is vital that a new hire fits the corporate philosophy,
or he stands little chance of long-term success (Rodgers, 2006).  From the CEO
to the lowest level member of the organization, the hiring process should focus
on what the organization needs and whether or not the candidates fully
understand that they are there to move the organization forward, not just for their
own self interest (Nitschke, n.d.).  Reducing turnover starts with commitment
from the top, so management philosophy should not only match the corporate
climate but should invite others to join in with their best foot forward (Rodgers,
2006).  Dysfunctional cultures are simply tough to fix (Witt, 2006).  Cultural
mismatch is a major reason for employee-employer relationship failure (Rodgers,
2006). Studies show that up to 50% of the typical employee’s job satisfaction is
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determined by the quality of his relationship with his direct manager (Rodgers,
2006). If there is a high quality relationship between the employee and his direct
manager, the employee’s job satisfaction will be high and vice-versa.
2.8.3 Strong Culture
Cultures develop and evolve over time through the actions of past leaders,
events and circumstances (Nitschke, n.d.).  Most cultures evolve unnoticed and
untouched by management for two main reasons: 1) organizational leadership is
focused on the short-term results of the company, usually quarter over quarter
results; and 2) leadership usually comes and goes on a frequent basis (Nitschke,
n.d.). The strength of the culture depends on two factors: 1) the degree to which
the values of the culture are codified and effectively transmitted to all; and 2) the
degree of pain people suffer for straying outside the cultural norms (Morasco,
2002).  Strong cultures are believed to exist where members respond to stimulus
because of their alignment with the organizational values. CEOs fail to see that
employees’ actions are often prompted by fear – fear of losing status, fear of
losing control, fear of losing their jobs (Sea Change, 2003).  It is only when the
culture is recognized and understood that managers, at all levels, can proceed
with running the business through recruitment and training programs (Culture or
Reputation, n.d.).
New employees should be trained in the company culture.  Also, decisions
on hiring need to be made carefully since people in an organization are the key
reasons cultures either are strengthened and reinforced, or, alternatively,
weakened and diminished (Rao, 2003). The corporate culture, and the
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reputation, is maintained through the recruitment process and thus it is not easy
to change strategy, direction or corporate culture over night simply because of
intertwining of beliefs and ideals.  (Culture or Reputation, n.d.). Morasco
believes that the strongest cultures are those in which all members clearly know
and understand the code, and also recognize that the penalties for violation are
harsh (Morasco, 2002).
The unofficial source of information in a company is called the grapevine.
Contrary to Morasco’s belief, Seaman suggests (as stated in Sea Change, 2003)
“in a healthy culture, senior management can actually learn a lot about what’s
going on by ‘listening in’ to the grapevine – inviting people to come forward and
talk about what is going on, without fear of censure or retribution.” There is
genuine conversation – leaders listen to what people say (Deering, Dilts &
Russell, 2003).  It’s a way of identifying significant issues before they get out of
hand and cause major employee discontent (Sea Change, 2003).  People at all
levels are encouraged and supported to speak openly and honestly about what
they think (Deering, Dilts & Russell, 2003).  As a result, leaders pick up signals
that give clues or coming opportunities and hints about emerging threats
(Deering, Dilts & Russell, 2003). “When you care about people, they are going to
be happier and more efficient at their jobs” (Leung, 1997).  If people at the top
are open, honest, communicative, and responsive and are aware of moral, social
and ethical values, then it is more likely the company will have those same
qualities (Culture or Reputation, n.d.).  That is because the very qualities
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demanded of leaders are the same qualities that go to make up corporate culture
(Culture or Reputation, n.d.).
A strong culture can be developed at a company even if employees do not
spend their evenings after work together socializing (Rao, 2003).  The key to
developing a strong culture is to make it relevant to the company’s business and
to assure that it reinforces the qualities necessary for the company to succeed
(Rao, 2003). Those qualities include accountability, teamwork, training,
responsibility, integrity, focus, understanding, growth, and ethics (Culture or
Reputation, n.d.).  A company’s culture thrives when there is stable leadership
and when senior management and employees share common values and
patterns of behavior (Sea Change, 2003). This begins by developing the shared
values for the company with the team, (not simply issuing them top-down) and
gaining consensus and agreement on what these core principles should be (Rao,
2003). The team must recognize that they are addressing a common goal, and
they must be willing and able to work collaboratively together to achieve it (Witt,
2006).  A successful company culture requires the existence of a well-defined,
structured environment with no ambiguous organization charts (Renard, 2006).
Very clear job descriptions and unmistakable lines of reporting provide clarity and
maintain the company’s stability and continuity (Renard, 2006). Strong cultures
are built where there is true alignment between actions that are desired and
actions that are rewarded (Rao, 2003).  The organization’s actions and plans are
determined by the desire and efforts of people at all levels of the organization,
and the credit for success is spread to many contributors (Deering, Dilts &
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Russell, 2003). The only way a company can build a strong corporate culture is
by weaving it into the fibers of the company (Rao, 2003). Thus, building a high-
performance culture requires extended and consistent investment over several
years, but once achieved, the built-in inertial momentum can help sustain high
performance for years ahead (The Wharton School, 2004).
2.8.4 Importance of Culture
The 1999 Institute of Medicine report emphasizes of utmost importance,
when a medical error occurs, to not place individual blame.  Additionally, the
report emphasized a dire need for leadership by executive leaders and clinicians
as well as holding the board of trustees accountable for patient safety.
Prevention and correction of system-based errors should be the only focus of a
non-punitive culture, not pointing fingers and placing blame.
The first task is the creation of a blame-free, protected environment that
encourages reporting of all medical errors.  Fear of reprisals, public castigation,
and loss of business will continue to impede the reporting of serious errors
unless incentives for making mistakes known to accountable oversight bodies
are provided (JCAHO, February 2000).  The blame for mislabeling a prescription
and the punishment for doing so, outweigh a pharmacist’s intent of doing what is
right and reportable medication errors are continually driven underground.  For a
typical caregiver involved in a medical error that leads to a serious adverse
event, the incentives to report are all negative - potential job loss, humiliation,
and shunning (JCAHO, February 2000).  Some positive reinforcement and a
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supportive environment that encourages the reporting of a medical error and full
disclosure to the patient are warranted in all realms of the medical industry.
President Clinton wanted to replace what some call a culture of silence
with a culture of safety, an environment that encourages others to talk about
medical errors, what caused them and how to prevent them. According to the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions,
creating a culture of safety means moving beyond a culture of blame to one of
"safety mindfulness".  Traditionally, the dominant psychological environment of
medicine has been a simplistic one of shaming and blaming, and then punishing,
individual actors who have been singled out for making mistakes, rather than an
environment in which errors are recognized as a complex systemic phenomenon
requiring broader solutions (Reinertsen, 2000).  In the shame/blame
environment, where errors are seen as a form of personal moral failure that
shatters the culture of infallibility inculcated in physicians since the first day of
professional training, the physician’s ultimate fear is “losing face” in front of one’s
peers (Wu, 2000).
The existing culture of blame and punishment, which suppresses
information about errors, must be transformed into a culture of safety that
encourages information sharing (American Medical Association, 2000).  Hoping
to foster organization cultures that promote error reduction efforts, the Joint
Commission has designed its policies not to penalize the accreditation status of
an organization that surfaces an error and performs the appropriate due diligence
required under the policy.  The resulting atmosphere provides incentives that
37
favor the surfacing of information about errors which contributes to error
reduction strategies that can be used by other organizations (JCAHO, February
2000).
2.9 Industry Leaders
When it comes to medical error reporting, the federal government has
been leading by example. The Department of Veterans Affairs and Department
of Defense have been frontiers in the use of automated and other systems to
reduce medical errors.  According to the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs National Center for Patient Safety (n.d.), the Veterans Health
Administration has two systems – internal and external- in place for reporting
medical errors. According to the Veterans Administration, both systems are
confidential and non-punitive.  However, the external system is voluntary and the
internal system is mandatory for death and serious injuries.
Using the expertise of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
the Veterans Administration developed an internal reporting system, the Patient
Safety Information System, called SPOT (U.S. Veterans Affairs National Center
for Patient Safety FAQ). This system identifies weaknesses in the system of
providing care rather than attempting to define how many errors occur in a given
amount of time. SPOT has been pilot tested in Veterans Administration’s
Veterans’ Integrated Services Network 8 which encompasses the state of Florida
and the most southern part of Georgia.  The external system is called the Patient
Safety Reporting System. This system was developed by a collaborated effort
between Veterans Health Administration and the National Aeronautics and
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Space Administration. According to U.S. Veterans Affairs National Center for
Patient Safety FAQ (n.d.), only National Aeronautics and Space Administration
personnel assigned to the reporting system can review data until the de-
identification process is complete.
The Veterans Administration completed implementation of an automated
order entry system in all its healthcare facilities, along with a bar-coding system
for medication administration in 2000. Because people on the frontline are
usually in the best position to identify issues and solutions, Root Cause Analysis
teams at each of the Veteran Administration healthcare facilities formulate
solutions, test, implement, and measure outcomes in order to improve patient
safety. Findings from the teams are shared nation-wide as cited by the United
States Department of Veterans Administration in “Culture Change: Prevention,
Not Punishment”.  As a result of such findings, Veterans Administration
increased patient safety training for staff from 15 to 20 hours a year.
In spring 2000, all 500 Department of Defense hospitals and clinics
implemented a mandatory reporting system (Clinton-Gore Administration, 2000).
Department of Defense implemented a new computerized medical record that
makes pertinent clinical information on a patient available when and where it is
needed.  Further, the Department of Defense launched an integrated pharmacy
system for over 8 million of their beneficiaries. This new system allows
Department of Defense’s physicians to precisely track prescriptions as they are
filled in public and private pharmacies worldwide thereby, alleviating drug-drug
interactions and/or adverse events.
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There have been others that contributed to the foothold on medication
errors.  In private industry and non-punitive medication error reporting, the
Oklahoma State Board of Health leads the way.  In 2001, Oklahoma became the
first state to grant legal protection to the United States Pharmacopeia (2001) –
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (USP-ISMP).  Oklahoma regards
submitted reports as privileged communications and bans their use in legal
proceedings.  The ability to report medication errors without fear of retribution
should help healthcare providers identify trends and implement system-wide
safety measures to prevent future errors (Cohen, 2001).
2.10 Chapter Summary
A major effect of the 1999 Institute of Medicine report was that it helped
to enlist a diversified variety of stake-holders to advance the patient safety cause.
In 2001, Congress responded to the Institute of Medicine recommendations by
appropriating $50 million annually for patient safety research to the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality in order to further understand when, how, and
under what circumstances errors occur; identify the causes of errors; develop
tools, data, and research needed to foster a national strategy to improve patient
safety; and work with public and private partners to apply evidence-based
approaches to the improvement of patient safety.  The lead federal agency
charged with supporting research designed to improve the quality of health care,
reduce its cost, improve patient safety, address medical errors, and broaden
access to essential services (United States Congress Subcommittee on Health of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 2002).  The
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most important stake-holders are the physicians, nurses, therapists, and
pharmacists who have become much more alert to safety hazards and who are
committed to making improvements on the front lines (Leape and Berwick, 2005).
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine committee asked the Food and Drug
Administration to: 1) develop and enforce standards for the design of drug
packaging and labeling to maximize safety; 2) require pharmaceutical testing of
proposed drug names; and 3) establish an appropriate response to problems
identified through post-marketing surveillance, especially those that are
perceived to require immediate response to protect the safety of patients.
The Institute for Safe Medication Practice (March, 2002) conducted a
survey on drug companies providing fewer unit dose packaged medications. It is
clear from the survey that, despite some initial worry about costs, many hospitals
are ready to do their part to move patient medication-technology forward. The
survey results indicated that almost two-thirds of respondents would be less likely
to purchase a product if it were not available in unit dose packaging (ISMP,
March 2002). The pharmaceutical industry must now join the battle of
medication error prevention and produce all products in unit dose packages with
a uniform bar code.
As of 2004, there has not been any new labeling or packaging guidance
documents; pharmaceutical companies are not required to test proposed drug
names and packaging; a standard process for this testing has not been
established; and at times, FDA response to problems uncovered through
reporting programs is slow or non-existent (ISMP, November 2004).
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While the 1999 Institute of Medicine report, “To Err Is Human”, has not yet
succeeded in creating comprehensive, nationwide how-to steps for
improvements in patient safety, it has made a profound impact on individual and
organizational attitudes.  The 1999 Institute of Medicine report has changed the
way healthcare professionals think and talk about medical errors.  A central
concept of the report—that bad systems and not bad people lead to most
errors—has since become a mantra in healthcare (Leape and Berwick, 2005).  A
2004 Institute of  Medicine report, “Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the
Work Environment of Nurses,” suggests that a persistent professional culture that
fosters unrealistic expectations of clinical perfection is an external barrier that
seriously impedes full implementation of a non-punitive, just culture of safety
(ISMP, February 2005).
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Development
3.1 Introduction
As was stated in the literature review of medical errors, the theory
proposed and tested by this research will primarily reflect the relationship
between the culture and the pharmacist’s decision to hide or come forth in the
discovery of a medication error.  The model will propose an intervention process
that attempts to explain some of the difference in human behavior in an
organization by cultural characteristics and individual moral make-up.  The
purpose of this research is not to identify the process, but to identify the types of
culture in conjunction with one’s moral values that may account for the difference
in decision making.
Because complete disclosure of a medication error does not occur most of
the time, the research will be of necessity, an assessment of organizational
culture and individual moral make-up.  This model is designed to explain why
some pharmacists choose to reveal (report) that a medication error did occur
while others in what appears to be the same situation choose to remain silent
(not report).
A theoretical model of error in the organization is proposed in Figure 3.1.
An incident is an occurrence of an action or situation that is a separate unit
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical Model
Person
Responsible(s)
Incidents
Error
Discovery
Non-PunitivePunitive
Report
No Yes
Job Design
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of experience occurring in the organization.  The incident may be as simple as a
phone ringing or a colleague interrupting to ask a question.  However, the
incident is a direct reflection on job design.  The incident, if not handled in
accordance with job design, results in an error.  This compromise on job design
could be as complicated as giving Jane Doe (2 years of age) a medication that
was meant for Jane Doe (82 years of age).  In the military, for example,
personnel error can be defined as any deviation from established procedure.
This may imply punitive measures and assumes all error would be eliminated by
“following the checklist” or “following procedures” (DeGreene, 1970).  In these
type-thinking organizations, there is a person(s) responsible as dictated in a
punitive environment.  In these instances, the event is the discovery of an error
rather than the discovery of a flaw in the system.  It now becomes the individual’s
decision to report or not report the error.
3.2 Defining Error and Its Classifications
Error is defined as an unintentional mistake (MSN Encarta, 2006). To be
considered an error, an aspect of human behavior must potentially have a
degradative effect on system performance (Degreene, 1970). In general, all
errors can be termed either active or latent. An active error is one whose effect is
immediate. For instance, jumping out of an airplane without a parachute has an
immediate effect. Either you splash into the water or you hit the ground.  Active
failures have an underlying history that extends back in time and up through the
levels of the system.  Latent errors are those errors whose effects are delayed -
the proverbial "accident waiting to happen" (Reason, 1990).  In the parachute
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example, perhaps the sky diver strapped his look-a-like knapsack on his back
thinking it was his parachute sack. As a result, every time the sky diver needs to
make a jump, the potential for disaster is high. Latent errors arise from decisions
made by designers, builders, policy makers, procedure writers, and top-level
management.  For example, top level management says that one pharmacist can
only be on the clock during an eight hour shift, otherwise the pharmacist that
works beyond eight hours in one day will be written up.  A medication error
becomes more likely as the pharmacist is approaching the end of his/her eight
hour shift as work is sped up to complete necessary prescriptions before the shift
ends.
James Reason developed the Swiss cheese model of how defenses,
barriers, and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident trajectory.  The holes
in the Swiss cheese model are analogous to the holes in the defenses, barriers,
and safeguards of a system.  The holes arise for two reasons: active failures and
latent conditions.  Latent conditions have two kinds of adverse effects: error
provoking conditions (time pressure, understaffing, fatigue, etc.) and long-lasting
holes (untrustworthy alarms and indicators, unworkable procedures, etc.) in the
defenses (Reason, 2000).  Latent conditions can be identified and remedied well
in advance of the occurrence of an adverse event.  Knowing and understanding
that remedial action aids in the prevention of error can lead to proactive risk
management.   Once errors are understood, steps to prevent them can be
developed.
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A number of classification schemes have been developed to categorize
human errors.  For example, Kirwan (1994) identifies four types of errors,
including (1) errors of commission, in which incorrect actions were taken, (2)
errors of omission, in which required actions were not taken, (3) extraneous acts,
in which an action that was not required was taken, and (4) error-recovery
opportunities, comprised of actions which can recover previous errors. Errors
have been classified into categories such as failure to follow procedures,
incorrect diagnosis, using poor judgment, misinterpretation of communications,
and insufficient attention or caution (DeGreene, 1970). Other schemes divide
errors into motor and cognitive categories while some divide errors into technical
or intellectual errors (PharmCon, n.d.).
In pharmacies, a technical error is one that generally occurs as a result of
a pharmacist having performed a function incorrectly; for example, the
dispensing of a drug in the wrong strength. In an article published by PharmCon,
Inc, “Medication Error Reduction Perspectives From Two States With Legal Case
Analysis”, an intellectual error is one that usually occurs as a result of a
pharmacist having failed to recognize, and acted to prevent, a problem with drug
therapy; for example, the failure to warn or to detect duplicative therapy or failing
to properly counsel.
3.3 Thought Process Mode
Cognitive psychology is the study of higher mental processes such as
attention, language use, memory, perception, problem solving, and thinking
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(American Psychological Association, 2002). Simply put, cognitive psychology is
the study of how people think. Cognitive scientists have attempted to understand
and model cognitive abilities such as perception, learning, language, memory,
and problem solving.  Cognitive psychologists and human-factors specialists
have been studying how and why people make errors for many years. Cognitive
psychologists determined that human beings operate in an automatic mode and
problem-solving mode.
In automatic mode, human beings perform processes that do not require
attention and can often be performed along with other tasks without interference.
For example, in automatic mode, human beings can hold a conversation while
tying a shoe.  In this mode, the actions are unconscious and effortless and once
we have a task "down," it becomes a part of automatic mode thinking (Leape,
1994).  The mind switches to problem-solving mode when a problem surfaces.
The problem-solving mode involves thinking that is directed toward solving
specific problems and that moves from an initial state to a goal state by means of
a set of mental operations (APA, 2002). Errors that occur in the problem-solving
mode might occur when the wrong rule is chosen, either because the situation
was miscalculated or the rule was misapplied.  Factors that affect the functioning
in problem-solving mode are pattern matching, biased memory, the availability
heuristic, confirmation bias, and overconfidence, filling-in the gaps of knowledge
(Leape, 1994). An example of pattern matching is when a pharmacist has to fill a
prescription for 0.1 milligrams of levothyroxine for Patient A and a prescription for
1.0 milligrams of levothyroxine for Patient B.  The pharmacist relies on previous
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thought out solutions from filling Patient A’s prescription as the pharmacist fills
Patient B’s prescription.  An example of bias memory is when a pharmacist fills
10 prescriptions of 0.1 milligrams of levothyroxine on a daily basis and one day
he is to fill a prescription for 1.0 milligrams of levothyroxine.  Because of the
familiarity of filling the prescription for 0.1 milligrams of levothyroxine, the
pharmacist over-generalizes when he fills the prescription for 1.0 milligrams of
levothyroxine. An example of availability heuristic is, if the pharmacist filled the
1.0 milligrams of levothyroxine with 0.1 milligrams of levothyroxine because that
was the first information to come to mind.  An example of confirmation bias is
when a pharmacist receives current documented evidence that 0.1 milligrams of
levothyroxine has no therapeutic value and continues to prescribe the 0.1
milligrams of levothyroxine because of a decade-old, supported hypothesis that
0.1 milligrams of levothyroxine has been shown to increase the functioning of the
thyroid in 95% of the subjects tested. Further, an example of over-confidence is
when the pharmacist believes that his/her actions to continually prescribe 0.1
milligrams of levothyroxine are justified and the pharmacist is in favor of all
evidence that supports his/her course of action. While operating in the problem-
solving mode, the result is a delay in the algorithm for problem-solving
processes.
Like the cognitive psychologists, human factors specialists are concerned
with understanding the interactions between human beings and systems.
According to the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (2005), the human
factors profession applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design
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systems that will optimize human well-being and overall system performance.
Human Factors and Ergonomics at San Jose State University, defines the
specialty of human factors specialists to include improving the operability,
maintainability, usability, comfort, safety and health characteristics of systems to
improve the human and system effectiveness and to reduce the potential of injury
and error.
3.4 Beginning of an Error
Human errors begin during the design stage, extending beyond process
and workplace design into construction and continuing into the design of
management systems for operations and maintenance (Process Improvement
Institute, 2005). These systems include management and training policies and
procedural development and standard operating procedure development. Faulty
procedures may be the actual cause of an error that initially appears to be the
result of inattention (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002). There
is seldom a single reason that an error occurs. A large number of factors, broad
in range, can be attributed to a single error. Usually, a chain of events that has
gone undetected and unnoticed by a system leads to a recurring safety problem.
Most pharmacy errors result from problems created by today's complex
healthcare system.
It is impossible to practice any profession without occasionally making a
mistake (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002). The right
conditions, at the right time, can lead to a mistake by anyone. Typically,
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mistakes become a concern only when a person is injured. To prevent the
mistake from occurring again, punishment is usually the preferred solution.
3.5 Pharmacists and the Pharmacy
The practice of pharmacy is a vital part of total health care.  The basic
value of medicinal treatment to patients in the United States is evidenced by the
increased therapeutic use of prescriptions.  In 2004, there was an average
number of 63,500 prescriptions dispensed annually per community pharmacy
(PR Newswire Association LLC., 2006).  With a total of 24,500 community
pharmacies, community pharmacists dispense approximately 1.6 billion
prescriptions annually (PR Newswire Association LLC., 2006). Annually, a total
of 1.3 million Americans experience a medication mixup (CNN, 2005).
Pharmacists dispense medications prescribed by physicians, dentists, and other
authorized medical practitioners. According to Florida Health Careers, most
pharmacists work about 43 hours per week. Earnings are high, but some
pharmacists work long hours, nights, weekends, and holidays (Bureau of Labor
and Statistics, 2006). Long working hours and overtime contribute to increased
worker fatigue and safety problems (Dawson et al, 2004). The long hours and
nights could potentially give rise to fatigue and result in a medication error.
The role of the pharmacist has radically changed over time. According to
an article by Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy: “Pharmacists’ Cognitive
Services”, it has shifted from one of “product dispenser” to one of “medication
therapy expert” on a healthcare team. According to American Pharmacists
Association Foundation (n.d.), pharmacists are trained to understand the
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composition of drugs, including their chemical, biological, and physical
properties.  By understanding the composition of drugs and how they work in the
body, pharmacists can identify medication interactions. Pharmacists must
understand the use, clinical effects, and composition of drugs, including their
chemical, biological, and physical properties (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006).
In McKee vs. American Home Products, Corp: A review of case law from
reported judicial opinions discloses that the trend is toward recognition of
responsibilities by pharmacists to both accurately process prescription orders
and also competently monitor drug therapy (Pharmacy Law and Management
Conference, 2002).  Pharmacists must exercise skill and care in the realm of duty
performance, so as to prevent undesirable effects from dispensed medications.
Skill refers to the ability to produce good results, and care refers to the effort one
expends in producing good results (Leape, 1994).
For the pharmacist, job design is an intricate part of his/her job.
Pharmacy is usually practiced in a very public area with many distractions and
interferences having the potential to divert attention from the task of processing
prescriptions and providing pharmaceutical care services for patients (Pharmacy
Law and Management Conference, 2002).  The challenges facing those who
design pharmacy systems that take into account the interaction of man and
machine, are many, varied, and complex. Quantitative information about human
performance, including error performance, is necessary for realistic system
planning, functions allocation, equipment design, selection, training, and
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evaluation (Degreene, 1970).  If done correctly and integrated with properly
designed equipment and ideal facility layout, errors will be few and far between.
3.5.1 Errors in Pharmacy
Medication errors tend to fall into three categories: prescribing, dispensing
and administering medicines (Cousins, 2005). A prescribing error involves
incorrectly entering the prescription.  Examples of prescribing errors are wrong
dose, wrong drug, illegible hand-writing on a written prescription, and incorrect
use of a prescribed drug. A dispensing error involves wrong drug, wrong patient,
mislabeling of prescription, and wrong dose.  An administering error involves
drug omission, wrong drug given to patient, and incorrect route of entry. There
are four types of events that are associated with each category of medication
errors: 1) adverse event – unintended incidents in care that may result in
undesirable outcomes and may require additional care; 2) near miss – events in
which unwanted consequences were prevented; 3) sentinel event - event in
which death or serious harm to a patient has occurred; and 4) no harm event - an
event that has actually occurred (no recovery action was taken) but where no
actual harm has come to the patient or the organization.  The causes of these
medication errors are complex in nature being that it is seldom a single error that
causes the mistake.  Often, there are some underlying systemic issues that
compromise the quality of the healthcare delivery system.
3.5.2 Causes of Medication Errors
Lucian Leape, M.D., identified a number of “proximal causes” to
medication error.  Proximal causes are defined as the apparent 'reason' the error
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was made (Leape et. al., 1995).  Sometimes there is more than one proximal
cause associated with a medication error.  Proximal causes are expansive
categories where the underlying system problems that result in medication errors
may be found.  Proximal causes as identified by Leape et. al. (1995) include the
following: lack of knowledge of the drug, lack of information about the patient,
violations of rules, slips and memory lapses, transcription errors, faulty identity
checking, faulty interaction with other services, faulty dose checking, infusion
pump and parenteral delivery problems, inadequate monitoring, drug stocking
and delivery problems, preparation errors, lack of standardization.  The Institute
for Safe Medication Practices (March 2001) identifies the main cause to
medication error as failed communication.  Other causes as identified by ISMP
(March 2001) include the following:
1) Failed Communication: this category includes the six broad categories:
a) Handwriting and oral communications, especially over the
telephone
b) Drugs with similar names
c) Missing or misplaced zeroes and decimal points
d) Confusion between metric and apothecary systems of measure
e) Use of non-standard abbreviations
f) Ambiguous or incomplete orders
2) Poor Drug Distribution Practices
3) Complex or poorly designed technology
4) Access to drugs by non-pharmacy personnel
5) Workplace environmental problems that lead to increased job stress
6) Dose Miscalculations
7) Problems Related to Drugs and Drug Devices
8) Labeling and packaging problems
9) Drug delivery device design flaws
10) Incorrect Drug Administration
11) Lack of Patient Information
12) Lack of information on the patient’s disease state or condition
13) Lack of information on changes in a patient’s therapy
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Because causes of medication error are an intricate part of this dissertation, all
causes of medication errors as defined by Institute on Safe Medication Practices
have been included in the above list.
Two major categories of factors that influence error are physiological and
psychological (Leape 1994).  Physiological factors include fatigue, sleep
deprivation, drugs, alcohol, and sickness. Psychological factors include
distraction due to other activity, as well as emotional states such as boredom,
anger, fear, and anxiety. Psychological factors can be triggered by external
factors such as overwork, interpersonal relations, and other forms of stress
(Leape, 1994).  In the airline industry, as analogous to the medical industry,
fatigue is noted as the primary adverse physiological factor that is associated
with the occurrence of airline accidents.
3.5.3 System Practice in Pharmacy
It is important that with any activity in which safety matters, that activity
should be done purposefully, according to a system, in which each specific action
is understood to cause a specific result, and changes can be made in the system
to improve results (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002).  A
system can be defined as "an interdependent group of items, people, or
processes with a common purpose" (Langley, Nolan K, Nolan T, 1992).  Most
pharmacists develop a system of their own for processing prescription orders,
and it is important that this individual system be compatible with the system
developed by the employer (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference,
2002).  Systems that rely on error-free performance are doomed to failure
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(Leape, 1994).  An effective and efficient system can avert pharmacy errors and
create a fail-safe system environment that absorbs error in pharmacy.
When an error occurs, the most common reaction is to find someone to
blame.  In reality, most medication errors are due in large part to multiple
contributing factors that cut across numerous lines of responsibility, technical,
procedural, and managerial, all which are inclusive of a system.  Medication use
systems are complex and the dispensing of one prescription, or the
administration of even one dose of a medication, involves from 10 to 15 steps, of
which each step offers a potential pathway to error. According to Academy of
Managed Care Pharmacy: Frequently Asked Questions, each system involved in
each of the 10 to 15 steps, such as computer systems, dispensing devices or
drug delivery devices, are potential sources of error.  Preventing errors and
improving safety for patients require system modifications to rid the system of
factors that contribute to medication errors. Safe medication practice is about
minimizing the risk of patient safety incidents involving medicines (Cousins,
2005), not blaming individuals. There exists no recorded data that validates
medical errors being reduced as a result of blaming an individual.
3.6 Development of Hypotheses
A set of three hypotheses regarding the nature of organizational
characteristics and individuality have been developed and are presented in Table
3.1.  The first and second hypotheses are concerned with the characteristics of
the organization while the third hypothesis investigates the relationship between
the individual and the organizational culture.
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3.6.1 Organizational Characteristics
Organizational culture is the shared set of beliefs, values, and patterns of
behavior common to a group of people (Schermerhorn Jr., 1996).  The term
corporate culture and workplace culture are often used synonymously with
organizational culture.  Simply put, organizational culture is the environment in
which people work. In an organization, the likelihood to shape attitudes and
behavior exists and members are encouraged to apply their efforts to accomplish
important organizational goals.  It is very important to mention that there are two
levels of culture, the observable culture and the core culture.  Observable culture
is what the workplace environment looks like and what it sounds like.  The core
culture consists of the fundamental beliefs that manipulate behavior and give rise
to the aspects of observable culture.
Hypothesis 1 states that intervention will improve company culture.
Intervention can come in many forms.  Intervention can be a new process for
filling prescriptions, a new piece of equipment, an alarm installed as a fail-safe,
an external audit of the pharmacy, a workflow analysis, distribution of a
pharmacy-related information sheet or a survey of the organizational culture. For
example, a new process for filling a prescription could be a triple check on
prescription verification.  A new piece of equipment could be an automated
pharmaceutical dispenser.  An alarm could be installed within the electronic
prescription verification system to notify the pharmacist of a mix-match.  External
audit of the pharmacy could be performed by a non-affiliated entity outside of the
organization.  A workflow analysis could be performed to assess the functionality
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of the workflow.  The distribution of an information worksheet could serve as an
eye opener for pharmacy related issues.  A survey could serve as an
assessment of issues related to pharmacy and serve as an opportunity to gain
members’ perspective on dealings associated with pharmacy. In short, these
interventions are all considered as a type of defense that can be interjected into
the organization at anytime.  Defenses, barriers, and safeguards occupy a key
position in the system approach (Reason, 2000).   Some technological systems
have varying layers of defenses built into their organization.  The installation of
these interventions can be accomplished by an industrial engineer as well as a
human-factors specialist. In a nutshell, industrial engineers deal with work
design and productivity. Industrial engineers are capable of designing work and
creating policies and procedures that are conducive to a safe work environment
and healthy culture while maximizing productivity. Like industrial engineers,
human-factors specialists deal with the applied science of workplace equipment
design with the intent to maximize productivity by reducing operator fatigue and
discomfort which can cause errors.
As stated previously, it is important that with any activity in which safety
matters, that activity should be done purposefully, according to a system, in
which each specific action is understood to cause a specific result, and changes
can be made in the system to improve results (Pharmacy Law and Management
Conference, 2002).  Further, if we acknowledge the potential causal role of
culture in the success or failure of organization change, then it makes sense to
develop strategies for examining and redesigning cultural systems as an
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integrated aspect of change management (Dooley, n.d.).  Therefore, it seems
plausible that intervention may improve organizational culture. Change is
eminent for every type of culture as the world advances, technologically.
The chosen intervention applied to this research is a cultural assessment
survey as well as pharmacy related informational sheets. These tools served the
purpose of an organizational development comprehensive intervention.
Organizational Development comprehensive interventions are used to directly
create change throughout an entire organization (Gale, 2006). The reasoning
behind the use of a survey for the chosen intervention was to assess pharmacy
related issues and to gain the members’ perspective of their work environment.
The pharmacy related issues were in reference to medication errors, reporting
medication errors, patient safety, job task performance, relationships within the
work place, customer concerns, and management within pharmacy. Hence, an
evaluation of the culture is the only way to know if the culture is having an impact
on medication errors.
The use of the Non-Punitive Information sheet was to serve as an eye-
opener to the pharmacists.  It was intended to serve as information and inform
the pharmacists that such a culture does exist.  Further, it was intended to serve
as a stimulation tool for pharmacists to begin to report all medication errors
regardless of the severity.
The National Practitioner Data Bank sheet was to serve as a source of
truthful information in relation to the functioning of the National Practitioner Data
Bank. An anonymous pharmacist said, “the National Practioner Data Bank
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serves as a lynching mob for any medical personnel that makes an error.” The
researcher thought that that attitude may have an impact on reporting medication
errors.  Thus, an information sheet with specific information about the National
Practitioner Data Bank was included as part of the intervention.
A comprehensive and systematic data collection strategy was used to
identify organizational attitudes and individual moral make-up.  The data was
then analyzed for results (Chapter 5) and a plan of constructive action was made
(Chapter 6).
Table 3.1 Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Number Hypothesis
1 Intervention will improve company culture.
2 Low company culture scores are associated with a lownumber of reported errors.
3
Individuals with a greater fear of reporting errors versus the
average score will have lower company culture scores on
average than individuals with less fear.
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3.6.2 Error and Environment
The problem of error induced by work environment is admittedly a
complicated task.  Error itself is a complicated issue when looking at the bigger
picture, inclusive of the environment.  The workplace environment, commonly
referred to as organizational culture, produces behavior amongst its employees’
that govern the employees actions to certain situations that arise in the
workplace.  The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting
and Prevention (Council) has taken the position that differences in culture and in
defining a medication error may give rise to the varying number of medication
errors reported.  Hypothesis 2 states that low company culture scores will be
associated with a low number of reported errors. As discussed in Chapter 1, a
low company culture score means a low representation of that particular culture
within the organization.  A company could have a high score on one scale as it
relates to a particular culture and low score on another scale as it relates to
another type of culture.  In this dissertation, the individual score is compared to
the aggregate response from the survey group.  A company having a high score
on one scale and a low score on another scale would imply that the culture of
that organization resembles that culture associated with the highest scale score.
On the contrary, a company having a low score would less likely resemble that
particular culture.
Historically, measurement efforts have focused on practitioner reporting of
medication errors, which, at best, uncovers just a fraction of the errors, most of
them harmless (ISMP, March 2006). It is estimated that incident reports identify
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only 2% to 5% of reportable adverse drug events (AMCP, n.d.). Therefore, it
seems plausible that a low company culture score will be associated with a low
number of reported errors. If a pharmacist does not believe that the company will
support him/her in reporting a medication error, it is likely that the pharmacist
does not believe in the company culture and will exhibit a low company culture
score in relation to the culture in which he/she works. Without a detailed analysis
of mishaps, incidents, near misses, and "free lessons," we have no way of
uncovering recurrent error traps or of knowing where the "edge" is until we fall off
the cliff (Reason, 2000).  It is imperative that healthcare organizations encourage
all medication error reporting.
Gross and Ayres’ analyses of accident data across industries (as cited in
Barnes, 2000) show that human error plays a causal or contributing role in 50-
80% of significant accidents. Human error is widely acknowledged as the major
cause of quality, production, and safety risks in many industries (Process
Improvement Institute, 2005).  The most commonly designated cause of
accidents is human error (DeGreene, 1970). Based on human nature, human
error is certain and will surface in every part of the process life cycle. Although it
is unlikely that human error will ever be completely prevented, there is growing
recognition that many human performance problems stem from a failure within
organizations to develop an effective policy for managing human reliability
(Process Improvement Institute, 2005).  Human reliability identifies the likelihood
and consequences of human error.  As defined by Meister (as cited in DeGreene,
1970), human reliability is “the probability that a task will be successfully
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performed at any required stage of system operation within a criterion time
period”. As long as fail-safes are installed within a system, human reliability will
always be high.
In the system approach, according to Reason (as cited in Wholey,
Moscovice, Hietpas, Holtzman, 2003), errors are seen as consequences rather
than causes, having their origins not so much in the perversity of human nature
as in "upstream" systemic factors. Systemic factors include frequent and
reappearing error traps in the workplace and the organizational processes that
transport them through the system.  Processes are generally not well-protected
from human errors since many safeguards are focused on equipment failure
(Primatech, 2006).
3.7 The Problem
Professionals are trained to believe that perfect performance is not only
expected, it is also achievable (Leape, 1994).  Often in the public eye, physicians
are expected to perform their tasks flawlessly as infallible performers, and any
error that occurs is often seen as a failure of character more than anything else
(Felciano, 1995). Medical professionals are trained to become experts in their
field.  As defined by Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, an expert is one
with the special skill or knowledge representing mastery of a particular subject.
That definition does not mention infallible.  Psychologists would call this a false
belief because the reality is that regardless of how skilled, and careful, human
beings will make errors.
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There have been numerous causes linked to errors in the pharmacy.
Some of the causes are as follow: shortage of pharmacist and pharmacy
technicians; unrealistic workloads; lack of a double-check system; and high
frequency of replacement of brand name with many different generic name
drugs.  In a survey conducted by Pharmacy Today (as cited in Parker and
Waichman, 2005) pharmacists were asked, "What could cause dispensing
errors?" Of 187 responses from 171 pharmacists and 16 pharmacy
paraprofessionals, insufficient filling time and too many distractions were
identified as two of the major areas of concern (Parker and Waichman, 2005).
In a study of 500 pharmacist malpractice claims conducted by Pharmacists
Mutual Insurance Company, the following types of errors were identified: wrong
drug dispensed 52%, wrong strength dispensed 27%, wrong directions given
7.4%, for a total of 86.4% of errors that could have been prevented (Parker and
Waichman, 2005).
3.8 The Reality
When an error is discovered, most often through a complaint, there are
three options that a healthcare facility can exercise in response to the medication
error: admit it, deny it or ignore it.   Generally, if the healthcare facility admits that
an error occurred, the complaint is resolved quickly and at the least possible
cost. Colorado's largest malpractice insurer, COPIC, has enrolled 1,800
physicians in a disclosure program in which they immediately express remorse to
patients when medical care goes wrong and describe in detail what happened.
Since 2000, COPIC has reimbursed more than 400 patients an average of
64
$5,300 each for bad medical outcomes, or a total of about $2 million (Kowalczyk,
2005). If the complaint is denied, it could potentially cost the healthcare facility a
great deal of money. As stated by Jerome Buckley (as cited in Kowalczyk, 2005)
the cost of settling the doctors’ claims has dropped by 23%. If the complaint is
ignored and the healthcare facility is found liable, the cost to the healthcare
facility could be astronomical. Another example as stated by Richard Boothman
(as cited in Kowalczyk, 2005) states that the University of Michigan Health
System has cut claims in half and reduced settlements to $1.25 million from $3
million a year since developing a disclosure policy in 2002.
There are several reasons that many believe the error rate to be higher
than actually reported in the United States. Due to the punitive nature of most
healthcare systems, effective reporting is stifled.  Because of the extreme
sensitivity to legal impact of error, physicians are often unwilling to openly
discuss slips or mistakes they make in an effort to analyze what systemic
influences may have brought on these errors (Felciano, 2005).  Exposure to
liability for order processing errors is of great concern to pharmacists because
error correction is typically punishment in the form of malpractice tort litigation
(Felciano, 2005). As Troyen Brennan, author of “Practice Guidelines and
Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?” noted, one of the reasons that the
error rate is high is because promoting safety is primitive, based on the myth that
the way to eliminate errors is to perform perfectly, but human beings are
incapable of sustained perfect performance.  Brennan concluded that fear of
punishment for performance errors inhibits error reporting. Although it is
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reasonable to expect an employer to take seriously every pharmacy error, and to
seek means of improvement to prevent future errors, it is unreasonable to expect
an employer to discharge a pharmacist from employment simply for having made
an error (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002).  Pharmacists are
all human and all humans make mistakes.  Hypothesis 3 states that individuals
with greater fear of reporting errors will have lower company culture scores on
average than individuals with less fear.
The current system of error prevention focuses on blame and
accountability. The public seeks out someone to blame; the legal system seeks
out someone to pay, usually the one with the deepest pockets. Pharmacist
malpractice falls into the same category as medical malpractice, in the respect
that if pharmacists and pharmacy technicians fail to treat the patient with a
reasonable degree of skill and care, they are guilty of medical malpractice just
the same as a doctor, nurse or other health care provider (Reich and Binstock,
n.d.).
The culture of blame that exists in many healthcare systems creates
strong pressure on individuals to cover up mistakes rather than admit them
(AMCP FAQ, n.d.). The threat of malpractice litigation provides an additional
incentive to keep silent.  Considering the problem of medical errors as the
responsibility of individuals who are inseparable parts of systems has a better
potential for focusing on accountability without blame and on consequences
without necessitating that they "suffer" the consequences (McKereghan, 2003).
Therefore, it seems plausible that individuals with greater fear of reporting errors
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versus the average score will have lower company culture scores on average
than individuals with less fear.
3.8.1  Report or Remain Silent
When an error occurs, it may be discovered immediately or it could
possibly have a latent effect.  Upon discovery of the error, comes the decision to
report or not report the error.  The nature of the situation does indeed have some
bearing on the behavior of the participants (Callahan, 1989).  After all, behavior
patterns, beliefs, moral values, laws and traditions are the defining features of a
culture.  Sometimes the self-serving nature of the situation plays an important
role in an individual’s decision to speak up or to remain silent. Before the
decision to reveal that one was involved in a medication error, an event or series
of events must take place in order to trigger the decision making process
(Callahan, 1989). These series of events are related to the culture as well as the
individual moral make-up. These events determine if a person is going to report
the medication error or remain silent.
3.9 Theory Summary
Although a punitive response may be appropriate in some cases, it is not
an effective way to prevent errors from recurring as well as promoting error
reporting within the organization.  Healthcare systems must establish a non-
punitive environment and system for reporting errors within their organization.
Trust is an essential piece of a reporting culture. Pharmacists must trust that
they will not be fired.  They must trust that they will not be blamed.  They must
trust that the organization really wants the pharmacist to reveal the medication
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error.  They must trust that the organization stands completely and supportively
behind the pharmacist.  They must trust that the safest procedures are protocol
in the pharmacist’s duties.  Engineering a just culture is an essential early step in
creating a safe culture (Reason, 2000).  Although normative in nature, healthcare
organizations should provide or be provided resources to encourage error
reporting and to implement methods to alleviate errors. Healthcare facilities
should have procedures to identify and improve vulnerable parts of a system
prior to an error reaching the patient.
Developing a system to mitigate medication errors in pharmacy is a
priority in itself.  The priority is a life saving event. In order to develop a system
to alleviate the number of medication errors, this study will ascertain the validity
of the following hypotheses: 1) Intervention will improve company culture; 2) Low
company culture scores are associated with a low number of reported errors; and
3) Individuals with a greater fear of reporting errors versus the average score will
have lower company culture scores on average than individuals with less fear.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
4.1 Introduction
In order to study the phenomenon of medication errors in pharmacy, a
prospective multi-method approach has been implemented.  Because of the
inaccurate total of medication errors in the United States, it would be ideal to
study a pharmacist at work.  None the less, this approach was not conducive to a
safe work environment as an observer becomes an added distraction in the
already busy work environment of a pharmacist.  As stated in Chapter 4,
Theoretical Development, distractions were a primary cause of medication error.
The phenomenon of medication errors is complex in nature, therefore this
research chose a multi-analysis survey approach to analyze the pharmacist’s
perceived workplace culture and moral make-up.  This survey was developed in
an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of being an actual observer of
pharmacists at work.
4.2 Survey Development
The survey for this study was developed using the Corporate Culture
survey (Corporate Survey, n.d.) developed by Connect2 Corporation (See
Appendix C), as a foundation.  The first step in building upon the existing culture
survey was to determine if there were additional characteristics of a workplace
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culture that influence behavior at work, in this instance, pharmacist’s behavior at
work. Having the privilege to attend pharmacy meetings, the researcher noted
that some of the pharmacists had innovative ideas as to the structure of work and
how it should be performed.  Others expressed operating more efficiently while
maintaining quality, with specific regard to pharmacy layout and order
processing. Others spoke of integrity and doing what is right. Based upon the
pharmacists’ comments additional cultures, as listed, emerged: 1)
Integrity/Humanistic; 2) Efficiency/Quality; and 3) Innovative.  These were
cultures other than those cultures outlined in the Corporate Culture survey.  The
following cultures were outlined in the Corporate Culture survey: 1)
Deliberative/Traditional; 2) Established/Stable; and 3) Urgent/Seat of the Pants.
The additional cultures as well as moral implications associated with the
members of the culture emerged. The factors/characteristics that formed the
bases for each culture are outlined in Table 4.1. In many situations, culture has
a powerful influence on the moral order of an organization.  Generally, people
from the same type of culture have more or less identical realities and ways of
thinking (Maiese, 2003).  These identical realities and mindsets are what
contribute to the attributes of the moral make-up of a person belonging to a
certain type of organizational culture. The individual moral make-up in the
cultures studied is deduced from the trait characteristics that make up the culture
(See Appendix E). Table 4.2 lists the cultures studied and the corresponding
question numbers from the culture assessment survey.
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4.2.1 Integrity/Humanistic Culture
Organizational Integrity is a complex of virtues working together to form a
coherent character: a hopeful, identifiable, and purposeful community where trust
abounds (Ethics and Policy Integration Centre, 2003). Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary describes integrity as a firm adherence to a code of especially moral
or artistic values. Integrity often refers to a refusal to engage in lying, blaming, or
other behavior generally seeming to evade accountability which aims at the
discovery of some truth. Integrity is synonymous with honesty, hence the
measured paradigm. Critics argue that honesty tests measure many things
unrelated to honesty: fearfulness, traditionalism, street-wiseness, admission of
human frailty (Strategic Dimensions, n.d.).  Although the issue of medication
error is one that is fearful in itself, particularly to a pharmacist, the issue of
integrity must be addressed. At the end of the work day, do we ask the
pharmacist to have a seat and strap him/her to a lie detector and ask questions?
As the questions are being asked, do we inject the pharmacist and monitor his
eye movement and body language to detect truth telling? The inaccurate low
number of medication errors reported suggests that there is an integrity issue at
stake in pharmacy, hence the interest in integrity testing.
There are ways to objectively and effectively measure integrity.  The key
step is to identify integrity-based behavior in pharmacy. Behavior indicative of
integrity in pharmacy could be a pharmacist telling a patient that he/she has been
wrongly filling a prescription for a period of time or a pharmacist openly sharing a
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Table 4.1 Culture Characteristics
CULTURE CHARACTERISTICS
Integrity/Humanistic
 This culture tends to be an honest entity
 People in this type of organization consider
integrity to be at the top of the list
 The organization likely encourages a
nurturing environment
 Upper-level management communicates
clearly and frequently to employees
Efficiency/Quality-oriented Culture
 This culture tends to be quality oriented
 People in this type of organization tend to
be hard workers
 The organization likely has many informal
systems that allow the employee to do what
he/she needs to do to get the job done
 Upper-level management communicates
priorities frequently to employees
Innovative Culture
 This culture tends to be innovative
 People in this type of organization often
consider issues carefully prior to making
suggestions and/or solutions
 The organization likely has many formal
systems that allow the employee to feel
empowered and to communicate ideas
 This cultural type regularly hires groups of
new employees that are thinkers and doers
 Upper-level management communicates
frequently to employees
 Employees communicate frequently
Deliberative Culture
 This culture tends to be intellectual and
thoughtful
 People in this type of organization often
consider issues carefully prior to making a
change
 The organization likely has many formal
systems, yet flexibly forms and reforms
teams in accordance with immediate client
needs
 This cultural type regularly hires groups of
new employees, generating a valuable flow
of diverse talent with fresh perspectives
 Senior management communicates
frequently to employees
Established/Stable Culture
 This organization has most likely been
around for a long time and/or is a family
business. These organizations tend to have
solid institutional memories, so they are
likely not to waste resources by repeatedly
"reinventing the wheel"
 This type of company has processes in
place to address most situations
 Organizations of this type tend to cultivate
employees by encouraging development
through mentoring programs and/or formal
training opportunities
 This culture type is known for compensating
its people relatively well
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Urgent/Seat of the Pants Culture
 This culture type features a positive work
environment, with tight bonds among
employees
 It is likely that an aspect of this
organization's mission includes responding
to crisis. People care deeply about the
firm's mission and work hard to achieve the
organization's goals
 Employees who frequently hurry to beat the
clock can create great results in a short
time, provided that quality is a strong value
in the organization
 These organizations tend to have a flat
structure that fosters communication and
collaboration among employees and speeds
the decision-making process
Table 4.2 Cultures Studied and Corresponding Question Numbers
Culture Studied Corresponding Question Numbers
Integrity 2 – 13
Efficiency/Quality 14 – 19
Innovative 20 – 25
Deliberative/Traditional 26 – 30
Established/Stable 31 – 35
Urgent/Seat of the Pants 36 – 43
medication error with his/her colleagues.  Integrity means that it is not what is
said, but what is done.  Likewise, ethics is not about what we say or what we
intend, it’s about what we do (Scribbler’s Ink, 2005).  Remember the old
adage, “actions speak louder than words.” Integrity encompasses ethical
behavior, truthfulness, moral values, trustworthiness, and compassion as a
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measure of one’s general character. Integrity is the purposeful, knowledgeable,
trusting exercise of authority in service to a broader community (Ethics and
Policy Integration Centre, 2003).
The purpose of organizational ethics is to guide the design and
development of structures and systems to evolve toward organizational integrity
(Ethics and Policy Integration Centre, 2003). An organization with organizational
integrity is a community that has many of the characteristics of a tribe (Ethics and
Policy Integration Centre, 2003). Integrity is the strength, unity, clarity and
purpose that upholds and sustains all of the activities of the enterprise (Bracher,
n.d.). The characteristics of an organization exhibiting integrity according to
Ethics and Policy Integration Center are as follow: 1) core beliefs; 2) inward
motivation towards growth; 3) stability in leadership; 4) intense sense of loyalty
and devotion in support of the core beliefs.
According to Bracher, there are eight attributes of an integrity-centered
company: 1) character; 2) honesty; 3) openness; 4) authority; 5) partnership; 6)
performance; 7) charity; and 8) graciousness.  Character is demonstrated by the
organization following through on statements made in the organization.  Honesty
is demonstrated through truthful communication.  Openness is demonstrated
through sharing appropriate information.  Authority is demonstrated through
employee empowerment.  Partnership is demonstrated through organizational
commitment to fulfill obligations.  Performance is demonstrated through
accountability throughout the entire organization from the ground-floor up.
Charity is demonstrated through generous public service throughout the
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community.  Graciousness is demonstrated when the organization respects both
the employee and the customer. The gist of an integrity based organization is
one that is honest, nurturing, and communicates openly, clearly, and frequently
to its employees. Employees tend to get self-satisfaction from performing their
job.  They are very knowledgeable in their field, love every aspect of their job and
get a high sense of honor when asked to explain a job-related function.
The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to an
integrity/humanistic culture are Questions 2 through 13. Through the use of
deductive reasoning based upon the previous paragraphs in this section, the
following statements are applicable to the moral implications of individuals in this
culture. 1) Individuals are people with a strong sense of honesty; 2) These
individuals are aware of the governing boards for their profession; 3) These
individuals believe in doing what is right and supports full disclosure of the
medical errors; and 4) These individuals believe in telling the truth, regardless of
how difficult it may be.
4.2.2 Efficiency/Quality Oriented Culture
Efficiencies are defined as reforms that 1) reduce resources (eg, people or
assets), while maintaining the same level of service provision; 2) result in
additional outputs, such as enhanced quality or quantity of service, for the same
resources; 3) remodel service provision to enable better outcomes (IDeA, n.d.).
Quality Culture Changer uses the knowledge of mistake attributes and human
behavior to create cultural changes essential in promoting error-proofing. Easy
to learn and use, these principles help organization leaders recognize why most
75
quality initiatives are destined to fail before they begin. Identifying and avoiding
actions that reward or punish mistakes removes key barriers to error-proofing.
According to Woods (1996), author of The Six Values of a Quality Culture,
there are six values intrinsic to a quality culture.  Those six values are: 1) We’re
all in this together company; 2) No subordinates or superiors allowed; 3) Open,
honest communication is vital; 4) Everyone has access to all the information they
need; 5) Focus on processes; 6) There are no successes or failures, just learning
experiences.  These six values work together to form an efficient culture.
The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to the
efficiency/quality oriented culture are Questions 14 through 19. The following
statements about individual moral make-up characteristics were derived through
deductive reasoning by use of the above information: 1) These individuals want
to produce a high quality product in the form of wellness for the patient; 2) These
individuals in this culture want fast results without compromising quality; 3) These
individuals create an efficient way of doing business; 4) These individuals will be
truthful because they do not want to compromise quality.  Any untruthfulness will
make their system unbalanced and quality will be compromised.
4.2.3 Innovative Culture
Organizations with innovative cultures establish excellent working
relationships at every level of the organization.  Employees tend to feel happy,
motivated, and fulfilled. Channels of communication are established among
employees, middle management and senior management (IES Consulting, n.d.).
The employees welcome, share, and appreciate each other’s ideas.
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Communication channels are open, upward and downward (Corporate Survey,
n.d.).  Employees tend to be loyal, productive, and have excellent rapport with
the customers. These organizations have a crystal clear vision that is shared by
every member of the organization. Members fathom how their role plays a part
in the organization’s ability to accomplish its goals. This is crucial to its success.
Key elements of an innovative culture include: 1) a fear free workplace
to tryout new ideas and take risks; 2) open communication; 3) resources in the
form of time, money and people; 4) mutual support from colleagues and
management; 5) praise for success and failure. In a culture of openness,
intelligent risk taking is encouraged and intelligent failure is perceived as an
opportunity for learning (IES Consulting, n.d.). Mistakes are dealt with
constructively and good work/behavior is effectively rewarded (Corporate Survey,
n.d.). Happy accidents – good things happening by accident - and unexpected
surprises are encouraged through creativity. Creativity necessarily involves the
destruction of old - and sometimes comfortable and perfectly good - ways of
doing business (Schuler, 2002). In an innovative culture, creativity and quality
exceeds quantity in terms of value.
It appears that fostering innovation requires the proper mix of structure
and flexibility (Runyon, 2005).  More flexibility and less structure aids in the
creation of an environment that is conducive to fostering an innovative culture.
The strength and success of these organizations can be attributed to: 1) open
and candid dialogue between employees and management; 2) win-win based
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solutions for all stakeholders and 3) employee-employer desire to want the other
to succeed.
The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to the innovative
culture are Questions 20 through 25. The following statements about individual
moral make-up characteristics were derived through deductive reasoning by use
of the above information:  1) The moral implications of individuals in this culture
are caring, sharing, and confident; 2) These individuals care about patient safety;
3) They are confident and do not feel ashamed about reporting/sharing a
medication error; and 4) These individuals are creative, which is a characteristic
of innovative, and they are capable of telling the truth in many ways without fully
disclosing the whole truth.
4.2.4 Deliberative/Traditional Culture
According to www.webster.com, tradition is defined as an inherited,
established, or customary pattern of thought, action, or behavior as a social
custom.  Further, it states that tradition is the handing down of information,
beliefs, and customs by word of mouth or by example from one generation to
another without written instruction. An organization that has a traditional culture
has a top-down style of bureaucratic management.  The organization seldom
rewards achievement, but often reprimands for errors. This negative reward
system leads members to shift responsibility to others to avoid being blamed
(Corporate Survey, n.d.).  Organizations that have a traditional culture have
some cult-like characteristics.  Members feel like they should be in accord with,
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gain the approval of, and be liked by others.  Members are expected to conform,
follow the rules, and make a good impression (Corporate Survey, n.d.).
According to the authors of “What Is Your Corporate Culture?”, a
workplace that has a traditional culture tends to be intellectual and thoughtful
(McGinty and Moss, 2001). The employees in the traditional culture think about
issues carefully before reaching a decision, hence the word deliberate. The
Business Edge (n.d.) states that a deliberate culture begins with an overall
mission that defines the firm’s central focus and a vision of what the company
wants to become.  In a deliberative/traditional culture, the actions are intentional,
purposeful, and deliberate.  The rules are made to be followed and any disregard
for the rules implies negligence and disrespect for the organization.
The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to the
deliberative/traditional culture are Questions 26 through 30. The following
statements about individual moral make-up characteristics were derived through
deductive reasoning by use of the above information: 1) Individuals in this culture
care about their jobs and understand how each task in doing his/her job is
purposeful in producing a desired outcome; 2) These individuals are detail-
oriented, knowledgeable, and well-rounded, as they socialize with people of
diverse professional backgrounds; and 3) These individuals will tell the truth as
long as it is in the best interest of the company. Otherwise, silence may be the
chosen alternative.
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4.2.5 Established/Stable Culture
In the past, the behavior, beliefs, and environment of a stable culture were
equally supportive. The beliefs support the behaviors, the behaviors fit
comfortably into the environment, and this in turn helps to reinforce the beliefs
(Gilman, 1997).  Merriam-Webster Online defines stable as firmly established
and designed so as to develop forces that restore the original condition when
disturbed from a condition of equilibrium or steady motion.  The latter part of this
definition – develop forces that restore the original condition - is what prompted a
change in the direction of two of the questions (Question 31 and 34) asked in the
survey as opposed to the questions (Question 6 and 9) asked in the “What is
Your Corporate Culture?” survey.  In a stable culture, the response to employees
not getting along and customer concerns are pre-scripted and timely.  In other
words, when employees are not getting along, the supervisor checks the
company protocol and that is what is delegated to the employees. Likewise,
when customers have concerns, the company follows protocol in a speedy
resolution to the problem.  These stable cultures want their organization to be
undisturbed and have installed pre-scripted measures to address issues that
cause a fluctuation in their system of doing things. These cultures are
established and have an attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  An organization
with a stable culture resists change. If the level of stress in this culture grows to
a noticeable level that imbalances the stability of the organizational culture, it is
difficult for the organization to return to the stableness.
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The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to the
established/stable culture are Questions 31 through 35. The following
statements about individual moral make-up characteristics were derived through
deductive reasoning by use of the above information: 1) The individuals maintain
a balanced work life and are content in the work environment; 2) These
individuals do not like change or conflict and as a result, these individuals follow
protocol on every issue that arises; 3) They find peace in a stable environment.
4) They are likely to bend the truth so as to not upset the balance of the
workplace.  They will adjust the truth so that it fits nicely into one of the “if this
happens, then do this” procedures; and 5) They feel comfortable knowing that a
protocol exists for every issue.
4.2.6 Urgent/Seat of the Pants Culture
Gandhi (as quoted in the 2005, August article published in Executive
Coaching and Change Management, “What’s Important Isn’t Necessarily
Urgent”) says, “if you want the world to be filled with hyper-efficient robots,
obsessively focused on getting their own tasks done at the expense of others'
progress, never veering off to look at a friend's new project, or to answer a
colleague's question, then by all means, please be that sort of person.” The
article also states that the term urgency suggests a ruthlessly businesslike
approach to time management.  This approach to time management is
considered flying by the seat of the pants. According to Edge/Schneider
Consulting Group, people began "flying by the seat of their pants" about 100
years ago.  If quality is deeply instilled within the workplace culture, employees
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who rush to beat the deadline can obtain great results. For time management
tasks the quality of the output will often relate to the amount of input into the
project.
The culture assessment survey questions that pertain to the urgent/seat of
the pants culture are Questions 36 through 43. The following statements about
individual moral make-up characteristics were derived through deductive
reasoning by use of the above information: 1) These individuals feel competent
at performing their duties; 2) They are often driven by money.  However, if the
price is right, they will stay with the employer for a long time; and 3) These
individuals are more than likely to not tell the truth.  These individuals are in a
hurry and will undoubtedly say what is needed in order to complete a task.
4.3 Scale Development
Scales were developed for this study using the Corporate Culture survey,
developed by Connect2 Corporation, as a foundation. Using the factors
discussed in each culture type from Section 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 above, a list of
measures for which scales were developed is listed in Table 4.3. Item pools for
each scale were developed to fit a pharmaceutical work environment as
suggested by several pharmacists.  A high score would represent a high level of
the paradigm as a low score would be representative of a low level of the
paradigm.  As with every culture, there are advantages and disadvantages
commonly referred to as pitfalls, which formed the basis for the data assessment
measures (Appendix D). The data assessment measures for the
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Deliberative/Traditional, Established/Stable, and Urgent/Seat of the Pants
cultures were developed by Connect2 Corporation.
Table 4.3 List of Measures
SCALE
NUMBER MEASURE PARADIGM
SURVEY
QUESTION
NUMBER
1 Integrity Personal honesty/morals 2 - 13
2 Efficiency/quality Personally rewarding 14 - 19
3 Innovativeness Idea-driven; win/win 20 – 25
4 Traditional Company honesty 26 – 30
5 Stableness If it ain’t broke don’t fix it 31 -35
6 Urgency It’s due yesterday 36 - 43
4.4 Pilot Test
The initial items were piloted on 10 pharmacists.  The subjects were given
a brief introduction to the study and asked to complete and critique the
questionnaire.  All surveys were administered on an individual basis.  In all
cases, the time needed to complete the battery was less than 15 minutes. After
the data were collected, an item analysis was conducted and the items were
revised (See Appendix E).  The subjects for this study are pharmacists at an
undisclosed facility in Florida.  Subject participation in this study is completely
voluntary.
4.5 Sample Size Justification
The sample size and power calculations are carried out using the PASS
2002 software (PASS 2002 Release: May 2, 2002, NCSS Statistical Software,
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Kaysville, Utah). The sample size was chosen based on the detection of a
statistically significant difference in the primary outcome measures of the primary
aim of the study. These measures are the six subscales from the company
culture questionnaire: 1) Integrity/Humanistic Culture; 2) Efficiency/Quality
Oriented Culture; 3) Innovative Culture, 4) Deliberative/Traditional Culture 5)
Established/Stable Culture, and 6) Urgent/Seat of the Pants Culture. These sub-
scales are described in detail including the advantages as well as pitfalls of each
culture in Appendix D.
This research involves two treatment groups, a control group and an
intervention group.  Each group was measured independently and co-
dependently. Repeated measures analysis of variance was used to test the effect
due to time (pre versus post intervention), treatment group (control versus
intervention), and the interaction between time and treatment group.  Of primary
interest is knowing if the change from pre to post is different for the two treatment
groups as well as the interaction effect.
No preliminary data exist to suggest what the average baseline value will
be for any of the scales, therefore the sample size justification is based upon
effect size.  Effect size is a measure of how big a difference in response there is
between the two treatment groups. Effect size as defined by the Institute of
Educational Sciences, refers to the standardized magnitude of the effect or the
departure from the null hypothesis. The effect size is calculated as a difference
between two population means divided by the appropriate standard deviations
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(Institute of Educational Sciences U.S. Department of Education, n.d.) as follow:
1) the standard deviation of the treatment group means for the main effect due to
treatment; 2) the standard deviation of the interaction effect group means for the
interaction effect; and 3) the standard deviation of the time means for the time
effect.
It was anticipated that 60 subjects could be recruited for this study. Thus,
it was anticipated that approximately 30 subjects would be in the control group
and approximately 30 subjects would be in the intervention group.  Each subject
was measured twice as represented in a pre and post survey.  Assuming no
change in the company culture score from pre to post intervention in the control
group and a 70% increase which is based upon the result of the sample size of
30 in the intervention group, the between-subject standard deviation is 0.71
calculated as the standard deviation of the treatment group means and the
within-subject standard deviation is 1.00. This design achieves 94% power when
an F test is used to test the groups (control and intervention) factor at a 5%
significance level and the actual standard deviation among the appropriate
means is 0.33 – this is the standard deviation of the two group means when
averaged over both time points separately for each group – which represents an
effect size of 0.47.  The design achieves 95% power when an F test is used to
test the times (pre and post) factor at a 5% significance level and the actual
standard deviation among the appropriate means is 0.33 and represents an
effect size of 0.33.  The design achieves 81% power when an F test is used to
test the group by time interaction at a 5% significance level and the actual
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standard deviation among the appropriate means is 0.26 and represents an
effect size of 0.26. Thus, a sample size of 60 is justifiable for this study.
4.6 Statistical Methods
All statistical analyses will be performed using SPSS for Windows (SPSS
12.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). The study sample will be described using
measures of central tendency (mean and median) and dispersion (standard
deviation and range) for continuous/ordinal scaled variables and frequency and
percent for categorical scaled variables. All of the analyses was two-sided with a
5% alpha level unless specified otherwise.
For the primary aim of the study, hypothesis 1, the intervention will
improve the company culture scores, repeated measures analysis of variance will
be used to test the effect on the company culture scales due to the interaction
between time and treatment group. The total variability in the response variable
may be attributable to subjects, time, treatment group and interaction between
treatment group and time. The repeated measures analysis of variance allows
testing of whether time, group, and interaction between time and group are
statistically significant factors in explaining the total variation in the dependent
variable.  For the secondary aim of the primary outcome measures, repeated
measures analysis of variance was used to test the effect on the company
culture scales due to the main effects of time and treatment group.
For hypothesis 2, adverse company culture scores (i.e. low scores) are
associated with a low number of reported errors, scatter plots and Pearson
correlation coefficients are used to measure the linear association between each
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of the baseline company culture scales and the number of errors reported at
baseline.
For hypothesis 3, individuals with greater fear of reporting errors are
expected to have more adverse (i.e. lower) company culture scores on average
than individuals with less fear, one-way analysis of variance is used to compare
the distribution of baseline company culture scales between the various
categories of Question 1 of the questionnaire, which is a surrogate measure of
the subject’s level of fear toward reporting errors. If the analysis of variance is
found to be statistically significant, post-hoc Bonferroni adjusted two-sample t-
tests can be used to determine which groups are different from which.
For exploratory purposes scatterplots and Pearson correlation statistics
are used to evaluate the associations among all six company culture scores.
Where necessary, either non-parametric techniques or transformation of
variables was implemented in order to achieve normal distributions.
4.7 Procedure
Taking a blind stab at a random number table designated the starting point
for stacking the surveys.  The random number table was read from top to bottom.
The odd numbers represented a control group survey and the even numbers
represented an intervention group survey.  The intervention group survey had
literature attached to the end of the survey.  The literature was a non-punitive
information sheet (Appendix F) and a National Practitioner Data Bank information
sheet (Appendix G). Making a guest appearance at a weekly pharmacy meeting,
a brief introduction to the survey was given.  The surveys were stacked
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according to a random number table to allow randomization in the study. The
potential subjects were asked to take a survey if they wish to participate in the
study and to return it to the slot in the locked box located inside the pharmacy.
The data was retrieved on a weekly basis over a two week period. Three months
later, the subjects were re-surveyed in an identical format as the initial survey.
4.8 Survey Distribution and Collection
Eighty-five pharmacists at an undisclosed location in Florida were
surveyed as part of this research.  Fifty-two pharmacists completed and returned
the survey resulting in a response rate of 61 percent.  Of those fifty-two
responses, 11 were deemed to be unusable because they had not completed
either the initial or the follow-up survey.  Therefore, a total of 48 percent of the
target population were included in the analysis.  Due to the sensitivity of this
research in respect to the potential for retaliation for admitting to a medication
error, the informed consent was waived.  The low response rate could possibly
be contributed to the sampling procedure or fear of reprisal or the lack of time
available for an already overworked pharmacist to complete.
4.9 Method Summary
Of the six organizational cultures discussed above, it was determined that
the culture representative of the organization studied in this research had an
integrity/humanistic workplace culture.  This is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 6.  Although it was anticipated that sixty pharmacists would participate in
this study, only forty-one were recruited. However, the statistical measures
remained the same but, the effect size had to be recalculated based upon the
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group (control and intervention) distribution.  Chapter 5 explains in detail the
changes in the effect size to account for a lower number of participants.
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Chapter 5
Data Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The data was collected on a weekly basis during the pre and post
timeframe, sorted according to group (control or intervention), and coded (a false
response represented a value of 0 and a true response represented a value of
1).  The coded data was put into an Excel spreadsheet and then analyzed using
SPSS for Windows.   While some surveys were missing data, the researcher
chose to replace the missing values with the average for all non-missing
questions within a given scale, by a study participant. SPSS supports the
replacement of missing values with the series mean (SPSS, 1997). None of the
surveys required more than 3 missing values to be replaced. Both descriptive
and inferential statistical methods were employed.  All testing was based on
determining statistical significance at a two-sided alpha level of 0.05. As stated
in Chapter 4, the study sample was described using measures of central
tendency (mean and median) and dispersion (standard deviation and range) for
continuous variables and frequency and percentage for categorical variables.
Repeated measures analysis of variance was used to test the effect due to time
(pre versus post intervention), treatment group (control versus intervention), and
the interaction between time and treatment group.
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5.1.1 Variations to Statistical Methods
Although an attempt was made to recruit 60 possible participants, only 52
responded, 41 of which had usable data.  There were a total of 41 valid surveys
which corresponded to the N-value used for statistical analyses of the data.   The
group distribution (control and experimental) for the 41 participants is located in
Table 5.1.   The control group had a total of 16 participants and the intervention
group had a total of 25 participants.  To accommodate the lower number of
participants than expected and to validate the data, a repeated measures design
with one between factor, treatment group (Control versus Intervention), and one
within factor, time (Pre versus Post) was used to analyze the data. This design
uses the Geisser-Greenhouse correction as referred to in SPSS.  It is a
correction factor that is computed which corrects the degrees of freedom more
than other F-tests (Keppel, n.d.). This design achieves 44% power to test the
treatment factor using a Geisser-Greenhouse Corrected F Test with a 5%
significance level when the actual standard deviation is 0.04 which represents an
effect size of 0.29.  It achieves 88% power to test the time factor using a Geisser-
Greenhouse Corrected F Test with a 5% significance level when the actual
standard deviation is 0.04 which represents an effect size of 0.50.  The design
achieves 88% power to test the interaction between treatment and time using a
Geisser-Greenhouse Corrected F Test with a 5% significance level when the
actual standard deviation is 0.04 and represents an effect size of 0.50.
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Table 5.1 Group Distribution
Group Frequency Percent
Control 16 39
Intervention 25 61Valid
Total 41 100
It was stated in Chapter 4 that Hypothesis 2, adverse company culture
scores (i.e.low scores) will be associated with a low number of reported errors,
would be analyzed using scatter plots and Pearson correlation coefficients in
order to measure the linear association between each of the baseline company
culture scales and the number of errors reported at baseline. The Pearson
correlation coefficient measures the strength and direction of a linear relationship
between the X and Y variables (Lethen, 1996). The data collected for
Hypothesis 2 was comprehensive of the entire pharmacy instead of on an
individual basis.  Therefore, a quantitative and qualitative approach was taken to
answer Hypothesis 2.
Although in Chapter 4, it was stated that for Hypothesis 3, individuals with
greater fear of reporting errors will have more adverse (i.e. lower) company
culture scores on average than individuals with less fear, a one-way analysis of
variance will be used.  The one-way analysis of variance was to compare the
distribution of baseline company culture scales between the various categories of
Question 1 of the survey.  The various scales represented a surrogate measure
of the subject’s level of fear toward reporting errors.  Because of the responses
received for Question 1, a different test statistic was employed. Two-sample t-
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tests were used to compare the average company culture scores for Question 1
of the survey, between those who said they would report errors “immediately”
versus those who did not say they would report the error immediately.  Pearson’s
correlation coefficient was used to measure the linear association between the
company culture scores.
5.1.2 Derivation of Scale Scores
Scale scores were derived according to the instructions provided by
Connect Two.  The number of true responses were counted and the subscale
which had the most true responses, percentage wise, was indicative of that type
of culture in the organization studied.  If there were the same number of true
responses in more than one section, the culture match is assigned to this
combination of types (www.ConnectTwo.com).  Table 5.2 summarizes the data
for pre and post survey for each scale.  Minimum refers to the lowest scale score
that was marked by at least one participant for one of the scale categories.
Pre_Scale 6 as well as Post_Scale 6 had the lowest minimum percentage of 0.13
which indicates that the culture present was less likely to be that of urgent/seat of
the pants type of culture. Maximum refers to the highest scale score that was
marked by a participant for one of the scale categories in which a score of 1
indicated that at least one participant marked each item as true in a particular
category.  Pre_Scales 1, 3, 4, and 5 as well as Post_Scales 1, 3, 4, and 5 all had
a maximum score of 1.  Not one participant agreed with all the attributes of
Pre_Scales 2 and 6 as well as Post_Scales 2 and 6. Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and
5.4 depict this graphically in a frequency histogram. Scale 2 refers to an
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efficiency/quality oriented culture while Scale 6 refers to an urgent/seat of the
pants culture. Figure 5.2 represents Pre-Scale 6 data and Figure 5.4 represents
the Post Scale 6 data.  Both figures seem to be of a bi-modal nature.
Individually, the histograms seem to illustrate two values or data ranges that
appear most often.  This could reflect the presence of two different processes
being mixed. For instance, this could be a result of pharmacists operating on two
different shifts. Overall, what Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 illustrate is that there
was not at least one pharmacist in the pre and post survey that agreed (true
response) to all questions relative to the efficiency/quality oriented culture
(Questions 14-19) nor the urgent/seat of the pants culture (Questions 36-43).
Table 5.2 Pre and Post Survey Data for Scales
Statistics
NScale
Valid
Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Pre_Scale1 41 0.77 0.80 0.13 0.44 1
Pre_Scale2 41 0.51 0.50 0.17 0.17 0.83
Pre_Scale3 41 0.63 0.67 0.17 0.33 1
Pre_Scale4 41 0.74 0.80 0.23 0.25 1
Pre_Scale5 41 0.74 0.80 0.21 0.40 1
Pre_Scale6 41 0.50 0.50 0.17 0.13 0.75
Post_Scale1 41 0.78 0.80 0.12 0.50 1
Post_Scale2 41 0.53 0.50 0.14 0.17 0.83
Post_Scale3 41 0.67 0.67 0.18 0.17 1
Post_Scale4 41 0.74 0.80 0.21 0.20 1
Post_Scale5 41 0.76 0.80 0.19 0.40 1
Post_Scale6 41 0.53 0.63 0.17 0.13 0.75
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Scale Score
Figure 5.1 Pre_Scale 2 Frequency Histogram
Note: All values are in generic units
Scale Score
Figure 5.2 Pre_Scale 6 Frequency Histogram
Note: All values are in generic units
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Scale Score
Figure 5.3 Post_Scale 2 Frequency Histogram
Note: All Values are in generic units
Scale Score
Figure 5.4 Post_Scale 6 Frequency Histogram
Note: All Values are in generic units
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
96
5.2 Hypothesis 1 Data Analysis
For Hypothesis 1, intervention will improve the company culture scores,
repeated measures analysis of variance was used to test the effect on the
company culture scales due to the interaction between time and treatment group.
Table 5.3 shows that the main effect for time was not statistically significant
(P=0.827).  Additionally, Table 5.3 shows that the interaction effect between time
and treatment group was not statistically significant (P=0.084). In other words,
the National Practitioner Data Bank information and the Non-Punitive Culture
information sheet had no significant effect from pre to post survey on the
improvement of company culture scores.
Table 5.3 Tests of Within-Subjects Effect Scale 1
Source
Type III
Sum of
Squares
df MeanSquare F P
Sphericity
Assumed 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Greenhouse-
Geisser 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Huynh-Feldt 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Time
Lower-bound 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Sphericity
Assumed 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Greenhouse-
Geisser 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Huynh-Feldt 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
time *
group
Lower-bound 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Table 5.4 shows that the main effect of treatment group was not
statistically significant (P=0.099).  Table 5.5 and Figure 5.5 show how the
average score differed between the control and intervention groups.  The control
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group had an average Scale 1 score of 0.803 while the intervention group’s
average Scale 1 score was 0.743. The average scale score shows how likely the
group studied is of that particular culture.  It is expected that the pre and post
scale scores would be minimally different. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6 show the
pattern of variation in the average Scale 1 over time.  The average Scale 1 score
was 0.78 versus 0.77 for pre and post, respectively. This implies that when the
pharmacists were asked questions relative to an integrity type culture (Questions
2-13), the pharmacists were quite consistent in the survey responses from pre to
post.
Table 5.4 Test of Between-Subject Effect Scale 1
Source Type III Sumof Squares df Mean Square F P( 2-tailed)
Group 0.069 1 0.069 2.849 0.099
Table 5.5 Average Scale 1 Score for Treatment Groups
95% Confidence IntervalGroup Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Control 0.803 0.027 0.747 0.858
Intervention 0.743 0.022 0.699 0.788
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Control Intervention
Figure 5.5 Group Variation Average Scale 1 Score
Note: All Values are in generic units
Table 5.7 and Figure 5.7 show how the pattern of variation in the average
score over time differed for the control and intervention groups.  The average
Scale 1 score decreased for the control group from pre (0.819) to post (0.786)
while the intervention group increased from pre (0.731) to post (0.756).
Table 5.6 Variation in Average Scale 1 Score Over Time
95% Confidence IntervalTime Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pre 0.775 0.02 0.734 0.815
Post 0.771 0.019 0.733 0.809
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                                     Pre                                                          Post
Figure 5.6 Variation Average Scale 1 Score Over Time
Note: All Values are in generic units
Table 5.7 Group Variation in Average Scale 1 Score Over Time
95% Confidence IntervalGroup time Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pre 0.819 0.031 0.756 0.882Control
Post 0.786 0.029 0.727 0.846
Pre 0.731 0.025 0.68 0.781Intervention
Post 0.756 0.023 0.709 0.803
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Figure 5.7 Group Variation Average Scale 1 Score Over Time
Note: All Values are in generic units
Repeated measures of analysis of variance was used to test the main
effects and the interaction effect for each of the six scales.  The data for Scale 1
was presented above.  After analyzing the data for Scales 2 through Scale 6 it
was found that the main effect for time, the interaction effect between time and
treatment group, as well as the main effect of treatment group were not
statistically significant. In other words, pre to post had no bearing on the Scale 2
through Scale 6 nor did the interaction of pre and post in relation to the control
group and the intervention group.  Further, the control group and the intervention
group had no effect on the cultures studied from Scale 2 through Scale 6.
A comprehensive table for tests of within-subjects effects for all six scales
was produced and included in Appendix H. The p-value for all within-subjects
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effect was greater than 0.05.  This implies that the within-subjects, pre versus
post, had no bearing on this study. The data for Scale 1 through Scale 6 is
summarized in Tables 5.8 through 5.11.  The range of P-values in Table 5.8 goes
from 0.099 (Scale 1) to 0.831 (Scale 5).  Note that all P-values are greater than
0.05 which indicates that the between-subjects effect is not significant.  Table 5.9
shows that the control group’s Scale 1 score had the greatest mean of 0.803 and
the intervention group’s Scale 6 score had the lowest mean of 0.493. This
implies that the culture studied is more like Scale 1 (Integrity) for the control
group and less like Scale 6 (Urgency) for the intervention group. In Table 5.10,
Scale 1 pre-survey had the greatest mean score of 0.775 and standard error of
0.02 while Scale 6 pre-survey had the lowest mean score of 0.507 and a
standard error of 0.027. Again, this implies that the pre-survey culture was more
like Scale 1 (Integrity) and less like Scale 6 (Urgency). In fact, the organization
studied had relatively similar scores for Scale 1 (Integrity = 0.775), Scale 3
(0.634), Scale 4 (0.743) and Scale 5 (0.742).  Since Scale 1 (Integrity) was the
highest the evaluations of the study is based on that scale. Table 5.11
summarizes the average scale score from the treatment groups over time (pre
and post).
Although the tables and graphs provide useful information, none of the
results validated Hypothesis 1.  Therefore, it is concluded that intervention in the
forms presented in this research -survey development and informational sheets-
will not improve company culture scores.  On another note, had the research
been setup with a P-value less than 0.1 as significant, the between-subject effect
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would have been marginally significant for Scale 1 (P=.099).  This would have
indicated that the observed difference is too large to be explained by chance
alone.  In other words, we would have failed to reject the hypothesis that
intervention will improve the company culture scores.
Table 5.8 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Scale Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F P
Scale 1 Group 0.069 1 0.069 2.849 0.099
Scale 2 Group 0.011 1 0.011 0.309 0.581
Scale 3 Group 0.064 1 0.064 1.473 0.232
Scale 4 Group 0.015 1 0.015 0.201 0.656
Scale 5 Group 0.003 1 0.003 0.046 0.831
Scale 6 Group 0.068 1 0.068 1.661 0.205
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Table 5.9 Average Score for Treatment Groups
95% Confidence IntervalScale Group Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Control 0.803 0.027 0.747 0.858
Scale 1
Intervention 0.743 0.022 0.699 0.788
Control 0.506 0.033 0.439 0.574
Scale 2
Intervention 0.53 0.027 0.476 0.584
Control 0.689 0.037 0.614 0.764
Scale 3
Intervention 0.632 0.03 0.572 0.691
Control 0.755 0.048 0.657 0.852
Scale 4
Intervention 0.727 0.039 0.649 0.805
Control 0.747 0.044 0.658 0.836
Scale 5
Intervention 0.759 0.035 0.688 0.83
Control 0.552 0.036 0.48 0.625
Scale 6
Intervention 0.493 0.029 0.435 0.551
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Table 5.10 Average Scale Score Over Time
95% Confidence Interval
Scale Time Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pre 0.775 0.02 0.734 0.815
Scale 1
Post 0.771 0.019 0.733 0.809
Pre 0.511 0.028 0.455 0.567
Scale 2
Post 0.525 0.022 0.48 0.571
Pre 0.634 0.028 0.579 0.69
Scale 3
Post 0.686 0.028 0.629 0.744
Pre 0.743 0.037 0.668 0.818
Scale 4
Post 0.739 0.035 0.669 0.809
Pre 0.742 0.035 0.671 0.812
Scale 5
Post 0.764 0.031 0.702 0.826
Pre 0.507 0.027 0.453 0.562
Scale 6
Post 0.538 0.027 0.483 0.594
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Table 5.11 Group Variation in Average Scale Score Over Time
95% Confidence Interval
Scale Group Time Mean Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pre 0.819 0.031 0.756 0.882
Control
Post 0.786 0.029 0.727 0.846
Pre 0.731 0.025 0.68 0.781
Scale 1
Intervention
Post 0.756 0.023 0.709 0.803
Pre 0.502 0.043 0.415 0.589
Control
Post 0.51 0.035 0.44 0.581
Pre 0.52 0.035 0.45 0.59
Scale 2
Intervention
Post 0.54 0.028 0.483 0.597
Pre 0.639 0.043 0.552 0.725
Control
Post 0.74 0.044 0.65 0.829
Pre 0.63 0.034 0.56 0.7
Scale 3
Intervention
Post 0.633 0.035 0.562 0.705
Pre 0.772 0.058 0.654 0.889
Control
Post 0.738 0.054 0.628 0.847
Pre 0.714 0.046 0.62 0.808
Scale 4
Intervention
Post 0.74 0.043 0.653 0.827
Pre 0.731 0.054 0.622 0.841
Control
Post 0.763 0.048 0.666 0.859
Pre 0.752 0.043 0.664 0.84
Scale 5
Intervention
Post 0.766 0.038 0.689 0.843
Pre 0.527 0.042 0.442 0.612
Control
Post 0.578 0.043 0.492 0.664
Pre 0.488 0.034 0.42 0.556
Scale 6
Intervention
Post 0.499 0.034 0.43 0.568
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5.3 Hypothesis 2 Data Analysis
The number of reported medication errors that occurred in pharmacy
during the pre and post survey as well as the prior year pre and post survey
timeframe are included in Table 5.12.  Although there is a difference (100%
increase) from pre (3 medication errors) to post (6 medication errors), this can
lead one to believe the lowest company culture score was during the pre-survey
and the highest company culture score was during the post survey.  Looking at
Table 5.10 located in Section 5.2, the lowest average mean score in relation to
time for the pre-survey was Scale 6 (Urgency) and the highest post survey scale
score was Scale 1 (Integrity).
It was important to obtain the number of reported medication errors during
the prior year timeframe for both pre and post survey in order to determine if
there was pattern. The idea was to get a snapshot of the past reporting history
and compare it to the recently reported medication errors to determine if there
was increased reporting. Taking it a step further, the researcher decided to
determine if there would be a continued effort to report medication errors once
the post survey was completed.  So, the researcher decided to track the number
of reported medication errors for an additional three months after the post survey.
In order to determine if there were any changes, the researcher decided that the
prior year data for the additional three months tested was just as important. The
researcher thought that after partaking in the survey, pharmacists would be
prone to report medication errors immediately.  Hence, it was anticipated that
there would be an increase in the number of reported medication errors after the
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post survey. The data is presented in Table 5.13.  Figure 5.8 represents the data
graphically.  Table 5.13 and Figure 5.8, show that over a 3-month post survey
period, 30 medication errors were reported as compared to 22 medication errors
reported during the same timeframe in the prior year.  That equates to a 26.7%
increase in the number of medication errors reported. Thus, Hypothesis 2, low
company culture scores are associated with a low number of reported errors,
was not rejected.
Table 5.12 Reported Medication Errors
Timeframe Number of Reported MedicationErrors
Pre-Survey 3
Post Survey 6
Prior Year Pre-Survey 0
Prior Year Post Survey 0
Table 5.13  Post Survey Reported Medication Errors
Timeframe April May June
2005 10 8 12
2004 6 10 6
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Figure 5.8 Post Survey Reported Medication Errors
Note: All Values are in generic units
5.4 Hypothesis 3 Data Analysis
Question 1 of the survey was independently analyzed to address
Hypothesis 3 that individuals with greater fear of reporting errors will have more
adverse (i.e. lower) company culture scores on average than individuals with less
fear.  Three subjects were missing data for Question 1.   Of the remaining 38
subjects, 31 (82%) said that they would report an error immediately.  One (3%)
subject said that he or she would report the error only if someone saw them or
knew that it could have only been them.  One (3%) said that he or she would
report the error if it were a minor error (no patient harm).  Five (13%) said they
would report the error if it were a major error (serious patient harm).    The last
three groups were too small to analyze statistically so they were combined into
one group and labeled, “not immediately”.
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Now, the analysis compared two groups, those who said, “immediately” (n=31)
versus those who did not say, “immediately” (n=7). Since there were only two
groups to be compared, the two-sample t-test was used instead of analysis of
variance.  Table 5.14 presents scale data for all six scales for Question 1.  Table
5.14 shows that those who said, “immediately” had the highest mean scale score
(0.78) for Scale 1 (Integrity) and the lowest mean scale score (0.51) for Scale 6
(Urgency).  For those who said, “not immediately”, the highest mean scale score
(0.66) for Scale 1 and the lowest mean scale score (0.45) for Scale 2 (Efficiency).
This implies that those who said, “immediately”, as well as “not immediately” both
align with Scale 1 (Integrity).  Those that said “immediately” would less likely
align with Scale 6 (Urgency) and those that said “not immediately” would less
likely align with Scale 2 (Efficiency).  Table 5.15 presents the equality of means
for all six scales in relation to Question 1.  After studying Table 5.15 and
analyzing Figure 5.9, it was found that there is some evidence to suggest that
those who would not report errors “immediately” tend to have a lower Scale 1
score than those who did say “immediately.”  Table 5.14 and 5.15 show that the
group that did not say “immediately” had a statistically significantly smaller
average Scale 1 score than the group that did say “immediately.”  The average
standard deviation for Scale 1 score for the group that did say “immediately” was
0.78 versus 0.66 for the group that did and did not say “immediately.”  The P-
value for the equality of means of Scale 1 scores was 0.036.  This suggests that
we accept the hypothesis that individuals with greater fear of reporting errors will
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have more adverse (i.e. lower) company culture scores on average than
individuals with less fear for Scale 1 (Integrity).
Table 5.14 Question 1 Scale Data
NScale Question1
Valid Missing
Mean Median Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum
Immediately 31 0 0.7801 0.8 0.1274 0.44 1
Scale1
Not
Immediately 7 0 0.6646 0.7 0.12211 0.5 0.82
Immediately 31 0 0.5226 0.5 0.17393 0.17 0.83
Scale
2 Not
Immediately 7 0 0.4524 0.5 0.18545 0.17 0.67
Immediately 31 0 0.629 0.6667 0.1692 0.33 0.83
Scale
3 Not
Immediately 7 0 0.5905 0.6667 0.15482 0.33 0.8
Immediately 31 0 0.779 0.8 0.22127 0.4 1
Scale
4 Not
Immediately 7 0 0.6 0.6 0.1633 0.4 0.8
Immediately 31 0 0.7774 0.8 0.2089 0.4 1
Scale
5 Not
Immediately 7 0 0.6571 0.6 0.22254 0.4 1
Immediately 31 0 0.5121 0.5 0.16034 0.25 0.75
Scale
6 Not
Immediately 7 0 0.5 0.5 0.17678 0.25 0.75
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Table 5.15  Equality of Means
t-test for Equality of Means
Scale
t df P-Value (2-tailed)
Scale1 2.182 36 0.036*
Scale 2 0.954 36 0.347
Scale 3 0.552 36 0.584
Scale 4 2.011 36 0.052
Scale 5 1.361 36 0.182
Scale 6 0.177 36 0.86
* indicates P< 0.05
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immediately not immediately
Figure 5.9 Distribution of Scale 1 Scores for Question 1
Note: All Values are in generic units
Further analysis of Tables 5.14 and 5.15 showed that there is little
evidence to suggest a difference between those who said “immediately” versus
those who did not say “immediately” for Scales 2, 3, 5, and 6.  The P-value for
those scales were all greater than 0.05.  After analyzing Figure 5.10 which is
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exclusively Scale 4 data, there is some evidence to suggest a difference between
the two groups – “immediately” and “not immediately.”  However, Tables 5.14
and 5.15 show that there was not a statistically significant difference in the
average Scale 4 score between the two groups.  The average standard deviation
Scale 4 score was 0.78 versus 0.60 for the group that did and did not say
immediately, respectively (P=0.052).
Had the P-value tested been set to less than 0.1, Tables 5.14 and 5.15
would have shown a statistically significant difference for Scale 4 (Traditional
Culture) between the two groups – “immediately” and “not immediately.”  This
would have indicated that the observed difference is too large to be explained by
chance alone.  In other words, it is probably true that individuals with greater fear
of reporting errors had lower company culture scores on average than individuals
with less fear, for Scale 4 (Traditional).
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immediately not immediately
Figure 5.10 Distribution of Scale 4 Scores for Question 1
Note: All Values are in generic units
5.5 Exploratory Data Analysis
For exploratory purposes, scatter plots and Pearson’s correlation statistics
were used to compare each company culture score with each other.  Table 5.16
summarizes the data for the Pearson’s correlation statistics for each of the
company culture scales.  Of all the comparisons between the six company
culture scales, only Scale 4 (Traditional) and Scale 5 (Stableness) were
statistically significantly correlated.  Although Figure 5.11 shows little evidence of
a linear association, Table 5.16 shows that there was a statistically significant,
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moderately strong positive association between Scale 4 and Scale 5, r=0.48 with
a corresponding P-value of 0.002.  This made the exploratory analysis well worth
the additional investigation.
It has been shown, yet again, that if the statistically significance level had
been set to a P-value less than 0.1, Scale 4 (Traditional) and Scale 2 (Efficiency)
as well as Scale 5 (Stableness) and Scale 6 (Urgency)would have been
statistically significantly correlated with P-values of 0.097 and 0.087, respectively.
Table 5.16 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for all Scales
Scale Scale1 Scale2 Scale3 Scale4 Scale5 Scale6
Pearson Correlation 1 0.089 0.009 0.258 0.051 0.235
P-value 0.579 0.957 0.103 0.754 0.139Scale1
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
Pearson Correlation 0.089 1 -0.071 0.263 0.156 0.207
P-value 0.579 0.66 0.097 0.33 0.193Scale2
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
Pearson Correlation 0.009 -0.071 1 0.161 0.139 -0.101
P-value 0.957 0.66 0.314 0.385 0.528Scale3
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
Pearson Correlation 0.258 0.263 0.161 1 .478(**) 0.25
P-value 0.103 0.097 0.314 0.002 0.115Scale4
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
Pearson Correlation 0.051 0.156 0.139 .478(**) 1 0.27
P-value 0.754 0.33 0.385 0.002 0.087Scale5
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
Pearson Correlation 0.235 0.207 -0.101 0.25 0.27 1
P-value 0.139 0.193 0.528 0.115 0.087Scale6
N 41 41 41 41 41 41
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Scale 4 Score
Figure 5.11 Scatter Plot of Scale 4 versus Scale 5
Note: All Values are in generic units
5.6 Data Summary
It was quite interesting to see the data bring true meaning to this
dissertation.  Although Hypothesis 1 was rejected and variations had to be made
for the analysis of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, the tables and graphs
revealed a clear picture of what the data meant. It was determined for Scale 1
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(Integrity) that Hypothesis 3, individuals with greater fear of reporting errors will
have more adverse (i.e. lower) company culture scores on average than
individuals with less fear, was not rejected.  It was determined that the group that
would not report errors “immediately” had a statistically significantly smaller
average Scale 1 (Integrity) score than those who said they would report errors
“immediately.”  In the exploratory section of this dissertation, Section 5.5, it was
discovered that Scale 4 and Scale 5 were statistically significantly correlated.
In summary, Hypothesis 1, Intervention will improve company culture, was
rejected.  Hypothesis 2, Low company culture scores are associated with a low
number of reported errors, was not rejected.  Hypothesis 3, Individuals with a
greater fear of reporting errors versus the average score will have lower
company culture scores on average than individuals with less fear, was not
rejected.  Further detail is provided in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Discussion of Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
6.1 Discussion of Work
The 1999 Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human, sparked a
worldwide debate over medical errors.  It shed light on the exacerbated problem
of medical errors that aggregately went unnoticed and undetected for many
years.   The report however, united organizations to form commitments to better
understand how to deliver high quality care.  Many organizations formed
partnerships and began the development of workshops geared towards the
sharing of information on medical errors. The “person’s approach” was and still
is dominant in the healthcare industry.  The view shared by those that utilize the
person’s approach is that someone caused the medical error.  The systemic way
of analyzing a medical error plays no role in the person’s approach.  It was not
until recently that the medical industry realized the role that the system played in
medical errors.  Yet, some prefer the person’s approach to error while others, in
growing numbers, choose a system’s approach.
Three hypotheses were developed and tested in this dissertation.  It was
hypothesized that 1) intervention would improve company culture; 2) low
company culture scores would be associated with a low number of reported
errors; and 3) individuals with a greater fear of reporting errors will have lower
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company culture scores on average than individuals with less fear.  These
hypotheses were tested on pharmacists at an undisclosed facility in Florida.
6.2 Conclusions
Intervention was expected to improve company culture scores.  The
intervention was in the form of information – National Practitioner Data Bank
information sheet and Non-Punitive Culture information sheet.  The reason
behind the use of the National Practitioner Data Bank information sheet as part of
the intervention tool was that an anonymous source said, “Why would I report a
medication error or encourage others to do so, when the National Practitioner
Data Bank serves as a lynching mob for those who make errors?”  The
researcher believed that if one pharmacist felt this way, there were many others
that shared this identical thought of the National Practitioner Data Bank. Another
comment made by a pharmacist regarding the National Practitioner Data Bank is
that “The National Practitioner Databank is a public arena for displaying a history
of medical errors committed by a clinician.” Upon research of the National
Practitioner Databank, it was discovered that the databank serves as a clearing-
house for clinicians that were involved in a medical error that resulted in any form
of payment to an individual and only authorized healthcare personnel offices can
gain access to the databank. Credentialing is required every two years for
clinicians in the United States and the National Practitioner Data Bank serves this
purpose.
It was expected that there would be an increase in the number of reported
medication errors from pre to post survey in the intervention group.  In fact, there
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was a 100% increase in the reported medication errors from pre to post.  It is
possible that the post survey reported medication errors were errors made by the
same pharmacist(s) that reported the error in the pre-survey.  It is also possible
that a new generation of pharmacists emerged after partaking in this study and
decided to do what is right and report the medication errors.  It is also possible
that a stronger set of interventions might have resulted in a more significant
difference.
As expected, individuals with greater fear of reporting errors had lower
company culture scores on average than individuals with less fear.  Those who
said that they would not report an error immediately had lower score averages
than those who said they would report the error immediately.  This proved true
for Scale 1(integrity/humanistic culture).  When the data were collected, coded,
and then tallied for the number of true responses, it was determined that the
organization studied as part of this dissertation possessed an integrity/humanistic
workplace culture.  In this type of culture, pharmacists tend to be honest and they
consider integrity to be at the top of the list.  The pharmacy encourages a
nurturing environment and upper-level management communicates clearly as
well as frequently to employees.  As with every type of culture, there are
advantages as well as disadvantages.  Although honesty is an excellent policy,
too much information can be damaging.  The pharmacists in the company
studied are loyal to what is right, not to the organization.
A highlighted pitfall characteristic of the integrity/humanistic culture is that
the organization studied should be aware of the cultural implications of fostering
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a God-like environment that may bring religion into play when making work-
related decisions. The term, God-like is explained in the  King James version of
the Holy Bible, Deuteronomy 32:4 states, “He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for
all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.”
This implies that God is perfect, righteous, and just.  God is perfect, meaning that
he makes no mistakes. God is righteous, meaning that He will not pass over
wrongdoing.  God is just, meaning that He is fair.  These attributes are what
could potentially be used in the decision making of work-related issues.  Thus,
being God-like in the realm of practicing pharmacy could lead to error.  For
instance, a pharmacist acting in a God-like capacity could potentially convince
himself that he knows the best medicinal therapy for a patient regardless of what
research exists to dispute his claim. Just like God, the pharmacist is omniscient.
This event could potentially lead to error in pharmacy.
The researcher thought it would be interesting to see the actual group
average score changes from pre to post survey for all six scales.  The group
average score changes are located in Table 6.1.  The smallest percentage
change (0.30) occurred in the intervention group on Scale 3 while the largest
change (10.10) occurred in the control group on Scale 3. Please note that Scale
3 refers to an innovative culture. This is a quite interesting revelation that the
intervention group was 99.7% consistent with their responses from pre to post
survey while the control group was 89.9% consistent with their responses from
pre to post.  This may lend itself to further investigation in a future study.
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Overall, I conclude that we can reduce medication errors and improve
systems, to make better choices.  By installing fail-safes in all aspects of the
pharmacy system and educating patients on their medicinal therapy,
collaboration is promoted amongst key players including pharmaceutical
companies, pharmacy managers, and legislators.  Safer healthcare is the driving
factor in effecting change within the entire delivery system of pharmaceuticals.
The benefit to the world is literally life-saving.  An educated patient is the best
defense against a potential medication error.  In addition, educated patients are
intimately familiar with all aspects of medicinal therapy necessary for the
sustainment of good health.  Through implementation of a non-punitive culture,
medication error reporting will increase initially, and subsequently decrease over
a reasonable period of time.
Based upon the above conclusions, a road to having a non-punitive
culture in pharmacy for medication errors was built (Figure 6.1). Utilizing Lewin’s
three phases – Unfreezing, Changing, Refreezing - of planned change
(Schermerhorn Jr., 1996) the development of a non-punitive culture was
structured.  Steps a through e in Figure 6.1 are representative of Lewin’s Phase
I, Unfreezing.  In Phase I, the goal is to create a felt need and preparation for
change.  Steps f through h is representative of Lewin’s Phase II, Changing.
Changing people, changing tasks, changing structure, and changing technology
are instrumental in the success of Phase II. Training, group discussions, sharing
of knowledge are essential to bring about change. Also motivation, exchange of
ideas, and quality awareness forums are extremely critical to institutionalize the
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change. Steps i through k are representative of Lewin’s Phase III, Refreezing.  In
this phase, outcomes are reinforced, results are evaluated, and constructive
modifications are made.  Evaluation is a final key component in the refreezing
phase.  It gives the organization an opportunity to evaluate the successes and
the failures of the implemented changes as well as an opportunity to institute a
contingency plan to make constructive modifications. If the importance of the
change is thoroughly understood at the ground level, then success will be
achieved.
Although one culture type is not a fix all for every type of organization,
development of a non-punitive culture requires a combination of culture
characteristics.  Collaboratively, the mixed-culture characteristics form an ideal
workplace environment for the development of the non-punitive culture.  Often
times, a workplace culture is represented by more than one culture type.  In fact,
it was a combination of the six cultures that produced the characteristics of the
non-punitive culture.  The characteristics of a non-punitive culture and their
culture of origin are outlined in Table 6.2.  These characteristics were based
upon at least an 80% favorable response rate (yes) to each survey question as it
paralleled the description of the non-punitive culture described on the Non-
Punitive Culture Information sheet (See Appendix F).  The “yes” was in response
to the described conditions of the pharmacist’s work environment.  There was
over 80% response of “no” to Question 43, “Salary is more important to me than
professional growth.”  This “no” response was included because it demonstrates
that salary is not the governing factor in the pharmacists’ career.  The described
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Table 6.1 Pre to Post Group Change
Scale Group Pre Post Change % Change
Control 0.819 0.786 0.03 3.30
Scale 1
Intervention 0.731 0.756 (0.03) (2.50)
Control 0.502 0.51 (0.01) (0.80)
Scale 2
Intervention 0.52 0.54 (0.02) (2.00)
Control 0.639 0.74 (0.10) (10.10)
Scale 3
Intervention 0.63 0.633 (0.00) (0.30)
Control 0.772 0.738 0.03 3.40
Scale 4
Intervention 0.714 0.74 (0.03) (2.60)
Control 0.731 0.763 (0.03) (3.20)
Scale 5
Intervention 0.752 0.766 (0.01) (1.40)
Control 0.527 0.578 (0.05) (5.10)
Scale 6
Intervention 0.488 0.499 (0.01) (1.10)
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conditions covered the attributes of the six cultures evaluated in this dissertation.
It was interesting to see that the “yes” response rate and the one “no” response
rate were in line with the Non-Punitive Culture Information sheet.
Over 80% of the pharmacists surveyed responded favorably to Questions
6-10, 13, 15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28, 32, 34, 35, 38, 42, and 43 (See Appendix E).  A
synopsis of the favorable response is stated in the following sentences.  The
environment and the organization in which they work supports full disclosure of
medical errors.  The pharmacists believed the patients should be made aware
that a medical error has occurred.  The reporting of medical errors to a federal
agency will allow other clinicians to develop safety precautions in their system of
work as well as reduce the number of medical errors overall.  The pharmacists
believe that a non-punitive culture will actually increase reporting of medical
errors.  In fact, the pharmacists feel comfortable in reporting a medical error to
his/her supervisor. The pharmacists and the supervisors are most interested in
quality care for the patient and patients concerns are addressed in a timely
manner. In fact, the supervisors encourage new ideas about increasing patient
safety. The pharmacists understand how their duties contribute to the success or
failure of the organization.  They seem to have a genuine interest because they
expect to work at the organization for their whole careers. When there is a
conflict, they believe in working out differences before going to the supervisor.
The job meets the professional expectations of the pharmacists and personal
growth is more important than salary.  The pharmacists associate with people
from a wide variety of professional and personal backgrounds.
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One of the main characteristics of the non-punitive culture is truthfulness
which leads to openness and disclosure of a medication error. According to
Partnership for Health and Accountability (July 2004), a major goal in a non-
punitive culture is to create a culture where people come forward when errors
occur. According to Optimum Motivation Coaching (n.d.), when staff feel secure
and nurtured in their work environment they perform better. Further, when
people feel they are treated fairly they remain loyal to the company and
motivated by their work. Likewise, in pharmacy, when pharmacists are nurtured
in their work environment, they are more apt to develop a deep sense of care
about the organization’s mission and work hard to achieve the organizational
goals.  Just as clinicians have to make recordings in the patient record that can
only be interpreted in one way (Pharmacy Law and Management Conference,
2002), upper-level management has to communicate clearly and effectively to
the pharmacists. Once a hospital has assessed its culture of patient safety, the
leadership can decide which dimensions provide the best opportunity for
interventions within that organization (Partners for Health and Accountability, July
2004). The non-punitive culture wants to avoid disruption, although not
completely possible, so processes are put in place to address most situations.
Although the pharmacists are empowered to make decisions when they do
encounter situations not addressed in the policy manual, they consider the issues
carefully as well as communicate them effectively to management.  Pharmacists
are hard workers and are paid relatively well as a sign of compensation for doing
an invaluable humanistic-type job. Salary.com, Inc. (n.d.) lists the median salary
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for a typical pharmacist in the United States as $100,720. Over the course of
employment, pharmacists are encouraged to attend formal training to stay
abreast of new technology and to share information about medication errors
without the fear of punishment. Most states require the pharmacist complete
approximately 15 hours of continuing education each year
(http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/l_t_0001.cfm).
The non-punitive culture was built out of respect for pharmacists, patients,
and other clinicians with the intent to increase the quality of work life for
pharmacists and other clinicians. Additionally, it was developed with the intent
for the patient to realize his/her role in the quest for wellness so that the patient
can maintain or improve his/her quality of life.  Pharmacists do not set out to
make a medication error, it is simply the system way of doing things that allows a
medication error to happen. A system’s approach was utilized in the
development of the non-punitive culture. Until the system’s approach has been
globally accepted by all pharmacists, pharmacy managers, pharmacy governing
boards, pharmaceutical companies, and other clinicians, unfortunately, the
reported medication error rate will continue to be low and inaccurate.
Changing structure, tasks, or technology of any organization will change the
behavior and/or satisfaction of its members (Reitz, 1987).  An organizational
culture change to a non-punitive culture is instrumental in ridding our nation of
preventable medication errors. Wachter stated that, “while there are many
potential solutions to the problem of medical errors, I think the cultural change
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Figure 6.1 Pathway to Non-Punitive Culture
Set the Goal: Achievement of a Non-
Punitive Culture in Order to Facilitate a
Safe Work Environment for Clinicians
and to Promote Patient Safety
Weed Out Weaknesses/Threats
Effectively Communicate the Goal
Throughout the Organization
Conduct a Culture Assessment
Institute the Cultural Changes
Provide Timely Feedback of All
Concerns from the Employees
Provide Timely Feedback of the
Results of the Culture Assessment
Track Results and Communicate to the
Employees
Train Employees on New System
Mission Accomplished
Maintain Non-Punitive Culture
Yes
No
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
j
k
i
h
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will turn out to be the best and most lasting investment that can be made” (Olsen,
2004).  Establishing a culture that supports the reporting of errors without fear
and/or shame is crucial to creating an effective reporting system.
Table 6.2 Non-Punitive Culture Characteristics and Origin
Characteristics Culture of Origination
1) Honest entity
2) Integrity at top of the list
3) Encourages a nurturing environment
4) Upper-level management communicates clearly and
frequently to employees
Integrity/Humanistic
5) Quality-oriented
6) Hard workers
Efficiency/Quality-
oriented
7) Many formal systems that allow the employee to feel
empowered to communicate ideas
Innovative
8) Intellectual and thoughtful
9) Considers issues carefully
Deliberative
10) Company has processes in place to address most
situations
11) Cultivate employees by encouraging development through
mentoring programs and/or formal training opportunities
12) Compensates employees relatively well
Established/Stable
13) People care deeply about the firm’s mission and work hard
to achieve the organization’s goals Urgent/Seat of the Pants
6.3 Technological Insight into the Advancement of Medicine
Since the 1999 Institute of Medicine report, some have said that the
healthcare industry has been slow to make technological advancements in the
realm of patient safety in order to reduce the number of medical errors. Yet,
research shows (Bates DW et al. Effect of computerized physician order entry
and a team intervention on prevention of serious medication errors. JAMA
1998;280:1311-16) that over half of all medication errors can be prevented
through computerization of physician order entry (ISMP, March 2001).
Technology exists today that will allow for a much safer healthcare industry.
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Either no one has thought of how to combine today’s technology to solve a multi-
fold pharmacy/pharmaceutical problem or technological advancements in
healthcare are painstakingly slow.  Although some of the proposed technology is
in operation today, collectively, as a unit, the meeting of all facets of the
technology proposed has not occurred.
What is being proposed is the collaboration of existing technology to
produce an error-free medication system. The day will come when insurance
agencies will deliver a prescription card that serves as a gateway to better quality
healthcare.  This prescription card will be universal in its acceptance at any
pharmacy.  This prescription card will be the product of collaboration between
pharmaceutical companies, prescribing clinicians, and pharmacists. The
pharmaceutical companies will work hand-in-hand with pharmacies and those
clinicians with prescribing rights.  The pharmaceutical companies will develop a
database of all drugs to include a photo, route(s), dosage, and indication.  When
a patient goes to the doctor’s office and the doctor prescribes a drug, the doctor
will retrieve the name of the medication out of the database, select the route,
dosage, and select/record the indication.  The doctor will then scan the patient’s
prescription card so that the patient’s card will contain the full name of the
medication, a colored picture of the drug, dosage, route, and indication.  The
patient goes to the pharmacy to pick-up his/her prescription.  The pharmacy
technician scans the prescription card and this is where the automated double-
check system begins.  Independent double checks serve two purposes: to
hopefully, though not dependably, detect a serious error before it reaches a
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patient; and just as important, to bring attention to the systems that allow the
introduction of human error (ISMP FAQ, n.d.). The prescription is then filled.
During the filling process, by use of an automated machine, a picture of the drug
being filled is taken and compared to both the database drug photo and the drug
photo from the scanned prescription card.  This creates a three-way automated
system check on the prescribed drug. The prescribed drug, inclusive of the full
name of the medication, purpose of the medication, dose, and route is then
delivered to the patient.  Legislation should require that the medication’s purpose
and full instructions be written on each new prescription so that pharmacists can
educate patients properly and prevent errors if the purpose and prescribed drug
do not match (ISMP, March 2001).
As it stands in 2006, there are no laws governing prescription labeling that
mandates the purpose and/or full instructions on the label.  Until there is public
outcry, there is no foreseen voluntary change in the medical community to
produce beneficial information on prescription labels.
6.4 Recommendations
The recommendations are from a systemic point of view for all aspects of
the medication delivery system.  When the term system is used, most seem to
think that the reference is specific to equipment. However, the pharmacy system
is inclusive of the following:
1) pharmaceutical companies that process and package the drugs – unit
dose processing and packaging
2) delivery of the drugs to the pharmacy – box labeling and receiving
procedures
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3) the storage of the drugs – clearly labeled and organized so as to
accommodate a floating pharmacist
4) operating procedures of the pharmacy – clear and comprehended by all
pharmacy staff
5) pharmaceutical governing boards – communicates changes, provide
training/workshops
6) top-level management at the pharmacy – communicates clearly and
provides timely feedback
7) workplace policies and procedures – fathomed by all pharmacists
8) interaction with the varied professionals as related to patient wellness –
positive group dynamics
9) equipment that is used in pharmacy – pharmacists are intimately familiar
with the operation of all equipment used in pharmacy
10) prescribing clinicians – electronically order prescription
11) pharmacists – knowledgeable, skilled, and trained
12) pharmacy technicians – knowledgeable, skilled, and trained
13) delivery of prescriptions – prescription card check
14) workplace culture – non-punitive environment
15) interaction with patients – open and honest
16) pharmacy layout – maximize productivity, increase efficiency, maintain
quality
17) pharmacy job design – intimately familiar with all aspects of how to do
the job
18) patient – involved in his/her care
Together, these components work together to produce a high performance
system.  Successful collaboration requires building trust and using consensus-
building processes, actively engaging key players and all stakeholders, staying
focused on the shared goal of improving patient safety, and learning from others
active in the field (AHRQ, June 2001). According to the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs: “Culture Change Prevention, Not Punishment”, it
can only happen as a result of effort on everyone's part to take a different
approach to the way we look at things. If any one of the 18 components of a
pharmacy system is compromised, the end result could potentially lead to a
medication error.  Media reports of failures of quality, state board pharmacy
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activities that punish pharmacists who err, and sizable jury verdicts against
pharmacy chains for easily preventable errors, have created a demand for
systematic approaches to increase quality and reduced exposure to liability
(Pharmacy Law and Management Conference, 2002).
Adherents of the system approach strive for a comprehensive
management program aimed at several different targets: the person, the team,
the task, the workplace, and the institution as a whole (Reason, 2000). An
emphasis on prevention via a systems approach, in its entirety, is what is needed
to attain significant improvements in patient safety throughout the United States,
as a direct result of increased reporting of medication errors in a non-punitive
culture.
6.4.1 Responsibility
There needs to be more responsibility in the prescribing, dispensing, and
administering of drugs.  This responsibility should be three-fold to include the
doctor, the patient, and the pharmacist. In the event of an incapacitated patient,
a designated proxy will act on his/her behalf.  The relationship between the
doctor and the patient should be one where the doctor communicates the
treatment plan for the patient to the patient.  The part of the treatment plan that
requires medication should be explicit and address all the patient’s concerns.
The doctor should tell the patient what he/she is prescribing and what each
medication is for.  Additionally, the doctor should provide a color copy of the drug
from the database (mentioned in Section 6.3) to include the purpose for the drug.
The patient should then be responsible for validating exactly what the doctor
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ordered.  Then the patient goes to the pharmacy to get the prescription filled.
Section 6.3 explains the dispensing of drugs.  To take it a step further, when the
prescription is ready for pick-up, the patient should have to validate that the 3-
way comparison photo (scanned prescription card photo/database photo/actual
photo) is correct.  To handle the responsibility of administering drugs, patient
counseling should be required for all new prescriptions.  The counseling should
be validated by the patient, prior to the patient accepting the prescription.  An
educated patient or caregiver can be a crucial last check on the safety of any
medication (ISMP, March 2001). Having the patient validate what the doctor
prescribed, what the pharmacist dispensed, and how the drug should be
administered may reduce or eliminate liability for both doctor and pharmacist.
Now, a misdiagnosis by the doctor is a completely different set of circumstances
which was not covered in this research.
6.4.2 Further Research
While this study provided many insights into the workplace culture and
moral make-up of pharmacists in an organization, this study has some limitations
as well.  Only one facility was investigated.  Not every available pharmacist
participated in this study. Another area that might lend itself to further
investigation would be determining the workplace culture of similar facilities to
determine if similar results are obtained.  As well, determining the workplace
culture of those individuals/entities – pharmaceutical companies, other
prescribing clinicians, pharmacy governing boards, nursing staff - of which
pharmacists interact would be interesting.  Further research might include
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following a medication error via the route of the workplace culture as part of the
root cause analysis. Root cause analysis typically involves individuals involved in
the error and does not address the issue of the workplace environment nor the
complete system.
This study addressed the pharmacists’ moral make-up as it pertained to
the workplace culture in regards to truthfulness, other factors outside of the
workplace could shed additional light on the pharmacists’ limitations of
truthfulness.  Although pharmacists are human, the public seems to think
pharmacists should be infallible at work.  A 2004 Hillsborough County, Florida,
general election ballot listed a constitutional amendment that would give patients
the right to review, upon request, records of health care facilities’ or providers’
adverse medical incidents.  On the same ballot, there was a proposed
constitutional amendment that would prohibit medical doctors who have been
found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice from
being licensed to practice medicine in Florida.  Further research might include
obtaining the public’s opinion on disclosure of all workplace errors, whether a
pharmacist, doctor, lawyer, beautician, cashier, politician, clergyman, chef, etc.
As technology advances, the ability for a system to produce an error will
lessen.  Further research might include obtaining the public’s view on the use of
biotechnology to obtain prescriptions.  Instead of using a prescription card to
obtain prescriptions, the use of a scanned fingerprint and/or eye scan could
directly identify the person for whom the prescription is intended.  Only time will
tell how receptive the public is to these views.
136
References
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy. (n.d.). FAQ's about Managed Care
Pharmacy. Retrieved from
http://www.amcp.org/amcp.ark?c=pc&sc=xB5DA8F59D093CD77E98958B
4D248016D.
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy. (n.d.). Pharmacists’ Cognitive Services.
Retrieved from
http://www.amcp.org/data/legislative/concepts/Pharmacists%20Cognitive
%20Services%2Epdf.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2000, February). Medical Errors:
The Scope of the Problem. Fact sheet, Publication No. AHRQ 00-P037.
Maryland: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/errback.htm.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2000, February).  20 Tips to Help
Prevent Medical Errors. Fact sheet, Publication No. AHRQ 00-P038. MD:
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/consumer/20tips.htm.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2001, June). Beyond State
Reporting: Medical Errors and Patient Safety Issues. Retrieved from
http://www.ahcpr.gov/news/ulp/ptsafety/ptsafety.htm.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  (July 2003).  Five Steps to Safer
 Health Care. Fact sheet, Publication No. AHRQ Publication No 03-M007.
Maryland: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahcpr.gov/consumer/5steps.htm.
American Hospital Association & Joint Commission on Accreditation for Hospital
Organizations. (2001, August 13). JCAHO Database Worries AHA.
Modern Healthcare, v31, pp. 4.
American Medical Association. (2000). AMA Specifications for a National Health
System Error Prevention, Research, and Patient Safety Initiative.
American Medical Association.
137
American Pharmacists Association Foundation. (n.d.). How Your Pharmacist
Helps You.  Retrieved from
http://www.aphafoundation.org/Consumers/How_Your_Pharmacist_Helps
_You/.
American Psychological Association. (2002). Psychology Matters: Glossary.
Retrieved from http://www.psychologymatters.org/glossary.html#c.
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (1999, September). ASHP
Patient Concerns National Survey Research Report. Retrieved from
http://www.ashp.org/pr/survey.cfm.
Atherton, J. (n.d.). Shame-Culture and Guilt-Culture. James Atherton. From
http://www.doceo.co.uk/background/shame_guilt.htm.
Barnes, V. (2000). Human Factors in Accident Investigations.  Performance,
Safety and Health Associates, Inc.
Bok, S. (1979). Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York, Vintage
Books.
Bracher, J. F. (n.d.). Integrity Arch . Bracher Center for Integrity in Leadership.
Retrieved from http://www.brachercenter.com/integrityarch.html.
Brennan, T. (n.d.). Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or
Cohesion? . Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/trip1997/trip4.htm.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, 2006-07 Edition, Pharmacists. Retrieved from
http://stats.bls.gov/oco/ocos079.htm.
Bush, G. (2003, July). President Disappointed with Senate’s Failure to
Pass Medical Liability Bill.  The White House. Retrieved from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030709-8.html.
The Business Edge. (n.d.). Leading Organizational Change. Retrieved from
http://www.bizedge.biz/change1.htm.
Callahan, A. (1989, July). Situation and Individual Differences as Predictiors of
Voice in the Organization. Stanford University.
138
Clinton-Gore Administration Announces New Actions to Improve Patient Safety
and Assure Health Care Quality: Goal to Reduce Preventable Medical
Errors By 50 Percent Within Five Years. (2000, February 19). From the
White House Web site (http://www.whitehouse.gov).
http://www.ahrq.gov/wh21900.htm.
CNN. (2005, August 24). Medical Mistakes. CNN.
Cohen, M. (2001, August). Error-Reporting Law. Nursing. Springhouse
Corporation.
College of Nurses of Ontario. (2004, August 26). Best Practices in Disclosing
Health Care Error. Retrieved from
http://www.cno.org/new/notices/disclosing_error.htm.
Corporate Survey.com. (n.d.). Corporate Survey. Retrieved from
http://www.corporatesurvey.com/CultureSurvey.asp.
Cousins, D. (2005). What We Know: Medication Error Types. Safer Healthcare.
Retrieved from
http://www.saferhealthcare.org.uk/IHI/Topics/MedicationPractice/WhatWe
Know/Whatweknowoverview.htm.
Culture or Reputation.  (n.d.) from
http://www.instam.org/files/rrm/CULTURE_OR_REPUTATION.pdf.
Cutler, C. and Bocchino, C. (2000, September 11). National Summit on Medical
Errors and Patient Safety Research: Additional Statements. Quality
Interagency Coordination (QUIC) Task Force.  Retrieved from
http://www.quic.gov/summit/aaahp1.htm.
Daft, R.L. (2002) Organizational Theory and Design. Schoonhoven: Academic
Service.
Dawson, T., Heitmann,A., and Kerin, A. (2004, April 29-30).  Long Working
Hours, Safety, and Health: Toward A National Research Agenda.  NIOSH.
Retrieved from
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/workschedules/abstracts/dawson.html.
Deering, A., Dilts, R., & Russell, J. (2003). Leadership Cults and Cultures
 Leader to Leader Institute. from
http://leadertoleader.org/leaderbooks/L2L/spring2003/deering.html.
DeGreene, K. (1970).  Systems Psychology.  New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
139
Dooley, J. (n.d.). Cultural Aspects of Systemic Change Management. Retrieved
from http://www.well.com/user/dooley/culture.pdf.
EDGE/Schneider Consulting Group, LLC. (n.d.). Building High Performance
Cultures. Retrieved from
http://www.workwithedge.com/otherassesstools.html.
Eisenberg, J., (1999, December 13). Statement on Medical Errors. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, and Education.
MD: AHRQ. Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/news/stat1213.htm.
Eisenberg, J. (2002, January). AHRQ Partnerships Promote Patient Safety. U.S.
Medicine.  Retrieved from
http://www.usmedicine.com/column.cfm?columnID=80&issueID=34.
Ethics and Policy Integration Centre. (2003). Organizational Integrity. Retrieved
from http://www.ethicaledge.com/quest_1.html.
Felciano, R. (1995, February). Human Error: Designing for Error in Medical
Information Systems . Stanford University. Retrieved from http://www-
smi.stanford.edu/people/felciano/research/humanerror/humanerrortalk.htm
l.
Florida Health Careers. (n.d.). Pharmacy. Retrieved from
http://www.flahec.org/hlthcareers/PHARM.HTM.
Gale, T. (2006).  Thomson Corporation. (2006). Organizational Development.
Thomas Corporation. Retrieved from
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Oli-
Per/Organizational-Development.html.
Gilman, R. (1997). Stages Of Change. Context Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC09/Gilman1.htm.
Haddad, A.  (2001). Senators Set To Offer Medical Errors Bill. Congress
Daily, United States Congress. Ethics in Action. RN v64(i9): p25.
Hebert, P., Levin, A., Robertson, G. (2001). Bioethics for Clinicians: 23.
Disclosure of Medical Error. Canadian Medical Association Journal: 164(4)
pp 509-13.
Hodgetts, R. (1999). Modern Human Relations at Work 7th Edition. Texas:
Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
140
Human Factors and Ergonomics.San Jose State University. (n.d.).Retrieved from
http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/hfe/.
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. (2005). Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society: About HFES. Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society. Retrieved from http://www.hfes.org/web/AboutHFES/about.html.
IDeA. (n.d.). Culture and efficiency. Retrieved from
http://www.idea-knowledge.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=777735.
IESConsulting.com . (n.d.). Creating an Innovative Culture. Retrieved from
http://www.iesconsulting.com/culture.htm.
Institute of Educational Sciences U.S. Department of Education. (n.d.). Glossary
- NCES Statistical Standards. Retrieved from
http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/2002/glossary.asp.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (n.d.). Frequently Asked Questions.
Retrieved from http://www.ismp.org/faq.asp#Question_11.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001, April 18). Lesson Lost by the
Global Pharmaceutical Industry.  ISMP.  Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/GlobalPharm.html.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001, March 27). Testimony of Michael
R. Cohen, MS, RPh Medicare Reform: Laying the Groundwork for a
Prescription Drug Benefit. Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/pressroom/viewpoints/testimony_032701.asp.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001,September 19). ISMP Survey on
Perceptions of a Nonpunitive Culture Produced Some Surprising Results.
Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/articles/20010822.asp.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2002, March 6). ISMP Survey Shows
Drug Companies Providing Fewer Unit Dose Packaged Medications.
Retrieved from http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/Cutting.htm.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2002, June 26). Pharmacy Interventions
Can Reduce Clinical Errors - Part I of Findings from ISMP Survey .
Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/articles/20020626.asp.
141
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2004, November 4). FDA and the
Pharmaceutical Industry Must Be More Responsive for a Safer Healthcare
System. Retrieved from http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/fda.htm.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2005, February 24). Welcome to the
State Board of (Nursing, Pharmacy, Medicine) Inquisitions . Retrieved
from http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/articles/20050224.asp.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2006, March 10). Measuring Up to
Medication Safety. Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/20050310.htm.
Institute of Medicine Report. (1999). To Err Is Human: Building a
Safer Health System.  A Report of the Committee on Quality of Health
Care in America, Institute of Medicine. Washington, D.C.:National
Academy Press.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. (2000, February
22). Focus on Reducing Medical Errors. A Testimony by Dennis O'Leary
before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S.
Senate and the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Retrieved from
http://www.jointcommission.org/NewsRoom/OnCapitolHill/testimony_0222
00.htm.
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society (2001, October). Medical Mistakes
and Older Patients: Admitting Errors and Improving Care. Journal of the
American Geriatrics Society, 49(10), pp. 1361.
Kapp, Marshall.  (1997). “Medical Error Versus Malpractice.” DePaul Journal of
Health Care Law 1: p751-772.
Kapp, Marshal.  (2001). “Medical Mistakes and Older Patients: Admitting Errors
and Improving Care.” Journal of the American Geriatrics Society v49(10):
p1361.
Keppel. (n.d.). SPSS Textbook Examples: Design and Analysis. UCLA. Retrieved
from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/spss/examples/da/daspss16.htm.
Kirwan, B. (1994). A Guide to Practical Human Reliability Assessment. London,
UK: Taylor and Francis.
142
Kowalczyk, L. (2005, July 24). Hospitals Study When to Apologize to Patients.
The New York Times Company. Retrieved from
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2005/07/24/hospitals_study_whe
n_to_apologize_to_patients/?page=1.
Kraman, S. and G. Hamm (1999). “Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be
The Best Policy.” Annals of Internal Medicine v131: 963-967.
Langley G., Nolan, K., Nolan, T. (1992). The Foundation of Improvement. Silver
Spring, MD: API Publishing.
Leape, L., & Berwick, D. (2005, May 18). Five Years After "To Err Is Human":
What Have We Learned?. Journal of the American Medical Association
293 (19):2384-90. Retrieved from
http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=278113.
Leape, L., Bates, D., Cullen, D., Cooper, J., Demonaco, H., Gallivan, T., Hallisey,
R., Ives, J., Laird, N., Laffel, G., Nemeskal, R., Petersen, L., Porter, K.,
Servi, D., Shea, B., Small, S., Sweitzer, B., Thompson, B., Vander Vliet,
M. (1995)  Systems Analysis of Adverse Drug Events, JAMA 274 pp 35-
43.
Leape, L. (1994). Error in Medicine. JAMA v272,  pp.1851-1857.
Lethen, J. (1996, November). The Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Retrieved
 from http://www.stat.tamu.edu/stat30x/notes/node39.html
Leung, C. (1997). Culture Club: Effective Corporate Cultures. Rogers Publishing
Ltd. from
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/managing/employees/article.jsp?conten
t=20061009_81277_81277.
Maiese, Michelle. (2003, July). Moral or Value Conflicts. Retrieved from
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/intolerable_moral_differences/.
McGinty, D. W., & Moss, N. C. (2001). What Is Your Corporate Culture?.
Connect2 Corporation and Blueprint. Retrieved from
http://www.connecttwo.com/article_mirrors/corporate_culture.html.
McKereghan, D. (2003). Persons or Systems/Suffering the Consequences.
Eastern Washington University.
Medical Errors: Administration Response and Other Perspectives, White House.
Medical Errors: The Scope of the Problem.  Fact Sheet. Rockville, Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (2000).
143
Merriam-Webster Online. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://webster.com/dictionary/integrity.
Minnesota Pharmacists Association. (2006). MPhA - Minnesota Pharmacists
Association. Retrieved from http://www.mpha.org/mpha/consumer/.
Moore Jr,, D. (1998). Malpractice Insurance: JCAHO Pushes Bill to Protect
Hospitals that Report Errors. Modern Healthcare. v28 n 15: p12(1).
Morasco, J. (2002, December 15). Culture and Values. from
http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/2652.html.
Mott, D.  (2001). Ethics. Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology, Gale Group.
MSN Encarta. (2006). error definition - Dictionary - MSN Encarta. Retrieved from
http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861609064/error.html.
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention.
(n.d.) About Medication Errors. NCCMERP. Retrieved from
http://www.nccmerp.org/aboutMedErrors.html.
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention.
(n.d.) NCC MERP -- About NCC MERP. Retrieved from
http://www.nccmerp.org/aboutnccmerp.htm.
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention.
(2003, November 25) NCC MERP Supports Principles for Patient Safety
Reporting Programs. Retrieved from
http://www.nccmerp.org/press/press2003-11-25.html.
(n.d.). Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved from http://www.meriamwebster.com.
(n.d.). Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved from www.webster.com.
(n.d.). Organization Change. Retrieved from
http://www.acad.polyu.edu.hk/~msklma/OM/orgchange.html.
(n.d.). Getting Your License. from
http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/l_t_0001.cfm
Nitschke, R. (n.d.). Large Company Cultures Can Change With Patience. Puget
Sound Business Journal (Seattle). Retrieved November 27, 2006, from
http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2006/05/29/focus15.html.
144
Null, G., Dean, C., Feldman, M., Rasio, D., Smith, D. (2004, December).
Medicine for Sale $$$.  Retrieved from
http://www.garynull.com/medicine_for_sale.asp.
Olsen, K. (2004). Robert Wachter: The Word on Medical Mistakes. Retrieved
from http://www.healthleaders.com/news/feature57663.html.
Online NewsHour. (2005, February 5). Dr. Wachter & Dr. Leape on Medical
Errors. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-
june05/wachter-leape.html.
Optimum Motivation Coaching.  (n.d.). Employee Motivation Strategies
 Coaching.  Retrieved from
http://www.wordsandpeople.com/optimum-
coaching/employee_safe_strategies.htm.
Parker and Waichman, LLP. (2005). Pharmacist Malpractice. Retrieved from
http://www.yourlawyer.com/topics/overview/pharmacist_malpractice.
Partnership for Health and Accountability.  (2004, July).  Interventions to Improve
Safety Culture.  Emory Center on Health Outcomes and Quality.
Retrieved from
http://www.gha.org/pha/resources/topics/InterventionsSafetyCulture.pdf.
PASS 2002 Release: (2002, May 2). Utah: NCSS Statistical Software.
Pegasus Communications, Inc. (2004). What Is Organizational Learning?. From
http://www.pegasuscom.com/aboutol.html.
Pharmacy Law and Management Conference. (2002) Basic Error Prevention
Clinic. University of Florida.
PharmCon, Inc. (n.d.). Medication Error Reduction Perspectives From Two
States. Retrieved from
http://www.freece.com/FreeCe/Article_Dynamic.asp?dbArticleID=93&dbR
egID=&index=0.
Phillips, R., Dovey, S., Hickner, J., Graham, D., Johnson, M. (n.d.) The AAFP
Patient Safety Reporting System: Development and Legal Issues
Pertinent to Medical Error Tracking and Analysis. Advances in Patient
Safety, v3 pp. 121-134.  Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/advances/vol3/Phillips.pdf.
145
Pietro, D., Shyavitz, L., Smith, R., Auerbach, B. (March 18, 2000). “Detecting
and Reporting Medical Errors: Why The Dilemma?” British Medical
Journal v320: p794-796.
PR Newswire Association LLC. (2006). Number of Independent Pharmacies on
the Rise. Retrieved from
http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=64768.
Primatech Inc. (2006). Human Factors and Human Error Analysis. Retrieved from
http://www.primatech.com/consulting/services/human_factors_and_human
_error_analysis.htm.
Process Improvement Institute. (2005). Course 10: Preventing Human Errors .
Retrieved from
http://www.process-improvement-institute.com/human-error-prevention-
training.html.
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QUIC).(2000). Fact Sheet. MD:
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QUIC). (2001, February). Fact
Sheet, AHRQ Publication No. 00-P027.  MD: Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/quicfact.htm.
Rajendran, P. (2001). Ethical Issues Involved in Disclosing Medical Errors.
Medical Student Journal of American Medical Association v286: p1078.
Rao, V. (2006). Building Strong Corporate Cultures at Start-Ups - Resources &
Tips for Women Entrepreneurs. Ladies Who Launch. Retrieved from
http://www.ladieswholaunch.com/resource.cfm/resourceid/3.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. (2000, March 18). Human Error: Models and Management. British
Medical Journal, 320, pp. 768 - 770. Retrieved from
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/320/7237/768#B3#B3.
Reich & Binstock Attorneys at Law. (n.d.). Medical Malpractice. Retrieved from
http://www.reichandbinstock.com/medicalmalpractice.html#3.
Reinertsen, J. (2000). Let's Talk About Error: Leaders Should Take
Responsibility for Mistakes. British Medical Journal 320: p730.
146
Reitz, H. (1987). Behavior in Organizations 3rd Edition.  Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
Renard, S. (2006). Company's Corporate Cultures. Hoteliers. from
http://www.4hoteliers.com/4hots_fshw.php?mwi=184.
Rodgers, B. (2006). Observing and Upgrading Company Cultures Aid in
Employee Retention . Gwinnett Business Journal. from
http://www.gbj.com/content.cfm?Action=story_detail&StoryID=1762.
Runyon, J. (2005, November 30). Creating an Innovative Culture . Questex
Media Group, Inc. Retrieved from
http://www.innovateforum.com/innovate/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=253002
Salary.com, Inc. (n.d.). Average Pharmacist Salary. Pharmacist Job, Career
Education & Unemployment Help. Retrieved from
http://swz.salary.com/salarywizard/layouthtmls/swzl_compresult_national_
HC07000011.html.
Schein, E. (1990). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco:
Josey-Bass.
Schermerhorn Jr., J. (1996). Management 5th Edition.  New York: John Wiley
 and Sons, Inc.
Schuler, A. J. (2002). Business Creativity & Innovation: How to Build an
Innovative Culture. Business Creativity & Innovation. Retrieved from
http://www.schulersolutions.com/html/business_creativity___innovati.html.
Scribbler's Ink. (2005). What Do You Stand For?. Retrieved from
http://www.scribblers-ink.com/work_ethics.html.
Sea Change, Inc. (2003). Book Review: Toxic Cultures. from
http://www.seachangecoach.com/enterprise/cm.php?page_id=30&JRSess
=286f85ed662f464762e554a57ef1e75e.
Shalgian, C. (2001, June). Patient Safety Initiatives: Following the IOM Report.
Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons, v86(6) pp. 9-10. Retrieved
from http://www.facs.org/ahp/pubs/shalgian0601.pdf.
Smeltzer, J. (1989, May 4). The Effects of Liability Fears. New England Journal
of Medicine. 320(18):1221.
SPSS 12.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL.
147
Strategic Dimensions. (n.d.). Can You Measure Integrity?. Retrieved from
http://www.strategic-dimensions.co.uk/en/1/af004.html.
United States Congress. (2000, April 6). Senators Set To Offer Medical Errors
Bill. Congress Daily .
United States Congressional House Subcommittee Oversight Investigation. Cost
and Quality of Health Care: Unnecessary Surgery. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1976. Cited in Null, G., Dean, C., Feldman,
M., Rasio, D., Smith, D. (2004, December). Medicine for Sale $$$.
Retrieved from http://www.garynull.com/medicine_for_sale.asp.
United States Congress Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce House of Representatives. (2002, May 8). Reducing
Medical Errors: A Review of Innovative Strategies to Improve Patient
Safety.
United States Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safey.
(n.d.). Challenge and Achievement. Retrieved from
http://www.patientsafety.gov/NEWS/NCPSBg/bg_NCPSChallenges_0409
04.doc.
United States Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safey.
(n.d.). Culture Change Prevention, Not Punishment. Retrieved from
http://www.patientsafety.gov/vision.html.
United States Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety.
(n.d.). Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved from
http://www.patientsafety.gov/FAQ.html#Systems.
United States Pharmacopeia. (2001, May 8). Granted Legal Protection for
Medication Error Reporting in Oklahoma. Retrieved from
http://www.usp.org/aboutusp/releases/2001/pr_2001-21.htm.
Value Based Management.net. (2003). The Deming Cycle. Value Based
Management.net - Last update. from
http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_demingcycle.html.
Voelker, R. (2001). Hospital Collaborative Creates Tools to Help Reduce
Medication Errors. Journal of American Medical Association v286(i24).
Webster’s Ninith New Collegiate Dictionary (1985).  Merriam-Webster Inc.,
Publishers.  Massachusetts.
148
Weise, E. (2005). Medical Errors Still Claiming Many Lives. USA Today.
Retrieved from
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-05-17-medical-errors_x.htm.
The Wharton School: University of Pennsylvania. (2004). Creating Performance
 Cultures . from
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/structure/tools_for_design_and_chan
ge/creating_performance_cultures.shtm.
Wholey, D., Moscovice, I., Hietpas, T., & Holtzman, J. (2003, March). The
Environmental Context of Patient Safety and Medical Errors. Rural Health
Research Center University of Minnesota. Retrieved from
http://www.hsr.umn.edu/rhrc/pdfs/wpaper/working%20paper%20047.pdf.
Witt, P. (2006). Company Cultures Impact Project Sucess. Information
Technology Toolbox, Inc. Retrieved from
http://blogs.ittoolbox.com/pm/witt/archives/company-cultures-impact-
project-sucess-11568.
Woods, J. (1996). The Six Values of a Quality Culture. CWL Publishing
Enterprises. Retrieved from http://my.execpc.com/~jwoods/6values.htm.
Wu, A. (2000). Medical Error: The Second Victim. British Medical Journal 320:
p726-727.
(2000, March 18). Facing Up to Medical Error. BMJ, v320 (7237)
Retrieved from http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/320/7237/0.
(2004, November 2). Hillsborough County, Florida. Official General Election
Ballot.
(2005, August 5). What's Important Isn't Necessarily Urgent. Executive Coaching
 and Change Management. Retrieved from
http://www.edbatista.com/2005/08/whats_important.html.
149
Bibliography
Accel-Team. (n.d.) Employee Motivation: Theory and Practice. Retrieved from
http://accel-team.com/motivation/index.html.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2001, April). Patient Safety Task
Force Fact Sheet. MD:AHRQ. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/taskforce/psfactst.htm.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2002, March). AHRQ: Focus on
Research: Patient Safety. AHRQ Publication No. 02-M021. MD: AHRQ.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2002, July). Patient Safety
Database. Request for Proposals. MD: AHRQ. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/rfp02015.htm.
Aguayo, R. (1990). Dr. Deming: The American Who Taught the Japanese About
Quality.  New York: Simon & Schuster.
Asplen, L. (1997). Multidisciplinary Council Plans Campaign on Drug Errors
(National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and
Prevention) Drug Topics, v141(i8): p23(3).
Barach, P., and Small, S. (2000, March 18).  Reporting and Preventing Medical
mishaps: Lessons from Non-Medical Near Miss Reporting Systems.
British Medical Journal, v320 p759.
Bateman, A. (1990, June). Team Building: Developing a Productive Team.
Nebraska Cooperative Extension CC352. Retrieved September 25, 2000
Retrieved from http://www.ianr.unl.edu/pubs/Misc/cc352.htm.
Bates, D., Leape, L., Cullen, D., Lair, N., Petersen, L., Teich, J., Burdick, E.,
HicSheakey, M., Kleefield, S., Vander Vliet, M., Seger, D. (1998). Effect of
Computerized Physician Order Entry and A Team Intervention on
Prevention of Serious Medication Errors. JAMA v280(15) pp.1311-1316.
Battles, J., & Keyes, M. (2002). Technology and Patient Safety: A Two-Edged
Sword. Biomedical Instrumentation & Technology, 36(2), pp. 84-88.
150
Battles, J., & Shea, C. (2001, February). A System of Analyzing Medical Errors to
Improve GME Curricula and Programs. Academic Medicine, 76(2), pp.
125-133.
Battles, J., Kaplan, H., Van der Schaaf, T., Shea, C. (1998, March). The
Attributes of Medical Event-Reporting Systems. Arch Pathol Lab Med
v122, pp. 231-238.
Bay, T. and Macpherson, D. (1998). Change Your Attitude. New Jersey: Career
Press.
Berwick, D. (1999, July 17).  Reducing Errors in Medicine. British Medical
Journal. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
Bootman, J., Townsend, R., McGhan, W. (1996). Principles of
Pharmacoeconomics 2nd Edition. Ohio: Harvey Whitney Books Company.
Breitstein, J. (2001, September).  From Grocery to Pharmacy. Pharmaceutical
Execustive, 21(9), pp. 114-116.
Buck, C. (2001). Application of Six Sigma to Reduce Medical Errors. Annual
Quality Congress Proceedings.
California Academy of Family Physicians. (n.d.). Diagnosing and Treating
Medical Errors in Family Practice. Retrieved from
http://familydocs.org/assets/Publications/Monographs/MonographMedErro
rs.pdf.
Catlin, K. and Matthews, J. (2002). Building the Awesome Organization: Six
Essential Components that Drive Entrepreneurial Growth. Wiley.
Cohan, P. (1997). 6-7. The Technology Leader. California: Josey-Bass.
Combes, J. (2003). Comparing Hospital Performance by Measuring Medication
Error Rates: Is It Possible?. National Patient Safety Foundation, 6(1).
Davies, E. (2001, October). The Quality Gurus. Engineering Management
Journal, pp. 223 – 229.
Davis, R., and Barach, P. (2000). Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing
Medical Error: The Role of Preventive Medicine. American Journal of
Preventive Medicine, 19(3), pp. 202-205.
Domingo, R. (n.d.). The Need for A Quality-Oriented Corporate Culture.
Retrieved from http://www.rtdonline.com/BMA/QM/17.html.
151
Duffy, D. (1999, January 15). Cultural Evolution. Retrieved October 8, 2000 from
http://www.cio.com/archive/enterprise/011599_rah_content.html.
Eisenberg, J. (2000, January 20). The Best Offense Is a Good Defense Against
Medical Errors: Putting the Full-Court Press on Medical Errors. AHRQ, at
the Duke University Clinical Research Institute. Maryland: AHRQ.
Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/news/spch012000.htm.
Eisenberg, J. (2000, February 16). Testimony on Patient Safety and Medical
Errors. AHRQ, before the Senate Health Education Labor Pension
Committee. Maryland: AHRQ. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/tst21600.htm.
Eisenberg, J. (2001). Testimony on the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget
Request for AHRQ. AHRQ, before the House Subcommittee on Labor-
Health and Human Services-Education Appropriations. Maryland: AHRQ.
Retrieved from http://www.ahrq.gov/about/cj2001/cjtest01.htm.
Gebhart, F. (2001, February 19). New JCAHO Patient Safety Standards Stress
Prevention. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
Gerlin, A. (1999, September 13). Error Risks Add Up for Patients. Knight Ridder
News Service.
Glod, M. (2000, July 3). Prescription Deaths Bring Call for Checks; Critics
Seek Pharmacy Oversight. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.
Grazier, P. (n.d.). Team Motivation. Teambuildinginc.com. Retrieved September
25, 2000, from
http://www.teambuildinginc.com/article_teammotivation.htm.
Grandinetti, D. (1998, December 14). Electronic Prescribing: Where’s the
Physician Leadership? Medical Economics. Retrieved from
http://www.findarticles.com.
Greene, J. (2001, February 19). New Approach Uses CME to Reduce Medical
Errors. American Medical News.
Gross, M. and Ayres, T. (1998, September 30 - October 1). Research Initiative
for Human Performance Management of Nuclear Power.  Paper presented
at the IEEE Workshop: R&D for Cost Reduction. Fukuoka, Japan.
Gryskiewicz, S. (2000, September). Cashing In On Creativity At Work.
Psychology Today. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
152
Hagberg, R. and Heifetz, J. (n.d.). Telling the CEO His/Her Baby Is Ugly.
Retrieved from
http://www.leader-values.com/content/detail.asp?ContentDetailID=262.
Hawkins, J., (1997, May). Perspectives for Empowerment.  Leadership Edge,
Inc.
Hedrick, T., Bickman, L., Rog, D., (1993). Applied Research Design: A Practical
Guide. Applied Research Methods Series v32. California: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Health and Human Services Agency Gives Consumers Tips on Preventing
Medical Errors. (2002, February 1). Maryland: Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2002/contips.htm.
Hickok, T. (n.d.). Downsizing And Organizational Culture. PAMIJ. Retrieved from
http://www.pamij.com/hickok.html.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (n.d.) Prevent Adverse Drug Events
Before They Occur! ISMP.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2000, January 24). Discussion Paper on
Adverse Event and Error Reporting in Healthcare. ISMP. Retrieved on
December 17, 2001 from http://www.ismp.org/Pages/IOM.html.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001, December 12). The Year 2001 at a
Glance: ISMP’s Medication Safety “Cheers”. ISMP.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001, June 13). Medication Error or
Professional Judgement? ISMP. Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/professional.html.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2001, October 3). Systems Thinking:
Tap Into Staff Creativity to Unleash Innovation.  ISMP.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2002, December 18). “Cheers” for
Medication Safety: Celebrating those who made a difference in 2002.
ISMP. Retrieved from http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/difference.htm.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2004, December 16). 2004 ISMP
CHEERS for Medication Safety: Celebrating Excellence. ISMP. Retrieved
from http://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acutecare/articles/20041216.asp.
153
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2004, November 4). FDA and the
Pharmaceutical Industry Must Be More Responsive for a Safer Healthcare
System. ISMP. Retrieved from http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/fda.htm.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (2002).
Reporting of Medical/Health Care Errors: A Position Statement from the
Joint Commission. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations. Retrieved from
http://www.jcipatientsafety.org/show.asp?durki=9348.
Journal of American Medical Association Letters: Reducing Medication
Errors. (2001, November 7). JAMA, v286(17.)
Karpa, K. (2001, September 3). Medication Safety Officer: A New Breed of
Pharmacist. Drug Topics. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
Kemp, J. (1964). Reason, Action and Morality. New York: The Humanities Press.
Kraut, A. (1996). Organizational Survey: Tools for Assessment and Change.
Josey-Bass Publishers.
Kuzma, J & Bohnenblust, S. (2001). Basic Statistics for Health Sciences 4th
Edition. California: Mayfield Publishing Company.
Lawler III, E., Nadler, D., Cammann, C. (1980) Organizational Assessment:
Prespectives on the Measurement of Organizational Behavior and the
Quality of Work Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Leape, L., Cullen, D., Clapp, M., Burdick, E., Demonaco, H., Erickson, J., Bates,
D. (1999, July 21). Pharmacist Participation on Physician Rounds and
Adverse Drug Events in the Intensive Care Unit. Journal of the American
Medical Association v282 pp267–70.
Leape, L., Woods, D., Hatlie, M., Kizer, K., Schroeder, S., Lundberg, G. (1998,
October 28).  Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical Error.
JAMA, v280(16).
Leonard, M. and Tarrant, C. (2001) Culture, Systems, and Human Factors -- Two
Tales of Patient Safety: The KP Colorado Region's Experience. The
Permanente Journal, v5(3). Retrieved from
http://xnet.kp.org/permanentejournal/sum01/HumanFactors.html.
Maccoby, M. (1998, September/October). Making Values Work. Research
Technology Management, v41(5) pp55-57.
154
Martin, B. (1997, March). Corporate Culture: Poison for Whistleblowers.
Newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia. pp1-2.
Meister, D. (1964, December). Methods of Predicting Human Reliability in Man-
Machine Systems, Human Factors vol 6 (6) pp 621-646.
Meyer, G. (2001, April). Setting a Research Agenda for Medical Errors and
Patient Safety. Health Services Research. Retrieved from
http://www.findarticles.com.
Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. (1999). Designing Qualitative Research. London:
Sage Publications.
McCann, D. (1996). Team Learning. Team Management Systems. Retrieved
September 25, 2000 from http://www.tms.com.au/tms12-2c.html.
Mcgarvey, R. (1997, September). Inspiration Points: Unmotivated Employees
Could Cost You Your Business. Entrepreneur Magazine.
McIntire, Sandra. (1986). Task-Specific Self-Esteem and Goal Setting As
Predictors of Training Performance. Thesis (Ph. D.):University of South
Florida.
McIntire, Sandra. (1982). Task-Specific Self-Esteem: It’s Nature and
Measurement.. Thesis (M.A.): University of South Florida .
Miller, D. & Salkind, N. (2002). Handbook of Research Design and Social
Measurement 6th Edition. London: Sage Publications.
Montgomery, D., Hubele, N., and Runger, G. (2000). Engineering Statistics 2nd
Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
MSNBC News Services. (2001, July 24). Data on Medical Errors Questioned.
NBC News.
Napoli, M. (2000, January). Preventing Medical Errors: A Call to Action. Health
Facts. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention.
(1995, October 16) Council Defines Terms and Sets Goals for Medication
Error Reporting and Prevention. Retrieved from
http://www.nccmerp.org/press/press1995-10-16.html.
(n.d.). Organisational Culture. Retrieved from
http://opax.swin.edu.au/~388226/howto/it2/o_cultre.htm.
155
(n.d.). Discussion Draft of the SHHV-SBC Task Force on Standards for Bioethics
Consultation. Retrieved from
http://www.mcw.edu/bioethics/DISDRFT4.html.
(n.d.). Pathways for Medication Safety. A Partnership: American Hospital
Association, Health Research and Educational Trust, and Institute for Safe
Medication Practices.
Nelson, B. (1996, December). Dump the Cash, Load On the Praise. Foundation
for Enterprise Development.
Nelson, John. (May 15, 2000). Mandatory Error Reporting. Family Practice News.
Norbjerg, P. (n.d.). The Creation of an Aviation Safety Reporting Culture in
Danish Air Traffic Control. Retrieved from
http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/iria03/p11-norbjerg.pdf.
Online NewsHour. (2005, February 5). Dr. Wachter & Dr. Leape on Medical
Errors. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-
june05/wachter-leape.html.
Organized Change, Inc. (2003). Frequently Asked Questions About
Organizational Change . Retrieved from
http://www.organizedchange.com/faq.htm.
Packard, T. (1995). TQM and Organizational Change and Development. New
York: Rockefeller College Press. Retrieved from
http://www.improve.org/tqm.htm.l
Prager, L. (2001, January 15). Database Tracks Causes of Hospital Medication
Errors. American Medical News.
Prichard, H. (1957). Moral Obligation.  London: Oxford University Press.
Pyke, S.and Agnew., N. (1991). The Science Game Fifth Edition: An Introduction
to Research in the Social Sciences. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QUIC). (2000) Doing What Counts
for Patient Safety: Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and Their
Impact. Maryland: AHRQ.
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QUIC). (2001, February). Fact
Sheet, AHRQ Publication No. 00-P027.  MD: Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/quicfact.htm.
156
Reason, J. (2000, March 18). Human Error: Models and Management. British
Medical Journal, 320, pp. 768 - 770. Retrieved from
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/320/7237/768#B3#B3.
Reid, R. (1998). Characteristics of High Performing Teams. Retrieved on
September 25, 2000 from http://www.improve.org/team1.html.
Remarks by the President on Medical Errors. (2000). Dwight D. Eisenhower
Executive Office building, White House.
Roberts, H. and Sergesketter, B. (1993) Quality Is Personal: A Foundation for
Total Quality Management. New York: The Free Press.
The Roots of Sound and Rational Thinking (n.d.). Retrieved March 30, 2004 from
http://www.plusroot.com/term.html?term_id=295.
Schermerhorn, J., Hunt, J. and Osborn, R.  (1994). Managing Organizational
Behavior 5th Edition.  New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Shaha, S., Brodsky, L., Leonard, M., Cimino, M., McDougal, S., Pilliod, J., Martin,
K. (n.d.). Establishing a Culture of Patient Safety Through a Low-tech
Approach to Reducing Medication Errors. Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/advances/vol3/Shaha.pdf.
Shields, T. (2000, February). Major Healthcare Gaps Begin Medical Error-
Prevention Programs. Healthcare Purchasing News. Retrieved from
http://www.findarticles.com.
Spiegel, M, Schiller, M., Srinivasan, R. (2000). Schaum’s Outline of Probability
and Statistics 2nd Edition. McGraw-Hill Companies.
Spector, P. (1997). Job Satisfaction: Application, Assessment, Causes, and
Consequences. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Spector, P. (1999). Industrial and Organizational Psychology. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
SPSS (1997).  SPSS Missing Value Analysis 7.5.  Chicago: SPSS Inc.
Stammer, L. (2000, October). Seeking Safety. Healthcare Informatics.
Stewart, D. (n.d.). Growing the Corporate Culture. Retrieved from
http://www.wachovia.com/small_biz/page/0,,447_972_1695_1946_1966,0
0.html.
157
Sweeney, R. (2000, March 1).  ISMP Leads Congressional Briefing on
Medication Errors. American Family Physician.
Taylor, F. (1947). The Principles of Scientific Management. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc.
Think Win-Win (n.d.) Retrieved March 20, 2004 from
http://www.bemerson.com/seven/Think%20Win-Win.htm.
Thomas, M. (2001, October 1). Medication Error Reports to FDA Show a Mixed
Bag. Drug Topics. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
Treacy, M., & Wiersema, F. (1995). The Discipline of Market Leaders.
Massachusetts: Perseus Books.
Ukens, Carol. (1997, November 17). California Pharmacists Association to
Receive United States Pharmacopeia Help With Error Reporting. Drug
Topics.
U.S. News. (1998, February 28). Report: Deaths from Medication Errors on
Increase. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/us/9802/28/briefs/medication.deaths/index.html.
Vecchione, A. (October 18, 1999).  Hospitals Focusing More Attention on
Medication Error Reporting Efforts. Drug Topics. 143(20) p51.
Weingart, S. (2000, March 18). Epidemiology of Medical Error. British Medical
Journal, v320,  pp. 774-777. Retrieved from http://www.findarticles.com.
Wojcieszak, D. (2005, May/June). Standards, Audits, and Saying I’m Sorry: An
Engineer’s Family Proposes Solutions. Patient Safety & Quality
Healthcare. Retrieved on August 26, 2005 Retrieved from
http://www.psqh.com/mayjun05/consumers.html.
(2000, April). Reducing Errors in Health Care. Translating Research Into
Practice. AHRQ Publication No. 00-PO58. Maryland: AHRQ.
(2000, August 26).  Medical Errors: Reporting and Punishment. The Lancet
v356(9231), p 773.
(2000, December 11). FDA Increases Medication Error Focus. Retrieved from
http://www.findarticles.com.
(2000, June). Confidentially. Nursing Library. Retrieved from
http://www.findarticles.com.
158
(2000, November 1).  How Many Deaths Are Due to Medical Errors? JAMA
Letters. JAMA, v284(17).
(2000, October 3-6). Process Industry Incidents Investigation Protocols, Case
Histories, Lessons Learned.  Center for Chemical Process Safety.
Performance, Safety and Health Associates, Inc.
(2001). The Holy Bible: King James Version. Barbour Publishing, Inc. Ohio.
(2001, April 25). Margin of Error: The Ethics of Mistakes in the Practice of
Medicine. JAMA, 285(16).
159
Appendices
160
Appendix A: Historical Perspective
Table A.1 Historical Perspective
DATE INDIVIDUAL(S)/
ORGANIZATION(S)
ACTIONS OUTCOMES
1976 U.S. House of
Representatives’
Subcommittee on
Oversight and
Investigation of the
Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce
Issued its report, “Cost
and Quality in Health
Care:  Unnecessary
Surgery.”
Estimated that there
were some 2.4
million unnecessary
operations every
year, with as many
as 11,900 deaths
attributed to these
unneeded operation
1984 The Harvard Medical
Practice Study
Looked at over 30,000
hospitalizations in New
York State
Approximately
27,000 individuals die
each year in New
York hospitals alone
as a result of
preventable medical
errors.
1997 Representative William
Coyne (D, Pennsylvania)
Introduced the Safe
Medications Act of
1997
Required that health
facilities report
deaths from drug
errors.  The bill would
impose a fine of
$15,000 for each
unreported death and
exclude those
facilities convicted of
failing to report a
death from receiving
Medicare and state
health-care payments
1997 President Clinton and
Vice President and the
Office of Personnel
Management
Established the
Advisory Commission
on Consumer
Protection and Quality
in the Health Care
Industry (Quality
Commission) and
launched the National
Forum for Health Care
Quality Measurement
and Reporting.
Developed standard
quality measurement
tools to help
purchasers,
providers, and
consumers better
evaluate and ensure
the delivery of health
care services.
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1998 President Clinton’s
Advisory
Commission on
Release the final
report on Consumer
Protection and
Quality in the Health
Care Industry
Identified medical
errors as one of the
four major
challenges facing
the Nation in
improving health
care quality
March 1998 President Clinton Established the
Quality Interagency
Coordination Task
Force (QuIC)
Respond to the IOM
report with
recommendations
on improving health
care quality and
protecting patient
1999 Institute of Medicine Issued a report, “To
Err is Human:
Building a Safer
Health System
Medical errors are
the 8th leading
cause of death in
America. An
estimated 44,000 to
98,000 deaths occur
each year in the
U.S. as a result of
medical errors.
December 1999 President Clinton Directed the Health
Care Quality Task
Force to analyze the
Institute of Medicine
study
Concur with IOM
recommendations
1999 James Jeffords, VT
Mike Enzi, WY
Bill Frist, TN
Introduced a bill to
amend the Public
Health Service Act
to reduce medical
mistakes and
medication-related
errors and referred
to the Senate Labor,
Health, Education
and Pensions
Committee
Amended current
law to reduce
medical mistakes
and medication-
related errors by
creating a Center
for Quality
Improvement and
Patient Safety to
track medical
mistakes and best
practices.
162
Appendix A: (Continued)
Table A.1 (Continued)
1999 Edward Kennedy,
MA
Patty Murray, WA
Christopher Dodd,
CT
Introduced
Voluntary Error
Reduction and
Improvement in
Patient Safety Act
and referred to the
Senate Labor,
Health, Education
and Pensions
Committee
Amended current
law to develop the
Center for Quality
Improvement for
Patient Safety to
direct a national
voluntary reporting
system, research
and dissemination
of critical
information.
2000 QuIC Response Endorsed virtually
every IOM
recommendation
proposed
President called for
a mandatory
reporting system in
the 500 military
hospitals and clinics
serving over 8
million patients; and
a phased-in
nationwide state-
based system of
mandatory and
voluntary error
reporting
Feb. 23, 2000 Connie Morella, MD
Brian Baird, WA
Donald Manzullo, IL
Ron Paul, TX
Thomas Tancredo,
CO
Phil English, PA
Dennis Moore, KS
Joseph Pitts, PA
Tom Udall, CO
Introduced
Medication Error
Prevention Act of
2000  and referred
to the House
Committee on
Commerce
Subcommittee on
Health and
Environment
Amended current
law to reduce
medication-related
medical errors by
providing for
voluntary reporting
by health care
providers of
medication error
information in order
to assist appropriate
public and nonprofit
private entities in
developing and
disseminating
recommendations
and information.
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Feb. 28, 2000. Arlen Specter, PA
Tom Harkin, IA
Daniel Inouye, HI
Introduced Medical
Error Reduction
Act of 2000 and
referred to the
Senate Committee
on Health,
Education, Labor,
and Pensions
Amended current
law to reduce
accidental injury
and death resulting
from medical errors
including
establishing 15
demo projects in
an effort to develop
a model for
medical error
reduction and
reporting.
April 6, 2000 Charles Grassley,
IA
Richard Byran, NV
Joseph
Lieberman,CT
Robert Kerrey, NE
Introduced Stop All
Frequent Errors in
Medicare and
Medicaid Act of
2000 and referred
to the Senate
Committee on
Finance
Amended the
Social Security Act
to improve the
safety of Medicare
and Medicaid.
March 2001 Michael R.Cohen,
MS, RPh
President of ISMP
Presented before
Congress.  Medicare
Reform: Laying the
Groundwork for a
Prescription Drug
Benefit
Underutilized
technology.
Recommended
incentives for
facilities that adopt
technology known
to reduce
medication errors.
July 2001 Joint Commission
on Accreditation of
Healthcare
Organizations
(JCAHO)
Adopted new
standards
Safety programs
must include
systems for
responding to
medical errors and
for internal and
external reporting.
July 2001 JCAHO Revised its
patient’s rights
standard
Required to inform
patients and
families about the
outcomes of care,
including adverse
events
August 2002 President Bush Called for medical
liability reform
See July 2003
Outcome
Comments
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2002 JCAHO JCAHO reviews
Emergency Care
Documentation System
and pronounced
EmpowER a “success
story and role model” In
Accreditation Issues for
Emergency Departments
Discharge
instructions are now
available in six
languages in addition
to English, and
automatically print
out in the patient's
native language
2002 Food and Drug
Administration
Introduced Performance
Plan: Reduce Adverse
Events Related to
Medical Products
Goal is to develop
and enhance
surveillance of FDA-
regulated products to
identify harm
resulting from use,
understand harm
through expert
analysis, and prevent
harm to other
patients by taking
action
January 2003 President Bush Bush urged Congress to
protect America's
patients, doctors, and
hospitals from the
staggering costs of out-
of-control lawsuits by
passing important
medical liability reforms
See July 2003
Outcome Comments
April 29, 2003 President Bush Proposals for Health
Security in the World's
Best Health Care System
for Patients’ Bill of Rights
Strongly supports the
passage of a
Patients' Bill of Rights
that leaves medical
decisions in the
hands of physicians,
instead of insurance
companies
July 9, 2003 President Bush Senate’s Response to
Medical Liability Reform
President
disappointed with
Senate’s failure to
pass Medical Liability
Bill
December
2003
Food and Drug
Administration
Sought bar-code system
in bid to cut down on
medical errors
Goal is to use bar-
coding technology on
drugs to reduce
hospital medical
errors and deaths
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June 2004 President Bush Discussed use of
wireless and
broadband
technology in
healthcare
Goal is to
streamline the use
of technology in
providing faster,
accurate and better
care.
January 27, 2005 President Bush Bush participates
in an event on
health care
information
technology at the
Cleveland Clinic
in Cleveland, Ohio
Bush pushes the
use of computerized
medical records
June 29, 2005 Mr. Enzi and Mr.
Baucus
109th Congress
Fair and Reliable
Medical Justice Act
introduced in
Senate
To restore fairness
and reliability to the
medical justice
system and promote
patient safety by
fostering
alternatives to
current medical tort
litigation, and for
other purposes
July 29, 2005 President Bush Bush signs law to
create medical-
errors database
A national database
on medical errors,
designate individual
reports as
confidential and
shield participating
providers from
liability
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The response to the IOM report by Congress was heard in a Joint Hearing
of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education.  President
Clinton released a plan for a nationwide, state-based system of reporting medical
errors to be phased-in over time. The plan included mandatory reporting of
preventable medical errors that cause death or serious injury, and voluntary
reporting of other medical mistakes and "near misses," or "close calls."  The
Clinton-Gore Administration (2000) worked with the National Quality Forum, a
private-public group of health care experts, to develop a set of patient safety
measurements that would lay the foundation for a uniform system of reporting
errors. Information will be aggregated and made public (without identifying
patients or individual health care professionals) to educate the public about the
safety of their health systems.  President Clinton described these efforts as a
balanced, common-sense approach based on prevention, not punishment; on
problem-solving, not blame-placing.
As put by Senator Christopher Dodd, the IOM study revealed a major
health crisis-not a deadly new virus or another tear in the safety net-but a crisis of
human error.  Further, he stated that most Americans feel confident that the
health care they receive will make them better-or at the very least, not make
them feel worse.  And in the vast majority of circumstances, that confidence is
deserved.
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Senator Edward Kennedy stated that any legislation put forward will not
effectively reduce medical errors unless it holds institutions accountable for
implementing practices and standards that improve patient safety.  The public
deserves meaningful information about how well individual health care
institutions perform on patient safety measures, so that patients can make
informed choices.
Senator James Jeffords, Chairman of Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions stated that the ideal reporting system must be non-punitive,
voluntary, confidential, and de-identified.
It is the view of Senator Arlen Specter that there should be a professional
responsibility by doctors and hospitals to tell people when they have been
injured.  It may be that in the long run, that the disclosure of errors can lead to a
way to deal with this problem which would be different from the current tort
system of medical malpractice, and perhaps those who are injured could be
compensated in some other way, like perhaps workmen’s compensation without
respect to fault.
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Quiz: What Is Your Corporate Culture?
Corporate culture is a complex subject. Yet analyzing your company's culture can
help you create a plan to improve it. This 15-question survey has been
developed to serve as a starting point for your analysis.
by Debra Woog McGinty and Nicole C. Moss
Corporate culture is a complex subject. Yet analyzing your company's culture can
help you create a plan to improve it.
This 15-question survey has been developed to serve as a starting point for your
analysis.
Answer each true/false question according to what is true most of the time. And
answer based on how your organization actually acts -- not how you would like it
to be.
True/False Questions
1) I know how my projects contribute to the success or failure of our organization.
2) Management here makes lots of announcements to employees.
3) I have colleagues from a wide variety of professional and personal
backgrounds.
4) In this organization, people who are not ready to be promoted after a certain
length of time at their level are generally encouraged to leave.
5) Departments or teams compete with each other for our organization's
resources.
6) When people are not getting along here, it's a long time before we directly
address the issue.
7) When it's time for me to learn a new skill, training is readily available at no cost
to me.
8) When the boss tells us to "jump!" we ask "how high?"
9) It takes a long time for this organization to address customer concerns.
10) Many employees expect to work at this organization for their whole careers.
11) Senior management says the door is always open -- and they mean it.
12) It is fun to work here.
13) We have three or fewer layers of management.
14) We have performance reviews less than once a year.
15) Compensation and benefits are relatively low here.
Count your "True" responses in each third of the quiz (questions 1- 5, 6-10, 11-
15). The section in which you have answered "True" the most times corresponds
to the culture type your organization most closely matches. If you have the same
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number of "True" responses in more than one section, your culture matches this
combination of types. On the next page, you'll find a list of primary advantages
and potential pitfalls of each one.
For questions 1-5:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
a Deliberative/Traditional culture.
Advantages:
1)  This culture tends to be intellectual and thoughtful.
2)  People in this type of organization often consider issues carefully prior to
making a change.
3)  The organization likely has many formal systems, yet flexibly forms and
reforms teams in accordance with immediate client needs.
4)  Senior management communicates frequently to employees.
Pitfalls:
1)  Although plenty of communication usually flows from the top of this
organizational type, management often does not indicate interest in feedback
from all levels. Beyond making announcements from management, ask for
regular feedback so you don't miss critical information and/or valuable
innovations from your staff.
2)  Be careful that your organization doesn't discuss change for so long that you
miss important opportunities to change for the better.
3)  This cultural type regularly hires groups of new employees, generating a
valuable flow of diverse talent with fresh perspectives.
4)  Be aware of the cultural implications of fostering competition within a
company. Internal competition may create resentment that drives costly turnover.
For questions 6-10:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Established/Stable culture.
Advantages:
1)  This organization has most likely been around for a long time and/or is a
family business. These organizations tend to have solid institutional memories,
so they are likely not to waste resources by repeatedly "reinventing the wheel".
2)  This type of company has processes in place to address most situations.
3)  Organizations of this type tend to cultivate employees by encouraging
development through mentoring programs and/or formal training opportunities.
4)  This culture type is known for compensating its people relatively well.
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Pitfalls:
1) Typically this type of organization struggles to handle conflict well, often
becoming either conflict avoidant or "command and control." If your organization
tends to be conflict avoidant, it may be time to address those problems that are
out of hand, or that have been out of hand in the past.
2)  "Command and control" style leadership may yield feelings of
disconnectedness among employees. Consider assessing employee morale
immediately.
3)  Overall, this culture type tends to be wary of turnover, so take a careful look at
your organization and consider whether it's holding on to people who might best
be let go.
4)  While established systems can be a positive sign of organizational health,
make sure your processes are focused toward addressing customer needs in a
timely matter. If your processes impede rapid resolution of customer problems,
rework them right away.
For questions 11-15:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Urgent/Seat of the Pants culture.
Advantages:
1)  This culture type features a positive work environment, with tight bonds
among employees.
2)  It is likely that an aspect of your organization's mission includes responding to
crisis. People care deeply about the firm's mission and work hard to achieve the
organization's goals.
3)  Employees who frequently hurry to beat the clock can create great results in a
short time, provided that quality is a strong value in your organization.
4)  These organizations tend to have a flat structure that fosters communication
and collaboration among employees and speeds the decision-making process.
Pitfalls:
1)  Caution: minimum rewards (both tangible and intangible) and minimum
feedback are common to this culture type. Rewards and recognition are
important not only to generate loyalty but also to foster collaboration.
2)  The constant rush to get things done quickly can lead to burnout and increase
the ever-present danger of losing talent.
3)  Although this type of culture generally features frequent upward
communication and grassroots change, top-down communication tends to be
inadequate. Beyond staying accessible, take time to share important messages
and expectations with your entire staff to keep them motivated and moving in the
right direction.
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4)  Making decisions under intense time pressure may lead to a reduction in the
quality of your products or services.
Is your culture type consistent with your expectations? If so, you probably have a
good handle on how your company behaves, its primary cultural drivers, and how
to make improvements where necessary.
Is your type different from what you thought it would be? If so, you might have an
unrealistic perception of your company's character and values. Take a closer
look at your answers above, and use the questions themselves as a guide to
shifting your organization's behaviors toward becoming the type of culture you
would like to see.
About the authors:
Debra Woog McGinty, principal of connect2 Corporation, coaches leaders to be
expert managers. She welcomes your comments at inc@connecttwo.com.
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172
Appendix D: Data Assessment Measures
Count your "True" responses in each section of the survey (questions 2-13, 14-
19, 20-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-43). The section in which you have answered "True"
the most times corresponds to the culture type your organization most closely
matches. If you have the same percentage of "True" responses in more than one
section, your culture matches this combination of types.
For questions 2-13:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Integrity/Humanistic culture.
Advantages:
  This culture tends to be an honest entity.
1)  People in this type of organization consider integrity to be at the top of the list.
2)  The organization likely encourages a nurturing environment.
3)  Upper-level management communicates clearly and frequently to employees.
Pitfalls:
1)  Although honesty is an excellent policy, too much information can be
damaging.
2)  People in this type of organization are loyal to what is right, not to the
organization.
3)  Be aware of the cultural implications of fostering a God-like environment that
may bring religion into play when making work-related decisions.
For questions 14-19:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Efficiency/Quality Oriented culture.
Advantages:
1)  This culture tends to be quality oriented.
2)  People in this type of organization tend be hard workers.
3)  The organization likely has many informal systems that allows the employee
to do what he/she needs to do to get the job done.
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4)  Upper-level management communicates priorities frequently to employees.
Pitfalls:
1)  Although quality should be at the top of the list, if the organization moves
efficiency to the bottom of the list, negative return on investment will occur.
2)  Be careful that your organization’s informal systems may be used against the
organization in lieu of an error.
3)  Be aware that communication should flow in both directions.  It is important to
listen to your employees.  A hire turnover can exist if employees are not listened
to.
4)  Be aware that communication should flow in both directions.  It is important to
listen to your employees.  A hire turnover can exist if employees are not listened
to.
For questions 20-25:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Innovative culture.
Advantages:
1)  This culture tends to be innovative.
2)  People in this type of organization often view issues as creative challenges.
3)  The organization likely has many formal systems that allows the employee to
feel empowered and to communicate ideas.
4)  This cultural type regularly hires new employees that are thinkers and doers.
5)  Upper-level management communicates frequently to employees.
6) Employees communicate frequently to upper-level management.
Pitfalls:
1)  Although innovation is good, too many thinkers may begin to compete with
each other and lose track of what is important.
2)  Be careful that your organization doesn't discuss change for so long that you
miss important opportunities to change for the better.
3)  Be aware of the cultural implications of fostering competition within a
company. Internal competition may create resentment that drives costly turnover.
For questions 26-30:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
a Deliberative/Traditional culture.
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Advantages:
1)  This culture tends to be intellectual and thoughtful.
2)  People in this type of organization often consider issues carefully prior to
making a change.
3)  The organization likely has many formal systems, yet flexibly forms and
reforms teams in accordance with immediate client needs.
4)  This cultural type regularly hires groups of new employees, generating a
valuable flow of diverse talent with fresh perspectives.
5)  Senior management communicates frequently to employees.
Pitfalls:
1)  Although plenty of communication usually flows from the top of this
organizational type, management often does not indicate interest in feedback
from all levels. Beyond making announcements from management, ask for
regular feedback so you don't miss critical information and/or valuable
innovations from your staff.
2)  Be careful that your organization doesn't discuss change for so long that you
miss important opportunities to change for the better.
3)  Be aware of the cultural implications of fostering competition within a
company. Internal competition may create resentment that drives costly turnover.
For questions 31-35:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Established/Stable culture.
Advantages:
1)  This organization has most likely been around for a long time and/or is a
family business. These organizations tend to have solid institutional memories,
so they are likely not to waste resources by repeatedly "reinventing the wheel".
2)  This type of company has processes in place to address most situations.
3)  Organizations of this type tend to cultivate employees by encouraging
development through mentoring programs and/or formal training opportunities.
4)  This culture type is known for compensating its people relatively well.
Pitfalls:
1)  Typically this type of organization struggles to handle conflict well, often
becoming either conflict avoidant or "command and control." If your organization
tends to be conflict avoidant, it may be time to address those problems that are
out of hand, or that have been out of hand in the past.
2)  "Command and control" style leadership may yield feelings of
disconnectedness among employees. Consider assessing employee morale
immediately.
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3)  Overall, this culture type tends to be wary of turnover, so take a careful look at
your organization and consider whether it's holding on to people who might best
be let go.
4)  While established systems can be a positive sign of organizational health,
make sure your processes are focused toward addressing customer needs in a
timely matter. If your processes impede rapid resolution of customer problems,
rework them right away.
For questions 36-43:
If you had the most "True" responses in this set of questions, your company has
an Urgent/Seat of the Pants culture.
Advantages:
1)  This culture type features a positive work environment, with tight bonds
among employees.
2)  It is likely that an aspect of your organization's mission includes responding to
crisis. People care deeply about the firm's mission and work hard to achieve the
organization's goals.
3)  Employees who frequently hurry to beat the clock can create great results in a
short time, provided that quality is a strong value in your organization.
4)  These organizations tend to have a flat structure that fosters communication
and collaboration among employees and speeds the decision-making process.
Pitfalls:
1)  Caution: minimum rewards (both tangible and intangible) and minimum
feedback are common to this culture type. Rewards and recognition are
important not only to generate loyalty but also to foster collaboration.
2)  The constant rush to get things done quickly can lead to burnout and increase
the ever-present danger of losing talent.
3)  Although this type of culture generally features frequent upward
communication and grassroots change, top-down communication tends to be
inadequate. Beyond staying accessible, take time to share important messages
and expectations with your entire staff to keep them motivated and moving in the
right direction.
4)  Making decisions under intense time pressure may lead to a reduction in the
quality of your products or services.
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Appendix E: Final Revision of Survey
Building A Non-Punitive Culture in Pharmacy for Medical Error Reporting
Questionnaire
Fill In 1 Answer for Each Question (1 of 3)
1. If I made a medical error, I would report it
O Immediately
O Only if someone saw me or knew that it could have only been me
O Only if it were a minor error (no patient harm)
O Only if it were a major error (serious harm to patient)
O Never
2. I would only feel comfortable reporting a medical error if I knew that there
would not be any repercussions against me.
O true O false
3. I have personally reported a medical error.
O true O false
4. If Question 3 applies, I would report it again.
O true O false
5. If Question 3 applies, the medical error I reported was associated with this
organization.
O true O false
6.  The environment/section that I work in supports full disclosure of medical
errors.
O true O false
7.  I believe that this organization as a whole supports full disclosure of
medical errors.
O true O false
8.  Patients should be made aware that a medical error has occurred.
O true O false
9. Reporting medical errors to a federal agency would allow other clinicians
to develop safety precautions in their system of work
O true O false
Please Provide the Last 5
Digits of Home Phone
_____________
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10.  Reporting medical errors reduces the number of medical errors overall.
O true O false
11.  I have heard of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).
O true O false
12. If Question 11 applies, I have a positive impression of the NPDB.
O true O false
13.A non-punitive culture will actually increase reporting of medical errors.
O true O false
Building A Non-Punitive Culture for Medical Error Reporting
Questionnaire
Fill In 1 Answer for Each Question (2 of 3)
14.  My supervisor is most interest in getting the job done as fast as I can.
O true O false
15.  My supervisor is most interested in quality care for the patients.
O true O false
16. I am most interested in getting the job done as fast as I can.
O true O false
17. I am most interested in quality care for the patients.
O true O false
18. The safety protocols that I have to follow slow down my job.
O true O false
19. The safety protocols that I follow add more efficiency to my job.
O true O false
20.  My supervisor encourages new ideas about increasing patient safety.
O true O false
21.  I have ideas that could increase patient safety.
O true O false
22.  I feel comfortable reporting a medical error to my supervisor.
O true O false
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23. I would be embarrassed if my colleagues found out that I made a medical
error.
O true O false
24. It is people who make medical errors not the system.
O true O false
25. It is the system that fails that allows medical errors to occur.
O true O false
26. I understand how my duties contribute to the success or failure of our
organization.
O true O false
27. Management effectively communicates in a way that meets the need of
the staff.
O true O false
28. I have colleagues from a wide variety of professional and personal
backgrounds.©
O true O false
Building A Non-Punitive Culture for Medical Error Reporting
Questionnaire
Fill In 1 Answer for Each Question (3 of 3)
29. Opportunity for advancement is based on performance rather than length
of employment.
O true O false
30. Departments or teams compete with each other for our organization’s
resources.©
O true O false
31. When people are not getting along here, my supervisor addresses the
issue in a timely manner.
O true O false
32. It is important for individuals to work out their differences before going to
the supervisor.
O true O false
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33. When it is time for me to learn a new skill, training is readily available at
no cost to me.©
 O true O false
34. Customer concerns are addressed in a timely manner.
O true O false
35. Many employees expect to work at this organization for their whole
careers.©
O true O false
36. When I have a problem and my supervisor can’t solve it, Chief/Assistant
Chief say the door is always open – and they mean it.
O true O false
37. It is fun to work here.©
O true O false
38. My job meets my professional expectations.
O true O false
39. We have too many layers of management.
O true O false
40.  The Service needs more supervision.
O true O false
41. Performance reviews are comprehensive and adequately access my
performance.
O true O false
42.  Salary and benefits are relatively low here compared to others in my
profession.
O true O false
43. Salary is more important to me than professional growth.
O true O false
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Appendix F: Non-Punitive Culture Information
The Institute for Safe Medication Practices defines a non-punitive
environment as a confidential reporting system where everyone understands that
errors will not be linked to an individual’s performance.  Furthermore, in a non-
punitive reporting system no criminal action and no disciplinary measures will be
undertaken against the reporter on the basis of information contained in
submitted reports. The intent of a non-punitive culture for medication error
reporting is to encourage staff to report medication errors whether it is a near
miss or death.  In a non-punitive environment, medication errors are classified as
system-based errors.  These system-based errors can be defined as a flaw in the
system of medicine, i.e. reading the wrong prescription on a script, administering
the wrong medication because the bottles looked alike or the names sound alike,
dispensing medication to the wrong patient, etc.  System-based errors exist in all
healthcare facilities.
In the proposed non-punitive culture, system-based medication errors are
reported and the reporter has the option of either complete anonymity (does not
identify the facility nor the staff member(s) involved) or disclosure of his/her
identity which would not be available outside of the facility.  The purpose of
disclosure would be to derive facts in the investigation process for further
clarification.  What is of utmost importance is how the error occurred and what
measures need to be instituted to eliminate the system-based error from
repeated occurrence.  It is important that system-based errors be reported as
they occur in order to prevent future harm to patients.
181
Appendix F: (Continued)
Imagine a culture where you were not reprimanded for coming forth with
an error that involved you.  Imagine a culture where you could offer suggestions
as to how to get a task done that would eliminate any possible harm to the
patient.  Imagine a culture where management listens to your problems and
respect your proposed solutions.  Imagine a culture where pharmacists from
across the world could share system-based error information with one another
and remain anonymous.  Imagine a system that provided timely feedback to
show how the reported errors saved lives.  Imagine a system where there would
be no more blame and shame but, honor and praise.  Imagine a system where
patients were informed in a timely manner (less than 24 hours) of a medication
error and management and the facility director supported you 100 percent.  Just
imagine a culture of unstressed truth.
There is such a culture that exists, the non-punitive culture.  It can be
yours. A non-punitive culture offers a nurturing environment that is open to
innovation, creativity, and change because fear of failing is not a limiting factor
(http://www.mers-tm.net/training).
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Appendix G: National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) Information
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 authorized the
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a National Practitioner
Databank to collect and release certain information relating to inept, incompetent
or unprofessional physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health care
practitioners.
The intent is to improve the quality of health care by encouraging State
licensing boards, hospitals and other health care entities, and professional
societies to identify and discipline those who engage in unprofessional behavior;
and to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians, dentists, and other health
care practitioners to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of
previous medical malpractice payment and adverse action history. Adverse
actions can involve licensure, clinical privileges, professional society
membership, and exclusions from Medicare and Medicaid.
The NPDB is primarily an alert or flagging system intended to facilitate a
comprehensive review of health care practitioners' professional credentials. The
information contained in the NPDB is intended to direct discrete inquiry into, and
scrutiny of, specific areas of a practitioner's licensure, professional society
memberships, medical malpractice payment history, and record of clinical
privileges. The information contained in the NPDB should be considered together
with other relevant data in evaluating a practitioner's credentials; it is intended to
augment, not replace, traditional forms of credentials review.
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Access to Information
Access to information in the NPDB is available to entities that meet the
eligibility requirements as defined in the provisions of the NPDB regulations.  In
order to access information, entities must first register with the Data Bank.
NPDB information is not available to the general public.  However,
information in a form that does not identify any particular entity or practitioner is
available.
Confidentiality
Information reported to the NPDB is considered confidential and shall not
be disclosed except as specified in the NPDB regulations. The Privacy Act of
1974, protects the contents of Federal systems of records such as those
contained in the NPDB from disclosure, unless the disclosure is for a routine use
of the system of records as published annually in the Federal Register. The
published routine uses of NPDB information do not allow for disclosure of
information to the general public.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Health and Human Services
(HHS), has the authority to impose civil money penalties on those who violate the
confidentiality provisions of Title IV. Persons, organizations, or entities that
receive information either directly or indirectly are subject to the confidentiality
provisions and the imposition of a civil money penalty of up to $11,000 for each
offense if they violate those provisions.
For additional information log onto www.npdb-hipdb.com
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Appendix H: Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Table A.2 Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Scale Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F P
Sphericity Assumed 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Greenhouse-Geisser 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Huynh-Feldt 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
time
Lower-bound 0 1 0 0.049 0.827
Sphericity Assumed 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Huynh-Feldt 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Scale 1
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.016 1 0.016 3.155 0.084
Sphericity Assumed
0.004 1 0.004 0.283 0.598
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.004 1 0.004 0.283 0.598
Huynh-Feldt 0.004 1 0.004 0.283 0.598
time
Lower-bound 0.004 1 0.004 0.283 0.598
Sphericity Assumed 0.001 1 0.001 0.048 0.828
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.001 1 0.001 0.048 0.828
Huynh-Feldt 0.001 1 0.001 0.048 0.828
Scale 2
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.001 1 0.001 0.048 0.828
Sphericity Assumed
0.053 1 0.053 3.093 0.086
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.053 1 0.053 3.093 0.086
Huynh-Feldt 0.053 1 0.053 3.093 0.086
time
Lower-bound 0.053 1 0.053 3.093 0.086
Sphericity Assumed 0.047 1 0.047 2.71 0.108
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.047 1 0.047 2.71 0.108
Huynh-Feldt 0.047 1 0.047 2.71 0.108
Scale 3
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.047 1 0.047 2.71 0.108
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Scale Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F P
Sphericity Assumed 0 1 0 0.013 0.91
Greenhouse-Geisser 0 1 0 0.013 0.91
Huynh-Feldt 0 1 0 0.013 0.91
time
Lower-bound 0 1 0 0.013 0.91
Sphericity Assumed 0.018 1 0.018 0.677 0.416
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.018 1 0.018 0.677 0.416
Huynh-Feldt 0.018 1 0.018 0.677 0.416
Scale 4
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.018 1 0.018 0.677 0.416
Sphericity Assumed 0.01 1 0.01 0.456 0.503
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.01 1 0.01 0.456 0.503
Huynh-Feldt 0.01 1 0.01 0.456 0.503
time
Lower-bound 0.01 1 0.01 0.456 0.503
Sphericity Assumed 0.001 1 0.001 0.066 0.798
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.001 1 0.001 0.066 0.798
Huynh-Feldt 0.001 1 0.001 0.066 0.798
Scale 5
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.001 1 0.001 0.066 0.798
Sphericity Assumed 0.019 1 0.019 1.159 0.288
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.019 1 0.019 1.159 0.288
Huynh-Feldt 0.019 1 0.019 1.159 0.288
time
Lower-bound 0.019 1 0.019 1.159 0.288
Sphericity Assumed 0.008 1 0.008 0.497 0.485
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.008 1 0.008 0.497 0.485
Huynh-Feldt 0.008 1 0.008 0.497 0.485
Scale 6
Time * Group
Lower-bound 0.008 1 0.008 0.497 0.485
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